

MARCH

COMMENTARY

Radio: Political Threat or Promise?

NORBERT MUHLEN

Intelligence and Evil in Human History

SIDNEY HOOK

Did Truman Scuttle Liberalism?

JAMES WECHSLER

The Inspector—A Story

JEAN MALAQUAIS

The Problem of Synagogue Architecture

RACHEL WISCHNITZER-
BERNSTEIN

I Know on a Night Overcast—A Poem

HAYIM NAHMAN BIALIK

Behind Palestine's Arab "Armies"

J. L. TELLER

Jewish Culture for America?—

A Golden Age?

MOSES LASKY

Against Separatist Culture

HERBERT B. EHLMANN

The Seventh Commandment

DAVID SCHEINERT

From the American Scene—

The Logic of My Aunt Yetta

ETHEL ROSENBERG

Cedars of Lebanon—

My Return to Hamburg

SOLOMON MAIMON

The Study of Man—

Is There a Bigot Personality?

JEROME HIMELHOCH

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Diana Trilling

Harold Rosenberg

William Petersen

Harold Kaplan

Alvin Johnson

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

LETTERS FROM READERS

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

40c

MONEY ISN'T EVERYTHING—

(OR IS IT?)



BY GROUCHO MARX

WHAT do you want to save up a lot of money for? You'll never need the stuff.

Why, just think of all the wonderful, wonderful things you can do *without* money. Things like—well, things like—

On second thought, you'd better keep on saving, chum. Otherwise you're licked.

For instance, how are you ever going to build



that Little Dream House, without a trunk full of moolah? You think the carpenters are going to work free? Or the plumbers? Or the architects? Not those lads. They've been around. They're no dopes.

And how are you going to send that kid of yours to college, without the folding stuff?

Maybe you think he can work his way through by playing the flute.

If so, you're crazy. (Only three students have ever worked their way through college by playing the flute. And they had to stop eating for four years.)

And how are you going to do that world-traveling you've always wanted to do? Maybe you think you can stoke your way across, or scrub decks. Well, that's no good. I've tried it. It interferes with shipboard romances.

So—all seriousness aside—you'd better keep on saving, pal.

Obviously the best way is by continuing to buy U. S. Savings Bonds—through the Payroll Plan.



They're safe and sound. Old Uncle Sam *personally* guarantees your investment. And he never fobbed off a bum I.O.U. on *anybody*.

You get four bucks back for every three you put in. And that ain't hay, alfalfa, or any other field-grown product.



Millions of Americans—smart cookies all—have found the Payroll Plan the easiest and best way to save.

So stick with the Payroll Plan, son—and you can't lose.

SAVE THE EASY WAY... BUY YOUR BONDS THROUGH PAYROLL SAVINGS

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INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

MARCH 1947 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 3

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Letters from Readers

Books in Review

Gentleman's Agreement, by Laura Z. Hobson

In Time and Eternity: A Jewish Reader,
edited by Nahum N. Glatzer

The Plotters, by John Roy Carlson

The Spirit Returneth, by Selma Stern

The Palestine Year Book

Norbert Muhlen 201

Sidney Hook 210

James Wechsler 222

Jean Malaquais 228

Rachel Wischnitzer-
Bernstein 233

Hayim Nahman Bialik 242

J. L. Teller 243

Moses Lasky 250

Herbert B. Ehrmann 253

David Scheinert 256

Sidney Hertzberg 259

Ethel Rosenberg 270

Solomon Maimon 273

Jerome Himelhoch 277

285

Diana Trilling 290

Harold Rosenberg 292

William Petersen 294

Harold Kaplan 297

Alvin Johnson 298

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Why Jews and Judaism in the World?

Leo S. Baeck

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Malcolm Ross

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Jacob Glatstein

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David Bazelon

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Heinz Politzer

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Unesco's Beginnings

Stephen Spender

The English poet reports on his hopes and his fears for the new world organization, based on his experiences with the inaugural session.

My Father's Double Life

Henry Steig

Portrait of a man with two strings to his bow—he was a housepainter; he was a *feuilleton* writer for the *Forward*. He became a boss (with a difference; he remained a good Socialist (with a difference). What is not possible in this golden land! In our "From the American Scene" department.

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Jean Malaquais

An ode to the destroyed cities of Europe from Guernica to Hamburg by one of a generation who strove and suffered in them in the catastrophic decade just ending.

COMMENTARY

INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

RADIO: POLITICAL THREAT OR PROMISE?

The Networks' Influence on the Public Mind

NORBERT MUHLEN

"GIVE me two weeks and the proper machinery and I will change the so-called mind of the American people on any given subject." George Creel made this boast when he was chairman of the Committee on Public Information under Woodrow Wilson. That was before radio broadcasting. With radio's development, the propagandist has his perfect "machinery"—the magic key to transform American opinion, for good or evil.

IS RADIO propaganda the great potential menace—or, if used properly, the great popular cure-all? NORBERT MUHLEN, who here offers an answer to this question, has had broad experience in political psychology and the study of public opinion, and was for two years editor of the *Radio Audience*, a publication devoted to the study of public reaction to radio. Dr. Muhlen was born in Bavaria in 1910 and earned his doctorate at the University of Munich. An active anti-Nazi, he was forced to leave Germany as soon as the Nazis came to power. He lived subsequently in Switzerland and then in France, where he was interned at the beginning of the war as an enemy alien; he escaped during the Nazi occupation, and made his way to this country in 1940. Dr. Muhlen's recent writings on radio and other subjects have been published in *Common Sense*, the *New Leader*, *Forum*, and various other periodicals. He has written a number of books, including *Schacht*, *Hitler's Magician* (1939) and *Starving Them to Death* (London, 1939).

Today, radio holds virtually limitless powers over the mind of the masses—so most people believe. Political parties spend more and more money to conduct their campaigns over the air. Demagogues see in the microphone a magical amulet requiring only the right formula in order to break down all barriers on the road to power. Promoters of tolerance, democracy, religion, good causes of all sorts, dream of great radio campaigns that will change the minds of men overnight and bring the whole world into some particular path of progress and righteousness.

Many facts seem to justify this faith.

Radio is monopolistic by nature. Since there is only a limited number of wavelengths that can be used for broadcasting, radio does not permit the free competition of ideas that is at least possible in every other medium of communication.

The overwhelming majority of the nation seems to be exposed almost continually to the influence of radio broadcasts. In 1946, 95 per cent of the urban families, over 85 per cent of the village families, and over 75 per cent of the farm families in the United States owned at least one radio set, and more time was spent in listening to the radio than in any other occupation except work and sleep. Each weekday, the average American

woman spent 5.9 hours, and the average American man 3.6 hours, listening to the radio.

In 1936, Roosevelt was re-elected to the presidency in spite of the opposition of almost all the newspapers. This was widely interpreted to mean that pro-Roosevelt radio oratory had defeated the anti-Roosevelt press.

In 1938, Orson Welles produced a radio dramatization of a fantastic novel by H. G. Wells, *War of the Worlds*. Of more than five million people listening, about one-fourth mistook the play for a series of news bulletins reporting something in the nature of an invasion from Mars. A panic ensued.

During the war, many radio entertainers "plugged" the sale of war bonds with all the high pressure usually applied to the sale of mouthwash and cigarettes. War-bond purchases went up.

From such facts, it has been assumed, rather uncritically, that radio can elect presidents, plunge the nation into hysteria, sell dictators, sell democracy, sell tolerance, sell race hatred—in short, that radio is the great new machine to shape the mind and change the ways of modern mass society.

HOWEVER, looking at the record, radio has so far proven itself strangely resistant to such use of its presumed power. It has consistently shied away from any effort to effect revolutionary changes in the mind of its audience. This is especially true in that department of broadcasting where the possibility of making an impression on the social and political ideas of the audience is most direct: news broadcasting, news comment, political discussions. Radio shuns propaganda and fears taking sides on the controversial like a plague.

This is reflected in the public's estimate of radio, as compared with the public's estimate of the press, for example. Just before the war started in Europe, Elmo Roper's *Fortune* survey investigated public opinion about the trustworthiness of the various mass media. Fifty per cent of the cross section expressed the belief that "radio gives you news freer from prejudice," while only 17 per cent thought the same of the press. After the

war, the late Harry Field's National Opinion Research Center at the University of Denver asked a representative sample of the public about their judgment of the performance of various national institutions. Eighty-two per cent thought radio's performance was excellent or good, while only 76 per cent thought this of their churches, only 68 per cent of their newspapers, 62 per cent of their schools, and 45 per cent of their local governments. Given a choice between the movies and the radio, 84 per cent would give up the movies and only 11 per cent the radio. With the same choice between the newspaper and the radio, 62 per cent would give up the newspaper, but only 11 per cent the radio. One of the main causes of this popular preference was the impression that radio was "fairer" than other media. This "fairness" apparently consisted in presentations that did not evoke the average listener's protest, or, in other words, that complied with his opinions and attitudes.

In the same survey, people were asked whether they had any criticisms of radio. Of the 64 per cent who felt critical, only 8 per cent disagreed with the contents of talks or news programs, and 6 per cent disagreed with the political viewpoints, while 30 per cent objected to different aspects of radio advertising, and 28 per cent disliked various features of entertainment programs.

RADIO's "fairness" rests on the very character of the medium and is enforced by American institutional safeguards.

A newspaper may express unorthodox or extremist or sectional views and still do good business; members of the sectional group, readers agreeing with unorthodox views, people who enjoy extremist attacks, will buy it. And the mass circulation attracts the advertisers as a vehicle for their sales appeals. In radio, however, the monopoloid limitation of the kilocycles has served to create just that two-sided fairness which it seemed to threaten. The advertiser pays the bill—directly or indirectly—for every program on the air; "his" program has to be listened to by all the potential consumers of his cigars

or headache pills, and these potential consumers are to be found in every section of the broad population, in the right wing as well as the left wing, among friends and foes of labor, Russia, or Mr. Truman. Therefore the presentation must go the middle way, appealing to all, or at least offending none.

Radio, American salesman par excellence, follows in the steps of the old-fashioned drummer, who entertained the buyers and left their minds and souls strictly alone. The customers be pleased!

In this, radio reflects the trend of all modern mass media to shun deviations from the *juste milieu* in the interest of the giant investments they represent. Like the movie industry, radio tends toward conservatism as a financial safeguard. In the last ten years especially, radio has kept its non-aggression pact with almost everybody.

Today, most station owners agree with most advertisers that they had better not try to propagandize the listener. Marshall Field III, asked whether he thought his newspapers or his four radio stations better fitted for the expression of his political views, replied: "I do not feel that radio offers any medium for the expression of my political views at all." And William S. Paley, board chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System, said in 1946: "It is one of the great strengths of our kind of broadcasting that the advertiser's desire to sell his product to the largest cross section of the public coincides with our obligation to serve the largest cross section of our audience."

The advertisers concur. A spokesman for America's largest advertising spender stated in a trade discussion: "Proctor and Gamble has a policy never to offend a single listener." The late George Washington Hill, President of the American Tobacco Company, said: "The last thing I could afford to do is offend the public." (The fact that Mr. Hill invented a type of radio commercial that irritates many listeners is not the point. "The Hit Parade" may be infuriating to sophisticates, but that has nothing to do with politics.)

American radio, being based on the mass-marketing point of view, has shown it can go far in slanting news, repeating misinformation, and spreading propaganda—but only when the public is united on one vast majority attitude, as against the enemy in time of war. But in topical controversies of domestic or foreign politics, most information, comment, and discussion on the air has been considerably more reluctant and less partisan than discussion in the press.

IN ADDITION to the limitations that broadcasters place on themselves for commercial reasons, there are the legal safeguards of the public interest introduced by the Communications Act of 1934. The Federal Communications Commission, licensing those broadcasters who work in the "public convenience, necessity, and interest," acts as a policeman of the air waves. The broadcasters, on their side, see to it that the policeman remains on his beat and does not assume program censorship, political interference, or other powers above his limited community service. Although the constant bickering between the two groups suggests a marriage of nervous and suspicious extroverts, the marriage does work out, on the whole, to the benefit of the listening public, which is protected from abuse by private monopolists as well as from abuse by political control.

With agreement on the necessity of keeping radio free of one-sided propaganda, there is still the question of how this can be done. Radio can aim at complete neutrality and dodge "opinionated" broadcasting altogether—as was attempted when the Columbia Broadcasting system in 1943 abolished news commentators, substituting supposedly objective "analysts"; or it can try to balance different views by giving time on the air to representatives of all sides in a controversy, as other networks have done. The second way seems more democratic, since it excludes the danger of station or network censors being the arbiters of what is "opinionated." It also seems more practicable, since completely "unopinionated"

presentations of current events are probably impossible. It is necessarily a small step from editorial judgment to bias and prejudice in the selection of the few news items presented on a program. And even the inflection of a commentator's voice may transmit hidden emotions or meanings that are not apparent in his written script. A Washington news commentator, for instance, a keen defender of free enterprise and an enemy of government regulations, once read a long list of OPA representatives, pronouncing Jewish-sounding names so provocatively as to turn his "objective" report into a *sub rosa* editorial.

WE CAN NOW explain the surprising fact that 94 per cent of American radio listeners do not feel critical of the political viewpoints expressed on the radio—a consensus that far surpasses public-opinion majorities on controversial issues. First, radio has apparently succeeded in "balancing" views to such a degree that most people can usually find a spokesman of their own favorite opinions to listen to. Second, the voices of extremists, to which people would object even if they didn't listen to them, have become so rare and so subdued that people can neglect them in their over-all evaluation of radio. In this, radio in 1946 has advanced greatly over 1936 or 1940, when Father Coughlin, Boake Carter, and Ford's Mr. Cameron were impressive radio features. The important spokesmen of extremism and prejudice are no longer on the national air waves.

Today, there remains only the voice of Upton Close (a pseudonym for Joseph Washington Hall) articulating the propaganda of the extreme Right, while a few commentators of the extreme Left are heard only over local independent stations.* Upton Close, who was dropped twice by networks and has been more off the air than on it in recent years, at present delivers a weekly

* After this was written, Upton Close, as well as several "leftist" commentators, went off the air. This proved and strengthened radio's present trend toward middle-of-the-road neutrality.

comment over stations of the Mutual Network, sponsored by Mervin K. Hart's National Economic Council, a political-economic pressure group. With his commercial sponsors, Close has also lost the big audiences he had during the first war years, when his bitter denunciations of the war in Europe, the Roosevelt administration, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and anti-isolationism seemed to express the pent-up feelings of a sizable group of listeners. In his present broadcasts, he still holds the same ideological line, although he seems to have dropped—on the radio, at least—his previous efforts to play upon racial and sectarian prejudices. In 1945, he offered a thousand-dollar War Bond "to any person who will produce anything I have ever written or said in public that is anti-Jewish."

Father Charles Edward Coughlin, the radio priest of the 30's, whose audiences and influence were incomparably greater than Close's, denied that he was anti-Jewish. After a radio sermon that aroused special opposition, John Shephard III, speaking for the New England Colonial Network, stated: "We cannot agree with the comment that his broadcast is anti-Semitic, or that it is designed to spread religious or racial hatred, and if we did so feel, the broadcasts would be discontinued." However, as the magazine *Broadcasting* stated and many listeners agreed, "the tenor and context of his remarks were interpreted in many quarters as definitely anti-Semitic."

In his first ten broadcasting years, he "espoused the cause of the underdog," and attacked "big business and banks" in a way that was nearer to the official speeches of the first New Deal than to those of the Third Reich. The broadcast that brought him the highest response—allegedly over 1,000,000 letters—was entitled: "Hoover Prosperity Means a New War." Another

* It should be noted that Coughlin had no commercial sponsor. His broadcasts were paid for by the Radio League of the Little Flower, an organization of listeners formed solely for the purpose of paying these costs. This type of "listener's co-operative" offers one way of circumventing the control of advertisers.

one, drawing 600,000 letters, attacked the "four horsemen of the apocalypse: Morgan, Mellon, Mills, and Meyer." These broadcasts reflected the social climate of the period that produced two Roosevelt landslides under similar slogans.

After Coughlin's new turn to hate-mongering had become generally known, discussed, and protested against, his advertising agency tried to renew his station contracts in the fall of 1939 with the promise that he would "not attack any race or creed, but will keep the patriotic tenor of trying to keep America out of war." The Code Committee of the National Association of Broadcasters, however, ruled that neutrality was a controversial matter, and hence acceptable only as a sustaining program. In fact, this meant the death sentence for Father Coughlin's radio career.

THE watchdogs of radio learned that there could be as much propaganda in a seemingly religious broadcast as in openly political ones. Another political hate crusader in religious robes, Dr. J. A. Lovell, an evangelist of the strange Anglo-Israel sect, preached sermons and prophecies amounting to anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish propaganda. He broadcast for six years on a local Los Angeles station, and occasionally in thirty-six other states, being financed by the contributions of the allegedly more than 200,000 members of the sect. In October 1945, his radio contracts were cancelled.

Robert Harold Scott of Palo Alto, California, who calls himself a "self-converted atheist," won in 1946, after a five-year fight with the Federal Communications Commission, the right to obtain radio time to broadcast his disbelief in God. Station KQW in San Jose, California, accepted the atheist "to determine whether there is sufficient interest in atheism in this area to justify time devoted to future broadcasts on the subject." In selecting programs, the FCC pointed out in its decision, a station must consider the interest of the people in its area as well as the qualifications of the speaker. "Every idea," FCC stated, "does

not rise to the dignity of a public controversy, and every organization, regardless of membership or the seriousness of its purposes, is not per se entitled to time on the air."

In fact, probably the only time in the last year when racial and religious intolerance went out openly over a national network was when Drew Pearson, accepting a challenge from the Georgia Ku Klux Klan, delivered a speech from the steps of the State Capitol at Atlanta which was broadcast by the American Broadcasting Company. But the support of intolerance in this case came from the audience, not the speaker. When Pearson praised racial tolerance and minority rights, people in the audience booed repeatedly and impressively; their demonstration was transmitted to a nationwide audience. When Senator Theodore G. Bilbo was interviewed by the press over the air, he was asked "not to refer to any race, group, or individual in any derogatory form"; probably for the first time in his life, he called the minority race of the South "Negroes." Harold Laski made references to the Catholic Church and the Vatican which were carried by the New York station of the American Broadcasting Company, and which a spokesman for the National Council of Catholic Men called "an insult to millions of God-fearing Americans." The organization was granted time on the air for a reply.

The prohibition of name-calling and invective over the air, and the obligation to give time to opposite views or replies, contribute much to making radio "fairer" than other media. A comparison of the total output of the leading newspaper columnists of the last seven years with that of the leading radio commentators of the same period is likely to confirm the point made earlier: that there was more partisan slant and prejudice—as well as more fresh, unconventional opinion—offered in the press than over the air.

As a matter of fact, educational and opinion-molding programs form only a small part of radio fare. While most Americans

of all strata list news programs as their radio favorites, the time devoted to entertainment programs, and their audience, is considerably greater. Altogether, these dramatic, variety, and comedy programs contain little that could shape political opinions and group relations—at least directly.

Most radio comedians depend for their effects on the use of "gags" or on making themselves into more or less generalized comic personalities, and they tend to make little use of group stereotypes, though there are frequent offenses against this rule in the case of Negroes—until a short while ago, the Negro market was neglected by most advertisers. To be sure, in the tradition of American humor, dialect, mispronunciation, and misspelling are frequent comic devices. Mrs. Pansy Nussbaum, the most popular Jewish character on the air, draws her main appeal from linguistic peculiarities, just as do the other inhabitants of "Allen's Alley"—Senator Claghorn from the South, Ajax Cassidy the Irishman, and Titus Moody the New England farmer. The American-Jewish names that make Mrs. Nussbaum's social circle so appealing—Papa Pinkus the Pickle King, or Jasper Rappaport, or Mrs. Nussbaum's own husband Pierre, a delicatessen clerk—belong to modern American folklore. The fact is that few Jewish parts and players, though some of them stress Jewish idiosyncrasies and alleged group characteristics a little more than Mrs. Nussbaum does, present markedly unfavorable stereotypes. Incidentally, an analysis of audience surveys shows that radio's Jewish funny-men have their most loyal listeners among Jews.

Most dramas and continuity stories also tend to shy away from the presentation of social and group questions. But since they have been frequently criticized for this lack of "social significance"—mainly by highly educated non-listeners—there is a tendency on some programs to present tolerance propaganda. The very popular nighttime drama, "Mr. District Attorney," is now crusading for equal rights to all Americans, and "Superman," the juvenile favorite, is now fighting prejudice and group hatred in-

stead of merely apolitical villainousness. Certain special dramatizations are offered as "public services," such as "New World A'Coming" over WMCA (New York), the transcribed "Lest We Forget," "Bright Tomorrow" over WINX (Washington, D. C.), and various dramatizations of the ills of intolerance over WSB (Atlanta, Georgia). These programs are more concentrated, aggressive, and group-conscious than successful soap operas like "The Goldbergs" and "Abie's Irish Rose," which in rose-colored pictures show the listening housewife that some individuals of different group backgrounds can live together and love each other.

The war-born idea that entertainment shows of general appeal might well be used to present a social message has not quite been discarded; crusading speeches for tolerance and group understanding have been packaged into such popular programs as the Kate Smith show, the Frank Sinatra show, and the "Teentimers' Show." Even the gallant Count of Monte Cristo, hero of a weekly nighttime drama, still as dashing on the air as he was a century ago in France, now fights against anti-American hate groups and agitators.

While no scientific, objective analysis of the contents of radio programs has yet been made, the over-all impression is that most radio programs of all types aim at neutrality and balanced presentation, with little deviations to the extremes, a decreasing number of intolerant voices, and an increasing volume of tolerance propaganda.

A DECISIVE question is how the audience reacts to its radio.

Quite obviously, a broadcast can have no effect if it is not listened to. Unless Nazi and Soviet methods prevail, unless listening is compulsory and refusal to listen is treason, the audience retains its freedom to select programs or not to listen at all. The threat of the radio dial hangs continuously over every program, and the threat materializes very often indeed. Many American farmers consider it a moral obligation to

tune out unpalatable doctrines, as Dr. Paul F. Lazarsfeld has reported; the same attitude is taken by New Yorkers.

But it is not necessary even to turn the dial; one has only to turn off one's mental antennae and switch one's attention to something else. This happens more often than the professional makers and measurers of public opinion usually assume. The seamstress who had two radios going all day because "it made her feel less lonely to have all the commotion around her drab working routine" may be the exaggerated rule rather than the exception.

A sampling of New Yorkers who had listened a week earlier to a political discussion forum of rather high standards were asked: "Do you happen to remember what subject was discussed on the program?" Sixty-four per cent answered simply: "I don't know." Of the remaining 36 per cent, none gave a right answer. Many had only subjective recollections: "It was very interesting," or "I liked it."

It appears also that many people listen to political information and opinion programs for pure entertainment. This was shown when Walter Winchell and Gabriel Heatter both drew larger audiences than any other program on the air at a time when the leading entertainment programs were in summer recess. Gabriel Heatter may well give father a satisfaction similar to that which his bobby-sox daughter gets from a crooner; the plots and intrigues revealed by Walter Winchell entertain many a citizen quite as much as "Gang Busters" and "The Lone Ranger" captivate his son. And political forums often take the place of prize fights.

MOREOVER, to hear is not necessarily to believe. A selected sample of Mid-western farm families was surveyed a few years ago by Dr. William S. Robinson to find out whether their opinions were influenced by listening to the radio. Testing the effects of a farm program pushing New Deal agrarian policies, a question near to the hearts and interests of the listeners, the

investigator found that only 18 per cent of the men and 14 per cent of the women and youngsters (between eight and sixteen years) remembered new opinions they had formed. And it turned out that only 5 per cent of the men and 3 per cent of the women had changed previously formed opinions since they took up listening. One farmer remarked: "Sometimes when I listen to Roosevelt, I even get to thinking he is right, though I know all the time that he's wrong."

Herta Herzog, who set out to discover what women expect and get from listening to "soap operas," reports that one listener explained: "They teach you how to be good. I have gone through a lot of suffering, but I still can learn a lot from them." Then the same woman was asked whether she disliked any program; she said: "I don't listen to 'The Goldbergs.' Why waste electricity on the Jews?"

In other words, a listener's basic attitudes and prejudices, having been acquired during childhood and youth, are deeply imbedded in his personality and are not easily changed by radio programs; whether propaganda is presented in concentrated form or diluted in more general presentations, it is likely to touch only the surface of the mind. Even if the listener is moved to agree, his basic patterns of thought and behavior may be little changed. And where the message is more subtle—in the inflections of a commentator's voice, or in the background of a comic's jokes—it is probably received only by those listeners who have a *previous mental set* for just such a message.

In a significant test among college students, it was found that those with anti-Semitic leanings were rather exact in pointing out the Jewish faces in a collection of photographs shown to them. Indeed, they discovered more than there actually were. On the other hand, those without anti-Semitic leanings hardly discovered any Jewish faces at all. Similarly, the effect of a subtle message in radio programs is likely to reflect a listener's bias rather than form it. A certain joke may seem anti-Semitic to

some, and not anti-Semitic at all to others.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." Radio in America being a democratic institution, a program means very likely just what the listener chooses it to mean—neither more nor less.

HOWEVER, this may not be the full story. The long-range influence of radio on the mind of the masses is still unknown. It has hardly been even examined. As with certain newly discovered drugs, while their short-term effects have been explored and confirmed, we do not yet know whether long-range effects are harmful, helpful, or nil. It may well be that radio has effects that will become palpable and meaningful only after decades. As a stalagmite is built by the multimillions of rhythmically falling drops, habitual and continual radio listening may build up a new shape and condition of the listener's mind.

Certainly it seems possible that in the long run—by its appeal to the common (and sometimes lowest) denominator—radio may help to produce a superficial, mechanical unity of shapeless, unorganized masses, a deep-rooted and dangerous uniformity of minds in passivity and submission. If it has such long-term effects, then it is doing the spadework for demagogues of all political colors. It could be preparing the ground for an organized minority to take over and rule while the majority acquiesces in organized passivity.

It may also be that radio's principle of offending nobody deteriorates into mere upholding of the *status quo*. Giving no voice to extremists, radio may discourage and disable every radical or unorthodox movement that might lead to necessary social improvements. Minorities may be silenced in the public debate, or may be driven to the fringes of the debate, where their social value often disappears. But, as I have said, we know little about these long-term dangers and prospects of radio broadcasting. And to make useful prognostications more

difficult, there are new technical developments to introduce important new factors: FM broadcasting, for instance, which makes possible a larger diversity of broadcasting stations and opinions, or television, which seems likely to increase the present monopoloid and middle-of-the-road trend of radio.

On the short-term level, in any case, there seems little danger of radio creating a dangerous uniformity. Even if all the mass media together are used with the highest pressure on the public mind, their immediate effects are small and mass attitudes are little changed. An experiment conducted in 1946, in the town of New Brunswick, New Jersey (population 48,000), demonstrated the limitations of mass propaganda. A ten-week campaign in favor of world trade and against economic isolationism was organized through all-out use of the local newspaper, speakers at club and labor union meetings, all kinds of displays in the schools, the public library, and shop windows, movies in the local theaters, essay, poster, and quiz contests, and radio programs. At the end of this concentrated assault on public opinion, a poll showed an over-all increase of 10 per cent in favor of the cause as compared with a poll taken ten weeks before. This result does not seem too impressive, and it may be assumed that the effect of the use of radio alone would have been still more negligible. (So much for hopes of counteracting deep-rooted racial stereotypes overnight by radio spot announcements and inserted tolerance messages.)

Significantly, another instance shows that radio's silence cannot stand in the way of short-term actions which a majority of the public considers necessary, or at least useful. With—according to Dr. George Gallup's polls—nine out of ten Americans in favor of governmental measures to control venereal disease by public information and medical measures, an organized minority succeeded in keeping discussion of the subject off the radio (and out of the movies). In spite of this, the whole plan of fighting venereal disease in public was

finally accepted and carried out, though not even the existence of such a plan had been mentioned on the radio.

YET radio possibly can check action, even if it shows little power to create attitudes. Thus, though it cannot eliminate prejudice, it can help keep prejudice from growing into active and aggressive hate. This radio can do without violating its general principle of neutrality, through providing reliable information and unbiased comment.

Radio can prevent active and organized persecution. "During times of crisis, public strain, and racial tension," Gordon W. Allport, Harvard University psychologist, states in an unpublished lecture, "riots could be controlled if the rumors which produce them could be spotted quickly and dissipated." According to Dr. Allport, 66 per cent of the rumors discovered during a given period were "hostile to various groups," and these "most dangerous and frequently occurring rumors" were uncovered and corrected only unsufficiently and ambiguously by the newspapers. In such cases, radio can inform the audience more quickly and more truthfully, being in many ways the proper machinery for halting mob action even though the impulse for such action comes from deeper sources.

What of our fears of the fascist demagogue coming to power through radio? In 1911, Woodrow Wilson said in a public address: "The man with power, but without conscience, could, with an eloquent tongue, if he cared for nothing but his own power, put this whole country into a flame, because this whole country believes that something is wrong and is eager to follow those who profess to be able to lead it away from its difficulties." His statement was wrong for the America of 1911—or even of 1947, for that matter. But his analysis of *the state of mind* of a nation ripe for overturn might well throw light on Hitler's rise to power.

However, it should be remembered that

Hitler rose to power without the "eloquent tongue" of radio, since German broadcasting was controlled by anti-Hitler governments. Not until Hitler had gained the total dictatorship was he able to use radio—to strengthen his hold over the already subjugated masses.

Even the short-wave broadcasts during the war did little to change the minds and morale of the people. The British who listened to Lord Haw-Haw, or the American soldiers who listened to Tokyo Rose, were entertained, not influenced. Only in two cases did broadcasts of that kind have any effect, and in both cases, other developments had prepared the minds of the listeners before radio did its share in persuading them to act: the surrender of France was promoted by short-wave broadcasts from Stuttgart in 1939 and 1940, but French defeatism had already been created by other conditions; the surrender of some German cities to the American army was promoted by "Operation Annie," the broadcasts of ABSIE, the American Broadcasting Station in Europe, but, again, defeatism had been created by other conditions.

Whether in a democracy or under a dictatorship, radio follows public opinion rather than shapes it. It is a conservative rather than a revolutionary power, contributing to the maintenance of established power. Weighing the record, radio's influence on the mind of the masses has been overestimated by observers who confuse the breadth of its audience with the depth of its impact. It may be true, as the historian Dixon Wecter has remarked, that "if America ever gets a dictator, whatever his other talents, he will almost certainly be a great radio artist." But this talent, as well as the other talents of the dictator, will amount to little unless America wants a dictator for deep reasons of economic maladjustment, social frustration, and spiritual despair that are beyond and above the fabulous power of the microphone to create. As the nation goes, so goes its radio, not vice versa.

INTELLIGENCE AND EVIL IN HUMAN HISTORY

An Answer to Intellectual Defeatism

SIDNEY HOOK

THE terms "transition" and "crisis" are two great semantic beacons of our times. They blink at us, not only in the ephemera of journalism, but in the most abstruse pages of contemporary political, social, and philosophical discussion. And yet, in one sense, every age is an age of transition in that it is an overlapped and overlapping segment of a historical process; and every important problem is a "crisis" in the affairs of men. "The crisis of our time" is thus a standing rubric in the interpretation of history.

Indeed, in so far as history is the consequence of human decision, crisis—crisis for someone in respect to something—is of its very substance. As good a definition of man as any is that he is a creature of crisis. Who-

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ever bestows upon him a permanent freedom from crisis frees him from history and from life. Happily, there is more in life than crisis, and we do not have to make a philosophy of it—or a habit of it—as the modern metaphysics of adolescence, existentialism, recommends. There is enough anguish in experience without seeking for more.

Nevertheless, we can and often do mean something distinctive when we speak of the crisis of *our* time or of the *current* era of transition. We mean that the basic problems which face us, arising from rapid *changes* in technology, economy, politics, ideology, and science (without seeking to order them causally) are at the very least comparable in gravity to the problems which have led historians to characterize, say the fifth century B.C.E., or the first century C.E., or the century of the Renaissance as times of crisis and transition. This is a legitimate use of the terms. We are even justified in saying that from the point of view of sheer magnitude and complexity—the number of interrelated problems which challenge us and the number of human beings who will be affected by our response—the crisis of *our* time transcends all others.

But the present crisis is also different qualitatively, in the same sense as we recognize that previous centuries of crisis were each distinctive. That is why it seems to me to be more fruitful to grasp the *specific* issues which confront modern man, color his fears and hopes, and give point to his growing conviction that he is running a handicap race with disaster. It is *this* crisis which must be overcome, not the general problem of crisis in human history.

However, many diagnosticians of our age—instead of concerning themselves with specific issues and specific proposals for meet-

ing them—prefer to seek a universal cause and a universal solution. They have located the source of our troubles in man himself and his permanent nature. According to them, the affliction of man lies in his *natural evil*.

Because man's evil nature has been denied or ignored or tossed off by a frivolous psychology, it has borne fruit, they assert, in the most ghastly forms of *historical evil*. This is the "fundamental truth" about man, *not* the superficial progressivism and the romantic glorification of man's natural goodness, which presumably are parts of the credo of modern liberalism. The whole litany of Nazi horrors has been recited to prove the debasement of human beings, the eclipse of the ideal of personal inviolability in the Western world. It has been cited also to prove the dangerous incompetence of the scientific habit of mind to plumb the depths of man, as well as the vapid unrealism of the liberal belief in intelligence and humanity.

Let us look at this diagnosis a little more closely.

MAN's inhumanity to man is an old story. It is a true story even when we remember, as so many do not, that the sources of human kindness and friendship lie just as deep in men as their cruelty. Otherwise the existence of love and the family would be a mystery.

There is a tendency, however, among many critics of man's behavior, confronted by an outrageous human action, to exclaim: "This is what man is *really* like"—a judgment they never make when human beings display great devotion and heroism. And yet the same simple way of thinking would justify the retort: "No, *this* is what man is really like." But is not the reason they pronounce the first and not the second judgment that they unconsciously expect man to be better than in present fact he is? Because he is not better, therefore he is no good at all. Paradoxically and significantly, it is their own implicit ideal of man that drives them to disgust with *man*, instead of

to sober inquiry into the actual complex behavior of *men*, its causes and possibilities. Their disillusionment is actually a kind of perverse testimony to their faith in human nature.

IF kindness may be defined as a quality of *personal* action which more or less intimately ties human beings together, despite their relative inequalities of power, position, and intelligence, in a bond of mutually gratifying interests, then surely it is as universal in human beings as cruelty.

It is a further fact that we can more easily stand the sight of our kindness than of our cruelty, and this, too, indicates something important about human nature. It is not unusual for those who make ruthless decisions to shrink from carrying them out themselves. Ask persons, as I have, who have heatedly called for indiscriminate mass execution of Japanese, Germans, and Russians because of the crimes of their governments or their soldiery whether *they* would be willing to man the machine guns themselves, and note the shocked pause even in the rare cases when they blusteringly answer in the affirmative. We have a natural horror of sitting down at the same table with those who have butchered others even in a just cause. Who wants to make a friend of the hangman?

It is questionable whether the tendencies to personal cruelty are more stubbornly rooted in men than their feelings of kindness, or whether such tendencies create the mass miseries of historical evil. It is significant that we always attribute intent and a personal quality to kindness, while we often tend to think of cruelty as impersonal and without personal intent. Thus we do not speak of a decision by a state as "kind" even when it has good consequences, for a kind decision or act must, we feel, always be a personal one. But we do speak of a "cruel" decree or a "cruel" law, even when we are unaware of the motives behind it. And today as in the past, human beings have suffered more from cruel decrees and laws, from the anonymity and impersonality of the mass terror

they generate, than from personally motivated cruelties.

I am not denying that there are cruel acts which are just as direct and personal as kind ones. Nor am I denying the demonic elements in human beings, that some human beings enjoy the spectacle of others' sufferings, and that others suffer from compulsions to destroy the things or persons they love. I am speaking now of those great ranges of cruelty in modern history, involving the fate of millions, that flow from the limitations of human imagination and sensitivity, of the cruelty men do because it is easy to stand what is out of sight, and still easier to stand what is out of mind. The statesmen who agreed that a million people should be uprooted here and settled there, who decided to cut off immigration to Palestine, to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima without first demonstrating its efficacy to the Japanese on another target with no human beings around—these men are personally no crueler than their critics.

Aside then from the cruelty of those who glory in the personal harm they can inflict, *the possibility of cruelty is the ever-present converse fact of human limitation.* We are all crueler than we know, not because we are evil, but because our senses and imagination have such a limited range.

But in this very fact we find one of the chief justifications of the use of intelligence. By enabling us to react to the future as if it were already present, to recognize the general in the specific, to unravel the chains of cause and consequence, we can to some extent overcome the natural barriers and limits of human perceptibility. By bringing what is out of sight into view, by anticipating consequences and so bring them into mind where mind means "minding," intelligence can diminish the occasions of human cruelty.

OBVIOUSLY, the possibilities of human cruelty are ever present. The sudden re-discovery of its brutal actuality by those who see the Nazi and Russian record of horror as signs of the crisis of our times adds nothing

particularly enlightening. One wonders how they managed to escape learning the facts of political life so long. Only the magnitude of the terror, its official organization, and the employment of scientific techniques in the execution and torture are new. But these are characteristics which are pervasive. Almost every aspect of modern culture is marked by them. For example, through the use of the radio and other official organs of propaganda more people than ever before in the history of the world are now being deceived by their national leaders. It would be naive, however, to use this as evidence that politicians have become more corrupt and the rest of mankind more stupid.

One wonders how many of those to whom the "true nature" of man has been revealed by the details of recent atrocities have studied the histories of Greece, Rome, the medieval church, and the rise of modern European states—to mention only patterns of events which have shaped Western civilization. Horror for horror, infamy for infamy, I challenge any of them to read or reread a book like Henry C. Lea's *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, with its details of the torture of suspected heretics and dissenters, or to familiarize themselves with the record of rapine and pillage on both sides during the Thirty Years' War without being overwhelmed by nausea. There is no point in piling up the evidence—which includes a chapter on the early American treatment of the Indians and the enslavement of the African Negroes. All that is required to understand it is the same imagination with which we read the account of the latest outrages in the press.

REALIZATION of the evil men can do and have done to men is integral to any intelligent appraisal of human history. But such realization is also one of the basic presuppositions of the philosophy of liberalism in its broadest sense—from Socrates to Dewey.

Liberalism an expression of superficial optimism? Shades of Voltaire! Together with Locke, he is far more representative of

liberalism in cultural life, as we understand it today, than Rousseau, the self-deceived prophet of totalitarianism. Liberalism based upon the belief in the inherent goodness of men? Not if the philosopher-statesmen of the American Republic are to be considered liberal!

Despite the charges of those who have impugned liberalism as a vague and weak aspiration for human cooperation, blind to the demonic furies in man, alone or in mobs, in their social and political philosophy (we are not discussing particular programs) liberals have been unceasingly aware of the multiple possibilities of evil—as well as good—in him. The whole liberal theory of the state is shot through with a distrust of concentration of power in the hands of men. It has always sought to hedge this power in by law and custom, institutional checks and balances. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of the liberal theory of the state flows from what has sometimes manifested itself as an excessive distrust of power to a point where it prefers the apparent safety of inactivity to the risks entailed in giving power a constructive office. Even the optimism of the economic theory of *laissez faire*—with which liberalism once shortsightedly identified itself—was not based on an optimism about men, but on an optimism about the mechanisms of the market which would further the public welfare no matter how selfish men were.

AND as for the socialist belief in the *natural* goodness of man—where is it found? In the doctrine of the class struggle? In the view that human nature is a historical product and therefore neither naturally good nor bad but *what man himself* makes of it through his socialized activity and under the limitations of biology and physics? In Marx's criticism of Moses Hess and Max Stirner? The false Marxian doctrine that the state will wither away is not based on a theory of natural human goodness—for crimes and outrage are expected to occur in a classless society—but on an unscientific view of the state and a simplistic theory of economic cau-

sation. It looks forward to a diminution, and then to an ultimate disappearance of organized punitive violence—thus confusing a process with its ideal limit. But it does not deny that evil may take subtler, and perhaps more refined forms.

In a recent article (COMMENTARY, March 1946) John Dewey observed that it was puzzling to understand why so many ex-Marxists ever considered themselves Marxists in the first place. Similarly, many who sneer at the tradition of pragmatic liberalism do so for reasons that make one speculate as to where they learned their liberalism and from whom.

They seem to have awakened suddenly to the strength of the human passions—the blind egoistic drive for property, the lust for political control over others, the hunger for place and prestige. Recognition of the strength of the human passions is a commonplace of historical liberalism—so much so that some liberals made the error of reading these passions into the natural endowment of man, a view which dies hard despite the advance of anthropological knowledge. But it was precisely because liberals recognized the force of these passions in our culture (together with others) that they exalted human intelligence into the guiding principle of action—not to suppress human passions, but to channel, purify, enrich—in short, to humanize them. They have rightfully feared that out of the seed of absurdity, fanatics would reap a harvest of atrocities. They have held up the vision of plural values together with a technique of establishing a moral economy among them. In this way they have sought to liberate men from absolute loyalty to predetermined ends held independently of their consequences for themselves and others.

THOSE who believe that events have rendered liberalism bankrupt suffer from two major misconceptions. The first is that the appeal to intelligence is an appeal to an abstract force opposed to passion or feeling, which it seeks to drive out, leaving the body in a kind of dead enlightened calm. But

this is to overlook the natural history and functions of intelligence. Intelligence is always a way of *acting*, directly or indirectly, in relation to a concrete problem in specific historical circumstances under the triple controls of a desire to find the truth (no matter how defined), knowledge already won, and the hard facts of experiment.

It is not sufficient to drive out one passion by another, even granting the validity of the Spinozistic insight that a passion cannot be talked to death but must be replaced by another passion (an insight with which modern pedagogy is just beginning to catch up). For we may discover that the passion instilled as a cure is as bad or worse than the passion regarded as a disease. We must have some positive ground for our acceptance of a passion other than its therapeutic value. More crucial, we must have some notion of how it is to be expressed. You cannot kill a passionate faith in Nazism unless you are prepared literally to kill everybody infected by it, which few are prepared to do. You can kill it by substituting another faith for it—a Russian *Vozd* for a German *Fuehrer*, a KPD for an NSDAP, an NKVD for a Gestapo. But obviously little has been changed in the pattern of belief and action until we substitute a faith of another quality. The reason in part why so much of human history shows such a violent oscillation between extremes of terror is that one ideological absolute has driven out another.

The second major misconception is the view that liberalism believes that the use of specific devices of intelligence will automatically or inevitably solve all human conflicts and difficulties. This reflects the assumption of the critics of liberalism that a solution must be total—for when *they* write solution they really mean salvation. But the emphasis upon intelligence is a recommendation, a proposal, a conditional prediction—it is not a prophecy or incantation. The doctrine of the omnipotence of thought is notoriously absent from the doctrines of modern liberalism from Locke to Freud. Intelligence is a small “candlelight” for Locke, and Freud believes it is a feeble

safeguard against the will to illusion. But both know that it is all we have in the way of a reliable guide, and believe that if we have courage enough it can be strengthened.

It remains true that mankind *may* be doomed even if it takes thought of itself and its predicaments, and despite all the techniques it brings to bear upon problems. This, the liberal admits. He adds only that mankind *will* be doomed if it does anything else. Until now, mankind as a species has been safe from self-destruction despite all its follies. Now it can really destroy itself with less thought than it requires for an individual person to commit suicide.

SO FAR I have been speaking of the evils that flow from the ignorance, insensitiveness, and imaginative dullness of even conventionally good men, such as those who drew up the Treaty of Versailles, who refused to permit the Weimar Republic to unite with democratic Austria, who followed the policy of non-intervention in Spain, and in other ways made easier the triumphs and oppressions of totalitarianism.

But what of personal evil and cruelty? What of our own demons? What of those who refuse to see or who knowingly do evil and enjoy it? What shall we say of those who deliberately sin against the light? Every one knows people who qualify for this role. Goethe confessed that there was no crime that he could not conceive himself capable of, and what is true for Goethe in this respect is probably true for everyone. I cannot see how this constitutes any special problem for the philosophy of liberalism unless we maintain that we are not dealing with a problem in psychology or education but one of theology. If we do not maintain this, where is the evidence that any other approach will succeed better which scorns to use the rich resources of modern psychology and the multiple arts of education, whose potentialities, for social reasons, have hardly been tapped? Are the delicate and deeply hidden disturbances of personality that develop into cancerous moral growths better treated by the discipline of stern conventions

than by the techniques of analysis and social re-education?

And if we do maintain that we are here confronted by a problem of theology, what are the grounds for believing that demons can be driven out by exorcism or "conversion" more effectively than by changing the patterns of habituation, perfecting punitive machinery, and strengthening the motives of kindness and cooperation which are just as natural to man as his cruelty?

I am so convinced that there will always be what one might call the problem of the pyromaniac in the good society that not for one moment would I trust the normal routines of education and mental hygiene alone. Since to be human is to be tempted, the moral the liberal draws is to *reduce* wherever possible the arbitrary power of men over men, thus limiting the effects of what cannot be controlled by social restraint and self-discipline. At the same time, it remains true that the frequency of acts of personal evil, as well as their impact on the fabric of human relations, is closely correlated with the kind of society in which men live, and with the *objective conditions* which frustrate their natural need for security, and hunger for affection. In a totalitarian society control over people's freedom and bread becomes the most powerful instrument known to bestialize human beings. Not only would a better order of thinking prevail in a better society but a better personal way of life, too.

THE recognition that evil is not an unnatural phenomenon in human history, and that our contemporary forms of it have their historical precedents, has led to the rise of a school of "hard-boiled" realists in social affairs. These consist of white-collared professionals who are quite cheerfully prepared to pay any price in other people's suffering for what seems to them to be progressive measures. We recognized this attitude for what it was—a mixture of insensitivity and stupidity—when many well-meaning people sought to gloss over the terror of Nazi and Fascist life on the ground that great strides had been made in banishing unemployment,

increasing production, and improving the standard of living when compared to the lowest point in some pre-totalitarian year. We learned to identify these people by their smug maxims: "You can't hew logs without making the chips fly," "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs." But we have not yet learned to recognize this attitude for what it is among the professional friends of Soviet Russia. When their attention is called to the barbarities and injustices inflicted on the Russian and non-Russian peoples, their rejoinder is a recital of the alleged accomplishments of the regime. The barbarities and injustices are dismissed as the inevitable costs of progress. What does it matter if there is a large concentration camp near every large industrial center filled mainly with victims of administrative decree who have never been tried? More pig-iron has been produced, more tanks and tractors, more rails or what not.

I do not here wish to examine or challenge the alleged facts of progress that are invoked as sanctification of wholesale human evil. Suffice it to say that many scholars and critics have maintained that as far as living conditions go, the workers and peasants of Russia (not to speak of other classes) have *not* improved their status.* But what I do wish to challenge is the blithe assumption that the tragic costs of social progress in Russia were inevitable. To say they were inevitable is to maintain that there are no alternatives to the suppression of all political freedom, to the planned destruction by starvation of millions of peasants, to the introduction of what Oscar Lange once aptly called the system of "industrial serfdom," to the periodic purges, and the vast network of concentration camps that spans the Russian land from the Arctic to the Caucasus.

* Many Gordon's *Workers Before and After Lenin* (New York, 1944); David Dallin's *The Real Soviet Russia* (New Haven, 1945); Victor Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom* (New York, 1946). Cf. these books with the claims made in Maurice Hewlett's *The Soviet Power* (New York, 1943), Albert Rhys William's *The Soviets* (New York, 1945), and the Webbs' *The Truth About Soviet Russia* (New York, 1942).

But just as soon as we ask for *specific evidence that this or that more humane alternative was found not to be feasible*, that alternatives were even sought, the question is evaded by the vulgar response, "After all, Stalin triumphed over Hitler!" As if a *military* victory, snatched from the jaws of defeat, constituted any answer. As well argue that the victory of Czar Alexander over Napoleon, which was less costly to Russia, constituted a vindication of serfdom. Would a victory by Hitler have justified his abominations?

This "tough-mindedness" is another expression of the abdication of intelligence. It refuses to discuss the specific problems and the specific ways of handling them, smothering all problems under a blanket allegiance to some vaguely defined goal. It wraps itself up in the blind faith, essentially religious, that no matter what is done, things will come right in the end. It is impatient with any attempt to judge verbal professions by consequences in fact. It is really not an attitude of tough-mindedness at all, for it cannot face or live with the truth. It cannot bear to see its assumptions put into the crucible of doubt. Rather is it a tender-minded sentimentalism that reads its pious wishes into the mysterious "workings" of history. No more eloquent sign of this tender-mindedness can be found than in the tendency among those who suffer from it to imagine that the only ones who are opposed to their favorite brand of totalitarianism are advocates of some other variety, that people who criticize Soviet Russia are inevitably Fascists.

ANOTHER view, related to the rediscovery of evil in man, is that the crisis of our time is expressed in actions which outrage the traditional principle of the inviolability of the human being. The assumption here is that until recently this principle was one of the inherited dogmas of the Western world. In the sense in which this is true, it still remains true, as an examination of the speeches, constitutions, charters, and proclamations of our time will show. The Atlantic

Charter expresses a concern for the principle of the inviolability of the individual no less than the preface to the Holy Alliance. But if we judge principles by what is done in their name, by the things they are used to countenance, the assumption that this particular principle was a living tradition in the past becomes dubious. If ever there was a time when belief in the inviolability of man was universally *professed* in the Western world, it was during the period of medieval Christendom. But again, save for the numbers and techniques involved, no greater respect for the inviolability of man was shown in the behavior of men then than now. Nor were things very different during the periods of the Reformation and Enlightenment when this principle presumably became secularized.

How explain an ardent profession of belief in the principle of human inviolability coexisting with the treatment given to heretics, pagans, and Jews; with sanguinary religious wars among those who shared the belief; and with the ruthless enslavement and exploitation of colonial peoples to whom the Christian nations carried the belief? Certainly not as deliberate hypocrisy. The intellectual reconciliation was possible because "the inviolability of the person" was construed by the dominant tradition as applying only to the kernel or essence of the human being—his immortal soul. That is why torture could be applied to a man's body without destroying his spiritual inviolability. That is why poverty, disease, and slavery were never considered obstacles to piety. That is why the "infinite and transcendent" worth of the soul, and its equality with all other souls were held not to be affected by any vicissitudes in the social, economic, and political relations of historical life, for the latter were purely external to man's soul.

This super-naturalism did not necessarily have to take religious or theological form. It expressed itself in legal doctrines, political philosophies, and economic theories which preserved the heritage of dualism between what a man essentially is and the accidental environment in which his free personality

operates. There is a direct line from the doctrine that all souls are of equal worth, whether bond or free, to the doctrine that all men are politically equal, whether pauper or newspaper baron, and to the doctrine that all men have equal economic opportunity in a system of free enterprise, whether sons of sharecroppers or sons of industrial magnates.

What do we mean by the inviolability of the individual or person? It is neither a theological nor a biological fact but a moral ideal. Those who urge its acceptance upon us obviously interpret it as a command, a prescription or recommendation for action. This basic moral injunction tells us how to treat human beings. Our treatment must involve at least two things. First, the recognition of certain procedures, customarily outlined in the Bill of Rights, before pains and penalties are imposed by governmental power. This is a relatively recent principle; it has no logical roots in theology, and is practiced only in democratic countries that have so far escaped the blight of totalitarianism. The second thing the principle enjoins upon us is just as important, perhaps more so because it underlies the first, viz., respect for the *uncoerced will* of the individual person.

The will can be coerced brutally—by hunger, by threats of personal violence, by making hostages of those we love. It can also be coerced subtly, and sometimes more successfully, by poisoned sources of information, by propaganda and educational monopoly. The degree to which we respect the inviolability of the individual can be measured, then, first by the legal restraints we put upon administrative power, second by the positive measures we take to reduce physical constraint like economic need and provide opportunities for the flowering of talent and personality, and third by the cultural provisions we institute to insure that individual decisions are guided by an *informed will*.

For us, inviolability of the individual can only emerge as a principle of *social* life, furthered or traduced by the kind of social

institutions which prevail. In personal relations, it presupposes a rule of intelligence which respects others' intelligence. In so far as any of our actions that vitally affects others proceeds without intelligent consideration of the consequences upon them, to that extent we fall short of respecting their inviolability as persons.

Conditions vary too much from country to country to permit a wholesale judgment on the present state of men's allegiance to the principle of human inviolability. Until stable social institutions buttress it, the principle will suffer from unstable allegiance. On the plane of politics it seems true that less regard is being shown by all countries, including democratic ones, for the consequences of political decisions upon the lives of individuals than in the period preceding the First World War. The Allied political decision to uproot millions of people from Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, under conditions that meant annihilation for some and degradation for the rest, is sad evidence of atrophy of the imaginative centers, and of the extent to which Hitler has triumphed even in defeat. But it is too soon to say that belief in human inviolability is dying in the hearts of men. The stories of the democratic resistance movements throughout the world, the daily unceasing labor of relief workers, the untold acts of mutual aid in civilian life which often transcend national borders, the fact that despite the colossal political ineptitude of the democratic powers in Europe it has not yet been engulfed by Stalinism—all these count for something in assessing the state of the world.

What seems to be the case is that the ideals of human inviolability and moral decency are not dying but are badly confused. They are confused partly because of institutional chaos, and partly by the process I have elsewhere called "the degradation of the word." Words feed directly into behavior. They release deep emotional tones which flood whole areas of conscious and unconscious human activity. In a world in which Nazis call themselves Socialists

and Communists call themselves democrats, normal responses to pain and hunger and human agony are inhibited and rendered uncertain. Viewed through ideological blinkers, the facts of human experience lose their immediate qualities as well as their evidential function. Cloudy abstractions get in the way of seeing consequences clearly. Not knowing what to think, many do not know what to feel; others, under the illusion of thinking, imagine they are feeling. The corruption of language, by corrupting thought, corrupts feeling too.

ANY attempt to explain the changes in the human behavior of our time in terms of "ultimate causes" is futile. There are no ultimate causes, and the ones usually assigned this role—lack of some cosmic faith or metaphysics or organic religion—are demonstrably inadequate in explaining why the past and present facts of human life are what they are. The problems that beset us today are specific, even if they turn out subsequently to be interrelated.

The question of how to reduce man's cruelty to man, if it has any meaning other than a lament about the natural or God-given world, is of the same order as "How can we build a more secure economic order?" "How can we preserve and extend political freedom as the state intervenes in economic life?" "How best to encourage initiative and original research when the government undertakes to subsidize higher education?" "How can we introduce effective controls on production of atomic bombs and similar weapons?" "How can we prevent war with Russia, and how can it be won if it is forced on us?" Further inquiry may show us that even these questions are too general and must be broken down into more manageable segments. But no matter how detailed, their bearing on the way in which men are to live in genuine communities with their fellows is undeniable. And if they appear shallow, it is only to those who mistake the rhetoric of oxymoron for profundity.

But are not the specific problems facing

us today extraordinarily different from all other problems which have faced men previously? They are—just as the last war was extraordinarily different from all other wars. They are graver because more threatening to our survival if they remain unsolved than any set of problems in the past. In *principle*, however, they are not different. They may be compared to the sudden emergence of a new plague that threatens to wipe out all human life, or an invasion by some strange creatures from Mars. The fact that the crucial problems of our time are *man-made* is not their distinctive feature. For every war among men has testified to some human failure, a lost opportunity to exercise a humane judgment and control despite the punishment of death and suffering.

What does all this amount to? Simply this, that if we wish to solve our problems and not just wring our hands over them, our task becomes the discovery of specific institutional devices, the planning of schemes and programs, both comprehensive and detailed, to meet the challenge of nature and history. It is well to remember that the challenge of our new problems is often the consequence of our success in meeting the stimulus of an old one. We have solved the problems of production but not of unemployment, of military victory but not of peace, of technical communication but not of participation, of literacy but not of cultural vulgarity. As Toynbee indicates, a response to a stimulus which creates the conditions of a new stimulus provocative of further response may signify a pattern of growth in a culture. But the minimum conditions for cultural growth include the minimum of conditions of continued life—today, peace and security. These must be met not by calls to virtue, which cannot help us here because they are *always* in order, but by political and social organization. Fundamentally, our alternatives are preaching or intelligent action, and we have been hearing a lot of preaching lately. If it is objected that this essay is a preaching too, its excuse is that it is a sermon to end sermons and a plea to turn to more fruitful pursuits.

BUT we have not lived through the last thirty years for nothing. We have learned the hard way that institutional devices for solving social problems are never of themselves sufficient. They can always be abused and perverted. One of the great weaknesses of the democratic socialist movement of the past was its uncritical faith in institutional changes. They were accepted because they promised to remove some existing evil, but they were not examined for their own possibilities of even greater evil. How these institutions would operate, and with what manner of men, was regarded as unimportant. For need determined social function, and the job to be done determined the character of the man doing it.

This attitude was widespread and productive of dangerous innocence. At the same time, it seemed so plausible in certain situations that it deserves a closer glance. Its apparent cogency may best be inferred from a telling story with which a leading technocrat used to make effective propaganda long before technocracy became a social nostrum. Many years ago in a large American city, the use of wooden cars with open platforms on the elevated and subway lines resulted in numerous serious accidents and much financial loss to the transit company. There seemed no way to prevent the jarring, the pressure of the gates, the falls due to sudden lurching. A municipal ordinance made it a misdemeanor to ride on these open platforms but it was completely ignored. In good weather, passengers preferred the open platforms to the interior of the train, and during the rush hours there was no other place for many to stand. After a while the officials of the company and municipality abandoned the campaign to reform the riding habits of the straphangers. They resigned themselves to the status quo and the inevitable lawsuits with the observation that it was against human nature to expect people to stay off the platforms of cars.

At this point, along came an industrial engineer who invented a train that had neither a front nor a rear platform. Human nature did not change. Men did not become

more heroic, prophetic, or noble—only more skilled in the mechanisms of control. Without appealing to either self-interest or love of neighbor, without preaching or threatening, the problem was solved.

Whatever the limitations of this approach are, it certainly provides a paradigm for daily thinking in many areas. It is the way of creative engineering from the time man learned how to cross a river without getting wet to the time he learned how to fly without breaking his neck. It is matter-of-fact and yet revolutionary, like the discovery that it was not necessary to burn down the barn in order to have roast pig. Graham Wallas somewhere suggests that an entire philosophy of human history and progress can be elaborated from the moral of Charles Lamb's "A Dissertation on Roast Pig."

NONETHELESS, there are many situations involving face to face relationships among human beings that cannot be solved by the invention of a mechanism or the construction of an organization, as indispensable as such things may be. There are situations that require fresh judgment, discretion, equity, and sympathetic insight if we are not to treat human beings like things. They are situations in which we are pledged to preserve variations in personal ends and goals at the same time as we possess the organizational power to misdirect, subvert, or impose on human beings a uniform pattern that reflects *our* will and not theirs. There is no increase in the danger that a train will jump the track merely because closed cars replace open ones. But the social institutions through which we seek to protect men from hunger and ignorance may become the means by which we bind them and blind them. There is no danger that the engineer of the closed train will substitute his conception of what the destination of the train should be for the multiple destination points of the passengers. There is a danger that partly in the interest of efficiency, partly in the interest of his own convenience, always temptable man will help others to get, not what they choose after

reflection, but what he chooses for them without reflection. Every social organization, whether for purposes of education, economic security, health, or charity, may become a terrible engine of human destruction. We recognize this obliquely whenever we reject a plan on the ground that it is too good for the people for whom it is made or, more accurately, that we haven't people good enough to whom to entrust its execution. We shudder at the phrase "engineer of the soul" which the Russians called their intellectuals at the time of the first Five-Year Plan. It epitomizes a ruthless hostility to individual differences and to the principle of personal inviolability.

But is this not calling for "the revolution within"—the anguished cry which goes up in every period that witnesses the triumph and betrayal of organizations? Is this not an appeal for that "inner transfiguration" of self, from something to something else, both equally obscured in a cloud of murky phrases? No, for the simple reason that the evidence of someone's change of heart that we seek is the change in his habits, his deeds, his personal and public behavior. This is the only reliable evidence.

WHAT is required is not so much a greater concern with oneself or with a discipline to insure one's purity of motives and conscience, but greater attention to *methods of action* by which political and institutional programs are carried out. What follows from the realization that we are all fallible and temptable is greater care about the *means* we use to save others. For example, who has not sometimes marveled at the utter good will and innocence with which Communist party fellow-travelers commit infamies (no one marvels at the professional cadres—long since made cynical by the discipline of the party line) ranging from espionage against their own government to character assassination? What these people,

* On this point, cf. one of the primary source materials of our time: *The Report of the Royal Commission: An Investigation of the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the*

quite decent in other respects, lack is awareness of what they are doing and an elementary sense of responsibility. The same is true of those individuals who are always on the side of history, who used to preface their extenuation of "the new order" in Italy and Germany with "I am not a fascist but—."

No "revolution within" will help them unless it is a shock of recognition at their own complacency—and there is no one method of imparting it. What they need is greater seriousness, more study, fewer formulas and slogans, more exposure to critical thinking—not conscience, which they profess to have, but conscientiousness, which they obviously have not. It is not the same thing as zeal.

Nor can it be legitimately said that the founders of the Communist State and International—Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Rachevsky—were lacking in sincerity, deep conviction, and generous feelings in their personal relations to the people around them. How would a revolution within or "inner transfiguration" have helped avoid the train of tragic consequences which followed the measures they used to seize power and to defend it—consequences which were predicted by their critics, Plechanov, Martov, Luxemburg among others? It was their lack of concern with alternatives to proposed means, their failure to realize that *the way* things are carried out determines what the future will be, not what we say about it, which undid them and made their talk about freedom and brotherhood seem cynical mockery. It was not their insincerity—in many ways they were as religious and single-minded as Loyola or Tolstoy—that helped convert their dream of a classless society into a police state. It was their cocksure assumption of the truth of their prophetic vision and of the axiomatic character of their own rectitude.

The trouble with so-called orthodox, scientific Marxism was not that it was scientific,

Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power. Ottawa, Canada, 1946.

but that it wasn't scientific enough. It operated with the unscientific notion that no matter *how* things were done, the desirable end in view would be realized, a little sooner or a little later. That is why it so needlessly sacrificed whole generations, classes, and nations, not to speak of individuals. Every intelligent criticism of the Soviet state rests on the charge that things could have been done differently and with different consequences. But sometimes the bizarre conclusion is drawn that what this really proves is that the Russian failure, the greatest tragedy in all history, must be attributed to the fact that the devotees of Marxism had a scientific outlook upon the world instead of a religious outlook. This in the same breath in which it is affirmed that orthodox Marxists had converted their scientific hypotheses into religious dogmas!

Something would be gained if critics of the scientific approach to social problems, who use orthodox Marxism as a foil, would frankly admit that in their view they are urging the substitution of one religion for another. They would then tell us by what other method we know, aside from *their* inner conviction, that one religion is better than another. They cannot all be equally good, otherwise why substitute one for another? And besides they are not all consistent. Any answer which is not flagrantly question-begging must abandon the high ground of mystical conviction for more empirical considerations. And when we are dealing with empirical considerations, we are in a domain accessible to methods of empirical enquiry.

One is often baffled by the austere restraint with which religious critics of scientific social theories glide over the unfortunate phenomena of religious wars and evade the

problem of religious truth. None of them has so much as commented on the demonstrable proposition that any religious dogma about the nature of man or the world is compatible with mutually contradictory modes of action in the real world. For all the "inner transfiguration," not enough light has been vouchsafed to show how religion can serve as a specific guide to a better social life—even if such a function is conceived as relevant to religion, which is not always the case.

We know how grave our problems are. To the natural precariousness of existence, there are added the dangers of national conflicts and civil wars. There is no guarantee that scientific intelligence can cope with them. But it has solved some questions and has suggested solutions to others. Let its rivals cite the social problems they have solved—after they are through informing us about the limitations of scientific method. They have had a much longer time to get results.

THE crisis of 20th-century man is the crisis of 20th-century society. It is expressed most fundamentally in the conflict between Western democratic socialism as typified in the domestic pattern slowly emerging in England today, and Byzantine totalitarianism as typified in Soviet Russia. American culture will slowly make its way towards one or the other. When it is over the divide, its evolution will determine the social and political pattern of the whole world. There is not yet one world in any except a trivial physical sense. When there is, the crisis of our time will be solved and a new round of problems will begin. If there is a world a hundred years from now, people will be writing on "the crisis of our times."

DID TRUMAN SCUTTLE LIBERALISM?

The Progressives' Complaint and the Administration's Record

JAMES WECHSLER

SINCE Franklin Delano Roosevelt's death his name has been taken in vain by friends and foes alike. The Democratic party introduced recordings of his voice in the 1946 campaign. Others, with even less authentic political claims on his memory, belatedly boast an intellectual kinship with the late President that was not always evident in his lifetime. One of his sons has published memoirs of his father's historic meetings; as someone has remarked, the boy merely heard what the men were saying but didn't understand what they were talking about. Frances Perkins has written with grace about the fallen leader, conceding that she was not privileged to explore all the complex chambers of his mind and that she frankly doesn't know what he would have done about the problems of the world that survived him. But her humility is not widely imitated.

Mr. Roosevelt's political enemies, operating in opposite fashion from some of his self-appointed political heirs, have attempted to lay wreaths of mud in his grave. One might have supposed that the Republicans would have been happy to let Mr. Roosevelt rest in peace. He fought them for thirteen bitter years, and he won all the major encounters.

JAMES WECHSLER, head of the Washington bureau of the *New York Post*, is considered one of the most highly-informed and responsible political writers in practice at the national capital. From 1942 to 1946—except for one year in the army—he was national editor of the newspaper *PM*. Mr. Wechsler wrote *Revolt on the Campus* (1936), *War Propaganda and the United States* (1940), and *Labor Baron* (1943), a biography of John L. Lewis. As a student in the thirties he was editor of the *Columbia Spectator* and one of the most active leaders in the national student movement. He was born in New York City in 1915.

But they persist in seeking a historical recount. They condemned him as a "war-monger" in 1940; now they propose to show that he neglected to prepare us for war. Eighty years after Lincoln's death his place in history is still challenged by Southern Democrats; the Republicans may yet equal this record in their quarrel with Roosevelt.

The behavior of the machine politicians seems less painful, however, than the performance of some liberal and left-wing leaders who have claimed to be the exclusive owners of Franklin D. Roosevelt's testament. Nothing quite like this has happened since the turbulent debate over Lenin's will. Two of the most insistent pretenders to Roosevelt's throne have been Henry A. Wallace and Senator Pepper. Their proclamations reached a crescendo last autumn and—as this is written—the fury has momentarily subsided. But the argument is not yet ended.

POOR Harry Truman. Under any circumstances his reluctant ascendancy would have contained the elements of pathos; he did not visualize himself in the robes of greatness and he approached power with a disbelieving look. He never considered himself a man of destiny, and nothing that has happened since he took office can have given him any reason to change his mind. But his deepest misfortune was to replace a Roosevelt—rather than a Harding—and to face each day the exacting challenge of comparison with his predecessor. This would have been an unhappy succession in any time, but it was peculiarly doleful in an era of democratic retreat. For Mr. Truman has not merely been accused of failing to resemble his predecessor. He has been blamed for everything that has gone wrong since Mr. Roosevelt died, as if the change in the presi-

dential role was exclusively responsible for the ensuing failure of the progressive play.

The roots of failure were, of course, evident and noted by many observers long before Roosevelt died. Yet Mr. Wallace and others who have led the chorus of lamentation continue to reduce the complexities and disappointments of the post war era to a nostalgic sigh: "If Franklin Roosevelt had lived. . . ." The frustrations of the Left are alternately attributed to Mr. Truman's venality and to his blundering. We are told that Mr. Roosevelt's survival would have ushered in a golden age and that Mr. Truman has set out deliberately to repudiate the works of his predecessor. Senator Pepper has told us with great certitude what Mr. Roosevelt would have said and done in every crucial problem that has confronted Mr. Truman. Mr. Wallace, once distinguished for his humility, boasts equally clear communion with the departed President.

In view of the father-complex from which most American liberals suffered during Mr. Roosevelt's lifetime, these post-mortems are perhaps inevitable. It was one of the tragic facts of the brightest Roosevelt years that under his guidance progressives lost much of their capacity for innovation and self-protection. They ran to father with their problems and they knew that in any really tight spot he would somehow rescue them.

Speculation on what might have happened if Roosevelt had lived is, of course, an unrewarding enterprise. He didn't leave a detailed testament; it was not the nature of the man to chart the exact course of a voyage before he eyed the political climate and studied the latest storm warnings. Perhaps the only thing we can state with assurance is that he would view the current recitations of some of his disciples with scepticism. Justly or not, he had an active contempt for the leaders of organized liberalism. To his pragmatic eyes, they often seemed like children who are especially precocious in some areas of the imagination but utterly retarded in dealing with rudimentary facts of life.

Yet, some appraisal of the continuity—

and lack of it—between the two administrations seems appropriate as a measure of our present situation. We are told that Roosevelt had found the path to permanent peace and that Truman has brought us to the brink of atomic war, that Roosevelt could have created a postwar New Deal while Truman has invited the money-changers back into the temple. And some liberals, pondering the legend, either pray for a Second Coming or give themselves up to black despair, cursing the fate that struck so cruelly in April 1944.

It seems to me no irreverence to Mr. Roosevelt's memory to suggest that this phase of the Roosevelt legend is largely fantasy. There are important and unhappy contrasts between the two administrations—and the two men—but one seriously doubts that the differences are responsible for the altered outlines of history. Without entering into a long debate on the influence of men over events, one remains unimpressed by the cruel comparisons drawn between Truman and Roosevelt. One need not write a brief in defense of Mr. Truman to recognize that many of his woes are politically hereditary, that he assumed office with a fierce yearning to fulfill what he considered Roosevelt's mission, and that his subsequent floundering reflects the weakness and irresolution of the liberal forces in the country as much as any personal inadequacy.

The truth is that these liberal forces were in full flight in domestic affairs from 1937 onward. One finds it difficult to believe that they could have been miraculously rejuvenated by Mr. Roosevelt.

ANY appraisal of the Truman regime must be divided—for purposes of precision as well as convenience—between the realm of foreign affairs and the business of domestic policy. I fully recognize that this dichotomy is considered a grave heresy in loftier Marxist circles because the two areas are presumed to be entirely interdependent. But watching the process of government in Washington, a correspondent becomes increasingly convinced that such rigid formulae are wide of the truth.

The interesting thing is that the Wallace-Pepper camp's bitterest indictment of Mr. Truman has been leveled at his foreign policy. This was the source of the widely heralded Truman-Wallace split; and while both Wallace and Pepper—with belated political sagacity—were among the first to hail the appointment of General Marshall as successor to Mr. Byrnes, they have voiced no apologies for their earlier proclamations. Nor have we any assurance that the conversion is lasting.

Wallace and Pepper charged that the Truman administration—chiefly in the person of Mr. Byrnes—had deviated disastrously from “the policy of Big Three unity” enunciated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. We were “getting tough with Russia” and thereby planting the seeds of a new World War.

The conduct of our foreign relations under Mr. Truman is no special evidence of the President's wisdom, beyond his initial realization that foreign affairs were over his head. He sensibly entrusted these matters to wiser men. The fact that has been insufficiently noticed is that the man who played perhaps the most influential role in Mr. Byrnes' regime was Benjamin V. Cohen, State Department counsellor. He was at Mr. Byrnes' side during the gravest tensions of the postwar months, and he will be at General Marshall's side during the Moscow meeting. His name was omitted from the most violent liberal polemics against the administration's foreign policy—because his name was obviously out of place in lurid stories of an “imperialist anti-Soviet conspiracy.” He was one of the earliest New Dealers. He personifies continuity between the Roosevelt and Truman eras in foreign policy. He participated in the great international meetings that preceded Mr. Roosevelt's death and he has occupied an even more strategic role in subsequent conferences. No one has suggested that gentle, erudite Ben Cohen has “sold out” to the warmongers.

Dean Acheson has risen to greater eminence in the Truman State Department than he ever enjoyed under Roosevelt. No

less noteworthy, but less widely known, is the influx of young progressives into lower echelons of the Department; their presence has provoked intermittent warnings in Congress that the Department is surrendering to subversion.

The Old Guard in the Department has neither died nor surrendered, and cookie-pushing is not a lost art. The important fact is that the men who have moulded policy in our postwar clashes with Russia are neither “crypto-fascists,” to borrow the terminology of the Communist handbooks, nor betrayers of the Roosevelt gospel. The inescapable conclusion is that the origins of postwar friction with the Russians run deeper than the wicked personalities of American diplomats; it is possible that Mr. Roosevelt himself (who manifested his interest in free Polish elections as long ago as the Yalta meeting) would have clashed sharply and solemnly with the Russian rulers over postwar settlements; it is possible that not even the patience and fortitude of Mr. Wallace would have insured United States-Russian amity on any terms except total democratic surrender.

IN THE same context, the selection of David Lilienthal as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission deserves significant mention. It was the Wallace-Pepper thesis that we were holding the atom bomb over Russian heads as we talked and that the weapon might carelessly drop out of our hands at any moment. Yet not even the *Daily Worker* has protested that Mr. Lilienthal is an imperialist bandit; the only cries of protest come from the most backward benches in Congress. The other appointments to the Atomic Commission—where Mr. Truman should have exposed his sinister warlike intentions—are equally unconvincing as characters in an imperialist plot. As I write, the danger is not that Mr. Lilienthal and his associates will plunge us into some reckless foreign adventure, but that Lilienthal will be convicted of heresy by the Republican (and Southern Democratic) witch-hunters.

The Wallace camp has decried the as-

cendancy of Senator Vandenberg in the lofty realms of foreign policy. It was President Roosevelt who placed him there. Roosevelt foresaw the possibility of a postwar resurgence of isolationism. We would not be in the United Nations now if we had to rely exclusively on the Pepper-Wallace contingent in the Senate.

We have failed—as we failed in Roosevelt's time—to give sufficient aid and encouragement to the Left democratic forces in Europe. There are some signs that we are recognizing the failure. But the Wallace school hasn't leveled its fire at this failure. It has demonstrated no concern for independent democratic and socialist movements, except to brand them as anti-Soviet conspirators. Bestowing pious words of blessing on the British Labor government, it has yet lost no chance to bait the British and to decry the specter of an "Anglo-American axis."

What Wallace and his associates are in fact suggesting is that Franklin D. Roosevelt would have been indifferent to the fate of the four freedoms in Russian territory, that he would have accepted all the rationalizations that were once used to justify Mussolini, and then Hitler. (As Ralph Ingersoll recently observed in his remarkable dispatches from Warsaw: the trains run and roads are being improved, why quibble about free ballots?) I don't know what Roosevelt would have said and done in each of the international disputes that has arisen since the peace. But men whose professional assignment is to cover the State Department are agreed that, in the first two years of Truman, liberal voices have been more attentively heeded than they were in the Roosevelt age. Cohen and Acheson are the most dramatic exhibits, and there are others.

In a time of world sadness it is nice to have villains one can identify at home. So Byrnes and Truman became the targets in the liberal shooting-gallery, with the Communists applauding wildly.

MR. Truman's home-front failures have been far more acute than his diplomatic blunders. Here again, however, one

detects a wistful quality in the "might-have-been" sermons. Certainly the resistance to social reform that characterizes the present Congress can be traced to national circumstances that preceded Mr. Truman's arrival. Would Mr. Roosevelt's presence have averted a Republican congressional victory? Would Mr. Roosevelt be more successful in selling domestic legislation to a hostile legislature? Any affirmative answer must be based strictly on faith.

Having said all that, it is still clear that Mr. Truman's inability to demonstrate any fighting capacity has so far been a dominant characteristic of his handling of domestic affairs. On only two occasions—the coal strike and the railroad strike—has he defied a powerful challenge at home, but I cannot escape the suspicion that in the postwar anti-union atmosphere these facts were less heroic than some of the President's admirers would have us believe.

The President is frequently reported as telling White House visitors that his devotion to the somewhat amorphous banner of "The New Deal" is unwavering. I believe that is true—that the President's instincts are unquestionably on the side of expanding democracy and that he would like to be recorded for posterity as a "fighting liberal." The platforms he has periodically presented to Congress reflect his allegiance to progressive social and economic measures.

But Truman hasn't begun to fight. There is his real failure.

More than a year ago he submitted a 21-point program to Congress. It embodied virtually all the ideas that Roosevelt had publicly projected for the postwar period, as well as a few that the Truman team fumblingly initiated. He called for a full employment act, for a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, for expanded social security and higher minimum wages, for greater aid to education, large-scale public housing, a comprehensive public-health program. He got a full-employment bill—drastically edited—and little else. Some may argue that the establishment of the full-employment principle was itself a momen-

tous achievement. I think the temper of Congress, even before the Republicans formally assumed control, was overwhelmingly hostile to the Truman platform. Yet the President's half-hearted gestures on behalf of most of the planks seemed like the motions of a man who knew he was beaten.

THE same listlessness was apparent a year ago in the President's dealings with the powerful steel corporations in the conflict that fundamentally wrecked the stabilization program. Steel was prepared to agree to industrial peace—at a high price; and through the intervention of Mr. Snyder it got what it wanted. Steel was given a price increase that shattered the stabilization structure, although the full damage was not apparent until some months later. General Motors, defying the findings of a presidential fact-finding board, also dictated its peace terms at the White House.

Through it all Mr. Truman never lost his patience with the industrialists—at least not publicly. The man who was prepared to engage in a death struggle with John L. Lewis showed no comparable lust for combat when confronted by a corporate sit-down. He capitulated to the meat packers and he sacrificed Wilson Wyatt to the housing interests, and neither challenge made him fighting mad.

Perhaps primarily responsible for the President's timidity and ineptitude was the character of the men around him (which inevitably mirrors the President himself). Long before Roosevelt died a vast change had taken place in government. The New Deal battalions of the 1930's were decimated. Some had gone off to the wars and others had simply gone off to private pastures. The bright young men of the 1930's had become the tired, discouraged, middle-aged men of the 1940's. The bright banners of domestic reform were drooping forlornly long before Pearl Harbor; they were trampled into the earth in the wartime rush to produce weapons on the terms that business demanded. The President could not—and would not—protect those who aroused

congressional wrath. The preoccupations of a global war left little time for new domestic dreams. By the time the war had ended and Harry Truman occupied the White House, much of the human material that shaped the New Deal was no longer around.

Mr. Truman has offered little inspiration to rally a new generation of young men with ideas, and if they were moved by his appeals, the political atmosphere of Washington would scarcely tempt them to offer their services. Most of them would be run out of town by the congressional watchdogs. So, in the places that men of talent and imagination occupied during the gaudy New Deal time, solid, sober citizens once again hold sway. It is paradoxical, as noted earlier, that the most promising men seem to be engaged in foreign-policy and atomic posts, and the paradox will probably provoke new and angry Republican protests before many weeks have passed. The drive to make mediocrity supreme in all fields will be a furious one.

The fact is that Snyders, Tom Clarks, Steelmans, and General Vaughans do not enjoy those conflicts with vested interests that militant advocacy of the Truman program would entail. They rightly argue that such measures have little chance of passage. But they give little sign of really caring about the result.

The Truman inner circle is not vicious; it is plodding, unimaginative, easily impressed by men who have "met a payroll," and deeply suspicious of "intellectuals"—meaning creators of ideas. The exodus of the New Dealers has assumed the proportions of a forced march. The departure of talent from government may have far more devastating long-range effects than the loss of some Democrats in the House of Representatives.

THE gap between decent instinct and aggressive performance has been repeatedly illustrated in White House efforts to aid the dispossessed abroad. At no time has it been suggested that Mr. Truman was apathetic

to the problem. But Attorney General Clark has been visibly half-hearted in pressing for modification of the immigration quotas. Neither has Mr. Clark's department demonstrated any uncontrollable passion for prosecution of Southern lynch-mobs. There has never been a moment, however, when Mr. Truman's emotions on such issues seemed artificial. A confidential poll of true congressional feeling on increased immigration would show, I think, how far the President is ahead of his congressional colleagues; and how futile it is to belabor him for the backwardness and apathy of American policy. I seriously question whether the present Congress would even be influenced by a *New Republic* editorial on the subject.

Yet the curious and disturbing fact remains that Mr. Truman's severest liberal critics have damned him most vehemently for his conduct of foreign affairs. In my judgment they chose the wrong battleground, and by doing so they not only weakened the chance for domestic rejuvenation but gravely undermined the effectiveness of the liberal-left. While the last battles against home-front profiteering were being waged, the leading liberal journals were crusading against a windmill—"imminent war with Russia." This spectacle must have enormously enhanced Mr. Truman's initial confusion.

THROUGHOUT the Roosevelt-Truman span we have had no progressive movement worthy of the name in the United States. We had the illusion of liberal strength during Roosevelt's lifetime, but it vanished with his death. In actuality progressive advances at home had reached a dead stop by 1938. Wallace inherited the symbolic leadership of the "liberal bloc," but it quickly became apparent that there was no bloc and that he was an inept leader. The fictitious "Roosevelt coalition" collapsed on Mr. Truman's doorstep; in fact, it had only been sustained by the war.

While recognizing Mr. Truman's inadequacies, any evaluation of the weaknesses of his administration must give major weight

to the disintegration of the Left. There has been no organized force—inside or outside of the Democratic party—capable of offering real resistance to the conservative advance. The greatest thunder on the Left has been provoked by his imaginary sins in the complex realm of Russian relations; no comparable heat has been aroused by his domestic timidity. In that setting it is questionable whether Truman can be expected to do much more than stage a delaying action and try to write a record for the future. The provincialism of the labor movement often pained Franklin Roosevelt; it must baffle and demoralize Harry Truman, confronted as he is by the difficult dilemmas of a world he never made.

In the final analysis any honest estimate of Truman's shortcomings must include a realistic appraisal of the futility and floundering of the liberal-labor Left. A revitalized liberal bloc, if one is to be created, must be free of any sentimental or cynical identification with totalitarianism. It must recognize real ties with the battered but unbroken legions of social democracy that have kept alive the vision of a society in which security and dignity are achieved within the framework of freedom. Without question, most of the men in the house on Pennsylvania Avenue have yet to grasp the dimensions of this decision. Yet Mr. Truman's confusion and innocence are to some degree a measure of the muddle in what is known as the "progressive wing" of his party.

The extraordinary response evoked by the newly-formed Americans for Democratic Action is a clue to growing awareness of the frailty of the progressive structure as it has operated in recent years. Until such a movement demonstrates the capacity of liberals to fight their own battles it is hard to see why Mr. Truman should take the rap for all our ineffectuality and bewilderment. One may view his performance as high comedy or as tragedy, but there is no point pretending that he is solely responsible for inventing the atom bomb or for the world's failure so far to work out some decent international method for its control.

THE INSPECTOR

A Story

JEAN MALAQUAIS

"**A**CT natural. Walk straight ahead." Marc Laverne "acted natural," but bore to his left at the first crossing he came to. Straight ahead: as it happened, that was how he was going—straight to Emilio Lopez' attic. So the forward-march order gave him a strong preference for detours. As he walked he tried to judge the age, corpulence, and possible agility of the policeman. As long as the other man paid no attention to the route and let him go where he wished, Laverne would try to work his way through the narrow streets, into the heart of the clammy maze of high, crooked walls, where a plunge into the dark would have some chance of success.

"No funny business, Laverne. Not with me," said the man, drawing out his words. His voice was as thick as his body, the powerful outline of which rubbed against Laverne's shoulder. "You know, I'm disappointed in you," the man said, tapping him on the elbow with his finger.

JEAN MALAQUAIS is a well-known French writer, author of a number of books, of which the best-known in the United States are *Les Javanais*, a novel, published here in 1942 as *Men From Nowhere*, and *War Diary*, an account of experiences as a French soldier in the late war, published here in 1944. Mr. Malaquais was born in Warsaw, Poland, in 1908, and during the past twenty-two years, in addition to extensive activities as a novelist, critic and poet, he has been "sailor, miner, book-keeper, factory worker, engine-driver, movie-director's assistant, motorcycle rider in a circus, and faithful and loyal frequenter of lodging-houses and popular soups." He is at present in this country, completing a novel, *Planete Sans Visa*, which is to be published in the fall in an English translation by Doubleday. "The Inspector" is an episode in this novel; it was translated by Peter Grant.

"It might even be the honorable Inspector Espinasse in person," said Laverne, not looking at the man. He was trying to make out whether there were any more policemen at their heels. "How nice to meet you! How are you, Inspector?"

A rumbling sound came from the inspector's chest. "Not so good, thanks—and you?" he said, as though talking into a kettledrum. He gave him another tap on the elbow with his finger. "Where were you on your way to, Laverne?"

"To go swimming on my back and count the stars," said Laverne.

"Huh. . . ." said the inspector, and they walked on peaceably.

So it was Espinasse, the old brute, Espinasse of the Sûreté Générale, rechristened National Security, inspector in Paris before the debacle, Political Division. Assigned to the Marseilles Prefecture, or on special mission? Laverne wondered. It came to him that Espinasse must have run into him by accident, not being a man to chase after his quarry himself. His taste was not for running down the quarry, but for dressing it after it was taken. The first time Espinasse had had a bone to pick with Laverne was the day after an office of the *Action Française* had been raided, an expedition in the course of which one of the Royalist bully-boys had left an eye behind him, and the most recent was at the time of the Munich Pact, as the result of an article described as "inciting the military to disobedience."

Espinasse's specter had a bad reputation among the initiate, and falling into his hands promised nothing to look forward to with pleasure. Although he seldom resorted to violence, those who had passed through his

back-room at Sûreté headquarters regarded him as a sadist of the first water. Thirty years on the job had thickened his skin but refined his instincts; and under a boorish exterior, he cultivated a delicate love of questioning a suspect, digging into him, taking him apart piece by piece—a love for “mosaic work,” as he liked to call it.

He combined the talents of a confessor with those of a vicious psychoanalyst. But he was particularly redoubtable for the exceptional keenness of his scent, for the infallibility of his memory. He would identify the author of a text by the turn of a phrase or by the punctuation, and he never forgot a face, a gait, a thing said. Laverne remembered the man's highly personal way of doing things. He seemed to cherish his quarry once he had it in hand—to take charge of it, to make its future his own business. Just as a family physician keeps in touch with his patients' state of health, Espinasse never lost sight of the tracks of his wild beasts; but, like all superior practitioners, he was really interested only in special cases—in the young catch, often still unripe, but with good bloodlines. When his net brought in a specimen whose breed he recognized, he would put it back in circulation after taking its measurements, and not the anthropometric measurements alone. He was known for having broken, then corrupted, a number of young members of the movement, and for having reared the most remarkable generation of *provocateurs* to infest the ranks of French revolutionaries since Vidocq's day.

His knowledge of the European working-class movement, from the earliest French equivalents of Brook Farm to the latest theses of the Fourth International, combined with a genuine understanding of Marxism, had taught him that Socialism was no “pretty utopian idea,” but a historical reality that could not be put down by filling the prisons to the doors. Moreover, Socialism as such did not worry him particularly; he did not allow himself enough time to see its first gleams lighting up the sky of France. Life had made him a specialist in the struggle against the revolutionaries, and he did not

hate his victims any more than the *torero* hated the bulls; on the contrary, he liked them when their condition was good, their weight standard, and they charged straight. His appetite was not titillated by small fry, nor by the harmless whales any bungler could harpoon without getting out of his bunk, and reform-school sentences were not in his line. A skilled hunter, he did not slaughter his game—not before the proper time. The political beast was of a different complexion than the common run: he liked it plump, ample in volume, rich with its full quota of stearin; he wanted the bleeding to be a treat to see.

He was patient, he worked on a long-term basis. It sometimes happened that a fine, full-blooded specimen got in a dig with the horn, but that was what made the corrida exciting. This Marc Laverne had a good leg. More than once Espinasse had allowed himself the satisfaction of letting him go free, and he wasn't going to leave the Germans the pleasure of skinning him—devil take him, he wasn't. That was their style, the boobs—to take something that deserved to be enjoyed delicately and skin it alive.

“THE Gestapo-Laval stickers that Mar-seilles was plastered with the other night—what did you have to do with them?” he asked, talking into a bass drum.

“Enjoyed reading them,” said Laverne.

“You're lying, Marc,” said Espinasse, yawning.

“It's naughty to tell a lie, isn't it, Inspector?”

They were walking up the middle of an airless alley, one on either side of a waterless drain. After seven sessions under questioning, some of which had lasted from six to eight hours without a break, Laverne had come to the conclusion that it was good strategy to answer Espinasse's questions in a light tone—provided the answer followed the question immediately, without seeming to have much thought behind it. He had a good enough nose to have sensed that the inspector enjoyed a bit of lightness in the fighting: a hard nut bounces better. And as

Espinasse had a jutting jaw, he liked to stick it out.

From their first meeting, Laverne had been aware that the inspector was not immune to the weakness common to champions, a weakness for running against the clock, jumping to make a kangaroo blench, swimming so fast the pool boils—all because their aim is to break the record, not to get anywhere. He would kill the bull, since the bull had to be killed, but the killing was only a pretext, the essence of the *fiesta brava* being the play of cape and muleta. Laverne was not fooled, therefore. He knew that the man had not yet attempted a real attack, not judging him either worthy of, or ripe for, the final thrust. Moreover, a stroll through the Old Port of Marseilles, which now, in early September, was rank with the richest effluvia of decayed tripe, was hardly a fitting occasion for lightning offensives. But he was afraid he might be wrong, afraid that even Inspector Espinasse's love of the art might have succumbed to the flatulent powers of Vichy's gases.

If I don't find out what's up in five minutes, he thought, I head for the nearest coal-hole.

THEY walked with even steps over the uneven paving. Somewhere close by in the darkness, cats were crying like ill-tempered babies. Against the leprous façade of the Hôtel de Ville, under the vaults rotted with the cholera of the ages, someone was gripping someone else in deathless embrace. The inspector's heavy breathing and weighty steps stirred not a whit the fetid odors of the night. Laverne tried to recall what he had been doing on a September night like this five years ago. Or four. Nothing, probably nothing. Otherwise he would remember. He reflected that if he had so little recollection of what had happened, it was because nothing had happened. Life. Life in its simplicity and its sacredness.

On the right, up the steps of the hospital building, run up those steps and you'll wind him, he thought.

"No funny business, Laverne," said the

inspector, talking into a barrel.

They continued walking with even steps over the uneven paving. Fifteen yards, twelve yards, nine yards, here I take off, thought Laverne.

"Wait," said the inspector. He put his finger on Laverne's elbow. "I'm not going to pull you in."

They continued walking with even steps. Two uniformed policemen shuffled past, and one of them turned his flashlight on them. "Huh. . . ." went the inspector. He had not taken away his finger.

Laverne did not feel relieved by the man's promise; in fact, he had had an intuition that Espinasse was not going to pull him in. Not this evening.

"Well, I'll be delighted not to see you again, Inspector," he said.

The inspector pressed his finger more strongly into Laverne's elbow, and a rumble came from his chest.

"You bastard," came an unruffled male voice from the edge of the empty blackness. "You dirty bastard, I'll teach you a lesson."

The inspector took away his finger. "You think I'm a bastard, a very dirty bastard," he said, talking into a barrel.

"Is that a question?" said Laverne.

"No. Yes. But you're a liar. . . ."

"That's one way of looking at it," said Laverne.

HE thought he had detected a sudden dissonance in the inspector's voice, as if at the very last instant he had bitten off the tail of his sentence. They had come out into a little square where by day there was a bust on a pedestal, where by night there was nothing. "I was born here," said the inspector. Here the old mistral sighed the notes of a *Lied*, the ancient masts creaked in the void, here an arm of the sea slept in the arms of the wharves.

It had never occurred to Laverne that there had been a day or an hour that had given birth to an Inspector Espinasse. An Inspector Espinasse existed per se, as out there the waters existed, and over here the filth—existed, having appeared on earth all

at once, with his hundred and ninety-five pounds of complexes clothed in white skin, and no one could imagine him little, sucking the milk of a breast, little and almost innocent.

"They'll put up a statue here to you," Laverne said.

The inspector said nothing. Backs to the city, they followed the quay, strolling along. Laverne reflected that indeed Espinasse was "not so good—and you?" This was not an examination, not a conversation, not a promenade. This was a mistake. A miscalculation. The inspector was suffering from myopia if he hoped that Laverne would forget what he was. He was suffering from glaucoma. Laverne had no sympathy to squander, no compassion for a wrong guy badly off. The moral chemistry of inspectors left him indifferent, and he was not the man to hold Espinasse's head to help him to vomit.

"Inspector, it's very kind of you, but if you have nothing more to say to me, I would just as soon walk alone."

Espinasse went "huh . . ." and put his finger on Laverne's elbow. A streetcar passed, wiggling its haunches like a mannequin. A long spark crackled at the tip of the trolley-pole, and in the purple glare the inspector's soft face was covered with soft blotches.

"A boy who goes by the name of Michel," he said. "He was seen the last time in Nantes, when the court job was pulled." His voice came out of the insides of a tomtom, it seemed to go on and on. "I would like you to tell me if you know him."

"I don't read the papers," said Laverne.

"I'm not asking you to tell me where he's hanging out. Probably you don't know. But you might know if. . ."

HE DID not finish, as if the strings of his bass fiddle had broken all at once. This is really bad, thought Laverne. He could not remember Espinasse tripping over his tongue ever before. The words held back vibrated and vibrated in the inspector's chest. What did he want to know, and

what was it he knew so little about? Good luck and a long life to him if he was running after Michel. Revolvers drawn, Michel and two others had invaded a German military court when three of their men were about to be condemned to death. An *Oberst*, a *Hauptmann*, a sentinel, a French gendarme, were killed. High-tension work. The following night a German patrol had riddled a cyclist with bullets. The corpse was identified as being that of a certain Alfred Jacquinet, laborer, twenty-eight years old, birthplace Béthune. It was Michel. Laverne heard of it two weeks later from a messenger who came to Marseilles. He had not known the man. He fished in the bottom of his pockets for a cigarette.

"But you're a liar," said the inspector, taking away his finger.

"It runs in the family," said Laverne.

He crumbled some tobacco dust and ashes into a cigarette paper. "Huh. . . ." went the inspector, and blew his nose. His handkerchief rose and disappeared like a breath on a frosty night.

"You think I'm a louse," he said.

"No," SAID Marc Laverne. "I never think of you at all." It seemed to him that the inspector's heavy step had become heavier. Far below them the sea was talking to itself, far above them the sky was gone. Laverne wet the edge of the paper and rolled a thin cigarette.

"I'd give you a decent cigarette if you asked me," said the inspector, talking down a rainbarrel. Laverne did not ask, and the inspector did not offer him a cigarette. They had retraced their steps, and once more the old city greeted them with its swampy scum.

"Look here, Laverne, you're pretty young to be taking me where I have no intention of going." A sound like the rolling of a drum came from far down in the mass of his body. "Those stickers—'People of Marseilles, unite against, etcetera'—your fingerprints were all over that job. I don't know who printed them yet, but a couple of days will settle that. In July you were in Lyons at a secret gathering of the 'revolutionary Left.' You

made three reports, one on the situation and outlook of the Resistance, one on the strike movement in England since 1940, one on the Russian internal picture. The leading articles of at least two underground papers are yours. I'm fairly sure you had something to do with the attempted robbery at the Toulon arsenal. I'm practically certain that you've been to Switzerland on a mission, and that you brought back tommy guns and grenades. I've got enough on you to send you to the guillotine five times over. But I'm not going to pull you in."

He stopped talking, and they went on several paces in silence. Two stinkbombs ran down the pavement like will-o'-the-wisps. Or were they the eyes of a cat? Laverne was wondering who the squealer was.

"You want to know who the squealer is," said the inspector. "He works for me. For me exclusively. I will tell you who he is. You can put him out of the way, and I won't raise a finger." He was talking from the bottom of a well, far down from the bottom of his chest. "On one condition. You will tell me if they caught Michel. You must know if they caught him. You can answer in one word: yes, no. Michel is my son."

Laverne stopped to light his cigarette. The inspector did not stop, and at once the high, crooked walls closed over him. His step became less heavy, then cottony, then remote.

In Laverne's hands the match flame died beneath the weight of the night.

THE PROBLEM OF SYNAGOGUE ARCHITECTURE

Creating a Style Expressive of America

RACHEL WISCHNITZER-BERNSTEIN

SPELLING reform and the cleaning of icons are, to some members of the older Russian generation, the two unforgivable sins committed by the Bolsheviks. (As it happens, both began under the Czarist regime, and the cleaning of the icons led to the discovery of valuable paintings beneath the dirt and overpainting.) There was something symbolic, people felt, about the familiar letter *yat*, dropped from the new spelling system, and about the once dark faces of the saints. Gone was the charm of the old.

Tradition, that coat of dust which gives things that dear old worn look, has always played an important role in our sense of the beautiful. In secular art, to be sure, the elements of novelty, surprise, or contrast may at times become more powerful. People tire of the paintings, the furnishings, the bric-a-brac they have lived with; they come to want new houses with new things in them.

THERE are many signs that these postwar years will witness a new wave of synagogue building in the United States. In this article, and in others that will follow, COMMENTARY seeks to provide a fruitful discussion of the principles that must concern those who will decide what shape new houses of worship are to take, as well as the general cultural problem involved. RACHEL WISCHNITZER-BERNSTEIN, architect and art historian, was curator of the Jewish Museum in Berlin, art editor of the magazines *Rimon* and *Milgrom*, editor for art and architecture of the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, and one-time research fellow of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Her book *Forms and Symbols of Jewish Art* was published in Berlin in 1935, and she has written articles on various phases of religious art. Mrs. Wischnitzer-Bernstein has recently completed a study, now awaiting publication, of the Messianic theme in the paintings of the Dura-Europos synagogue. She is now collecting material on American synagogues. She was born in Minsk and is now with the Yiddish Scientific Institute.

However, tradition is more inextricably associated with religious feeling, the sense of the sacred, and hence with religious art. The designer of religious structures has not the same freedom to introduce the new as the architect of residences enjoys. The ecclesiastical architect who dares contemplate innovations in the layout of a house of worship always does so with serious misgivings about their popular acceptance.

The work of Frank Lloyd Wright, a leader of what was regarded twenty years ago as the avant-garde of architecture, is instructive in this connection. To us, today, Wright's country houses with their plain and unadorned surfaces and overhanging roofs seem charming and quite inoffensive. We fail to understand emotionally what people could have found so "emancipated" about them. But our reaction to Wright's Church of the Unity, built in Oak Park, Illinois, in 1908—an edifice that Fiske Kimball, the art historian, called an appropriate setting for "disciples of modern rationalization"—is quite different. We can still feel the original shock. This church lacks the qualities tradition associates with religious architecture.

These qualities are hard to define and isolate. They are closely related to what Clive Bell, the English art critic, called "significant form," and they involve certain overtones that go to constitute what Lionello Venturi would call "content" as distinguished from actual subject matter. For the architects of the 19th century, the best way to bring out the meaning and purpose of a building was to conceive it in a style that would convey its "content" through sheer weight of historical association.

Beginnings of Orientalist Revival

A THEATER was deemed to be in the "right"

style if it looked like the Colosseum—which, to the educated, was the prototype of all theaters. This was an idea shared by Gottfried Semper, a young German architect of the 19th century who had much to do with establishing synagogue style in Western Europe. Semper had been a revolutionary and had fought in 1849 on the barricades in Dresden. Fleeing abroad, he had the opportunity to preach his gospel in Paris, London, Vienna, and Switzerland. Later, in the 1870's, Semper acquired a worldwide reputation with his Burg theater and museum buildings in Vienna. Despite his historicism, Semper anticipated, at least in his writings, some aspects of the modern functional theory of architecture; and a Swiss scholar, Joseph Gantner, recently compared his role with that of Le Corbusier in our own time. But it is as a synagogue-builder, not as a prophet, that Semper deserves our interest.

He had used the Colosseum as a model for his court theater in Dresden, but what historical model could he possibly use when commissioned to build a synagogue in Dresden? Semper argued that the synagogue should be provided with historical associations in its design and ornamentation that would reveal the building's character. This background of associations, he felt, could be derived from the Orient, since the cradle of Judaism lay there. But what did the Orient mean to Semper? It meant to him, as a Gentile, something different from what it meant to Jews. It meant a mixture of things seen on a trip to Sicily: a blending of the Byzantine, the Saracen, and the Romanesque. Accordingly, his synagogue, built in 1839-40, was conceived in terms of this special and local definition of the oriental.

Whether Semper's style made an emotional appeal to the Jewish community that used his synagogue is hard to tell. Any doubts on the part of the congregation were probably dispelled by the prestige of this young architect, at that time at the height of a brilliant career. Attesting the unlikelihood that Semper's Jewish clients felt dissatisfaction is the fact that his example was followed by other synagogue-builders and

established a vogue that has survived to this day—a vogue we might call the Gentile notion of what Jewish tradition *looks* like.

Protective Coloration

A NOSTALGIC, romantic vision of the Orient haunted the imagination of the artists of the early 19th century. As a matter of fact, oriental bric-a-brac had already become stylish even in the 18th century. Those who could afford to, built in the oriental taste—even when it was only a matter of a garden pavilion. In England, the Garden of Kew (1760) featured a mosque, an "Alhambra," and a Chinese pagoda. Catherine the Great of Russia commissioned her Russian architect to build her a Moorish summer palace. A synagogue in Moorish style at that time could have been quite in keeping with a general fashion all over Europe.

Napoleon's short-lived conquest of Egypt made the oriental synonymous for a time with the Egyptian. Forty years before Semper, in 1798, the very year of Napoleon's expedition, Friedrich Weinbrenner erected a synagogue in Karlsruhe with a facade decorated with Egyptian pylons. Like other exotic fashions, the Egyptian vogue became widely diffused, but it won much greater prevalence in furniture than in architecture. Table legs looked like wrapped mummies; sphinxes invaded desks and mirror frames.

Of the relatively few examples of Egyptian inspiration in architecture, the synagogue built in Munich in 1825 by the Frenchman Métyvier is outstanding. We would like to know, in this case as in Weinbrenner's, just what meaning the associations with Egypt conveyed by the architectural motifs had for the Jewish congregation concerned. Did they relish them as souvenirs of the land of the Exodus, where Moses was born and Joseph achieved greatness?

Illuminating here is the attitude toward Egypt expressed by Rahel von Varnhagen, one of those remarkable Jewish women who dominated the Berlin cultural salons of the early 19th century. On her deathbed, in 1833, she recalled that as a "refugee from Egypt and Palestine" she had found affec-

tion in her country of "adoption" (she had been born in Berlin). To Rahel Levin—baptized a Christian upon her marriage to the aristocrat Varnhagen von Ense—her Jewish origin was a source of embarrassment and grief, and associations with Egypt were but another reminder of what she deemed a humiliating past. Did the German Jews of her period who remained in the fold feel differently about the oriental?

Apparently not. When the building of a synagogue was contemplated in Cassel in the second quarter of the 19th century, the problem of choosing an appropriate style came up in all its complex ambiguity. First of all, the site and style of the synagogue involved problems of city planning; this provoked the interest of the officials of the court of the Duke of Cassel. His court architect, Johann Conrad Bromeis, submitted a design in Egyptian style. He pointed out that the outstanding characteristic of Egyptian art was durability, and argued that this was also the main feature of the Mosaic faith—a flattering view apparently shared by Cassel's minister of the interior, who approved of Bromeis' design. But the Jewish community rejected it. After years of debate and after more plans had been submitted and rejected, the synagogue was finally built in 1836-38 by August Schuchardt, a younger architect of the province of Cassel, and his Jewish assistant, Albert Rosengarten, in a reduced Romanesque style: unassuming and neutral, with just the right measure of medievalism required to identify the structure as of religious significance. There were no oriental suggestions.

Schuchardt, in disagreeing with Bromeis, offered some arguments inspired apparently by his assistant. He pointed out that Jews could not be expected to approve of a style that would remind them of their ancient oppressors. This was a telling point—but it was not the real reason why Bromeis' project was rejected. What actually motivated the Jewish community was expressed in the application of the communal leaders to the authorities: it was frankly admitted that the Jews did not want a synagogue whose outer appearance would not harmonize with the

environment. As a small minority group, they did not want to stress differences from the people around them or look conspicuous. Some may have remembered the anti-Jewish riots of 1819 in southern Germany.

The Cassel incident sheds light on the state of insecurity and frustration in which the Jews of Germany lived at that time. Thus the style of synagogue architecture became not merely a question of aesthetics, but also one of social policy. The revivalist Romanesque style was deemed more acceptable because it provided a vocabulary of greater currency and communicated a feeling of "rightness" and dignity. And even though the particular Romanesque of Semper's Dresden synagogue contained certain Moorish suggestions, they were so slight that they could be easily overlooked.

The Ubiquitous Moorish

ALBERT ROSENGARTEN, Schuchardt's able Jewish assistant, soon became a popular synagogue architect. In an article on synagogue style published in 1840 in a Viennese professional magazine, he held the classical Greek to be too closely linked with pagan cults to be suitable for Jewish purposes, but approved of the Roman classical, pointing out that the early synagogues actually belonged to that period and style. Whether out of deference to his famous colleague Semper—then completing his Dresden synagogue—or for other reasons, Rosengarten declared that the arts of Islam agreed with the conceptions of Judaism, and pointed out Jewish and Moslem similarities in attitude toward figurative representation.

In later years, however, Rosengarten changed his views completely. He acquired a pronounced dislike of Moorish style, which he attacked on aesthetic grounds, refusing to grant it creative impulse or expressive power. But again, there was an extra-aesthetic motive at work in this reluctance to see Judaism associated with the Arab arts and civilization. Rosengarten wanted to establish closer contact with Christianity. "The chief endeavor in Jewish and Christian worship is the elevating effect"—he wrote—

which common goal "could be attained only in classical, Romanesque, and Gothic architecture." (I quote from the London, 1894, edition of Rosengarten's *Handbook of Architecture*; the original German edition appeared in 1857.) Rosengarten went so far as to speak of the "perverted taste" of those who wished to impose Moorish forms on synagogue architecture.

Apparently he had in mind the synagogue at Mainz, a structure in Moorish style erected in 1853; and the synagogue in Leipzig, also Moorish, built by a pupil of Semper's in 1855. The Moorish synagogue of Cologne followed in 1856. The tide could not be turned. It appeared that the Jewish communities of Germany had changed their minds about oriental-style architecture, and that Rosengarten in the late 1850's no longer voiced the views of their leaders.

What had happened was a reorientation of taste following technological advances in the construction of buildings. The Crystal Palace in London and the World Exposition in Paris (1851 and 1855 respectively) had featured cupolas over cast-iron framework, slender iron columns, and faience and glass surfaces; these upset the traditional liking for the static in architecture and began to undermine the prestige of the Graeco-Roman. The slenderness of Gothic spires and Moorish minarets began to exert a stronger appeal on public taste, in line with the general revival of Gothicism. But as far as synagogue architecture was concerned, the Gothic was regarded as still too Christian for Jewish religious edifices. The Moorish, or some amalgam of the oriental, became the only alternative. Thus Abraham Hirsch, in his synagogue at Lyon in France (1864), blended reminiscences of the Temple of Solomon with Byzantine style in what he believed was a kind of recapitulation of the oriental style the Jews would have produced had they remained in the East.

The German architect Eduard Knoblauch was primarily concerned with technical problems when he began building the "New" synagogue in Berlin in 1859. To him the Moorish style seemed to agree best with the

slender cast-iron columns he introduced for the support of the women's galleries. (This synagogue was finished in 1866 by August Stuehler.) In any case, the Moorish struck Knoblauch as the most appropriate of all styles to the liturgical requirements of a non-Christian congregation.

But it should not be overlooked that since Leopold Zunz, the notion of the "Volksgeist" or national spirit had begun to permeate Jewish thinking. This counteracted the inhibitions and fears among Jews of which the Cassel community, in rejecting oriental suggestions, had been typical. In a sense the Moorish synagogue came for a time to represent the more progressive elements of the Jewish community. And the Moorish synagogue in Berlin so impressed Vladimir Stassov, leader of the art movement in St. Petersburg, champion of the Jews and their oracle in aesthetic matters, that he strongly advocated the Moorish style for the great choral synagogue in the Russian capital as being a very adequate expression of the Semitic genius. This was in the early 1870's. (The St. Petersburg synagogue was completed only in 1893, after years of wrangling with the authorities, who considered the project too ambitious.)

It would lead us too far afield to trace the diffusion of the Moorish type of synagogue through Austria, Italy, and the rest of Europe. One may wonder, however, why the sponsors of a Jewish "national" style never bothered to take a look at the old synagogues still preserved in Europe. There was the Romanesque synagogue in Worms and the Gothic Altneuschul in Prague, both authentic medieval structures; there was the classicist early 18th-century synagogue on Heidereuter Street in Berlin; and there was the early 19th-century Düsseldorf synagogue, a sober and severe example of the Renaissance revival. And there was also a brick synagogue in Cleve built in 1821 in Dutch classical. While in France, where almost nothing of the medieval period has survived, there still remained a few fine classicist synagogues from the 18th century. In Poland and Lithuania, on the other hand, a con-

siderable number of synagogues, beginning with the late Gothic of the 15th century, but especially representative of subsequent classic revivals, had survived, scattered over a wide area. The interiors at least of these last often displayed original features.

Yet to argue that these survivals could satisfy the craving for a "traditional" style would be beside the point. The Jewish communities had outgrown their old settings, and what they now needed were larger "modern" synagogues. Thus the synagogue in Lyon was built to house 500 persons, with seats for women included; the Brussels synagogue was designed for 700 people, the Leipzig one for 2,000 (because of the transients brought there by the Leipzig Fair), and the Berlin one for 3,000. The "modern" and "national" style could not be derived from the old, but small and modest, synagogue structures already existing in Europe, from small medieval chapels, or from classicist structures of a secular type.

First Synagogues in America

THE Moorish style turned up very early in the United States. Thus the old and no longer extant Temple Emanuel, on Fifth Avenue and Forty-third Street in New York, was built in Moorish style in 1868, its architect being Leopold Eidlitz, a native of Prague. The Central Synagogue, on Lexington Avenue and Fifty-fifth Street, was likewise built in Moorish style in 1872 by Henry Fernbach, born in Loewenberg, Germany. A characteristic Moorish edifice was the synagogue erected in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, at around the same time. Of more recent buildings, there is the collegiate building of Yeshiva University in New York with its synagogue for the High Holidays vaulted in Moorish style. It was built by Charles B. Meyers and Henry B. Herts in 1928.

Nevertheless, the Moorish-style synagogue never became as dominant in this country as it had been for an epoch in Western Europe. Classicist trends derived from American Colonial tradition were too powerful. This has held true in spite of the fact that the United States has a considerable Sephardic com-

munity, and it would be plausible to expect the Sephardim to build their houses of worship in the style, let us say, of the synagogues at Toledo. How plausible it was to expect this can be seen from the assumption made by Talbot F. Hamlin, the eminent historian of architecture, that the Moorish synagogues in America were created by Jewish exiles from Spain and Portugal. Incidentally, Hamlin had some very appreciative words to say about these edifices, more interesting to him than many Victorian churches.

It has been all too readily overlooked, however, even by our own historians, that the American Sephardim, immigrating not directly from Spain and Portugal, but from Holland and the Dutch colonies, could not carry with them any vivid memories of the Moorish period of their history. Their concepts of architecture and art were fashioned by 17th-century Dutch classicism. What they found in America was a Colonial and Georgian style, which was simply another phase of the same classical tradition. This explains why the 18th-century Sephardic synagogues—the synagogue on Mill Street in New York (1730), the synagogue in Newport, R. I. (1763), and that in Charleston, S. C. (1794)—were in complete harmony with the architecture of the other settlers, with nothing exotic about them.

The classical tradition was continued into the 19th century. The Sephardic Shearith Israel synagogue in New York, at Central Park West and Seventieth Street, built in 1897 by Brunner and Trion, reflects the then current phase of classicism—that is, French academicism, which was fostered by the enormous prestige of the Paris Ecole des Beaux-Arts among American architects of the period.

The Sephardim were not the only ones to yield to French classicism: there are enough examples to illustrate the diffusion of that style among the Ashkenazim in America. Thus, in New York, the classical facade, stemming from a French prototype, of the Temple Israel on West Ninety-first Street, which was designed by Tachau and Vought (1921-22), has very much in com-

mon with the equally French facade of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York on Liberty Street (1902) by James B. Baker.

Strong though the classical trend was in America, the revivals of medievalism introduced from Europe gradually loosened the hold of this traditional ideal of beauty. Typical of the Neo-Gothic current was the African Presbyterian Church on Elm Street in New York City, constructed in 1824 with a Doric portico in the best classical taste and a "Gothic turret without a spire." In 1826, the congregation Bnei Yeshurun bought the structure and made it a synagogue.

Somewhat later, the Egyptian vogue found an echo in America in Henry Austin's gateway of the Grove Street Cemetery in New Haven, Connecticut, which was erected in 1845-48. At about the same time or slightly later, the characteristic Egyptian temple facade was reproduced on a larger scale in the Old Tombs Prison in New York by John Haviland. When Isaiah Rogers in 1855 built the Judah Touro Memorial in Newport, Rhode Island, to provide the gateway and fence of the Jewish cemetery there, he gave the entrance a vaguely Egyptian silhouette that blended with Grecian suggestions somewhat in the manner of belated French Empire. But Rogers made no appeal to any particular historical associations; he merely followed the common view that Egyptian art, eminently funereal, offered a dignified setting for a cemetery. And it was this setting that in 1858 inspired Longfellow's poem, "The Jewish Cemetery at Newport," with its emphasis on past grandeur and anticipated "coming time."

American Romanesque

THEN came another revival, the last, and in some respects the most important for synagogue-building—the Romanesque, which in America did not confine itself to timid eclecticism, but became a creative factor in shaping the skyline of our big cities. This style has left a conspicuous imprint on American synagogues.

The Romanesque revival in the United

States was led by the architect Henry Hobson Richardson. His Trinity Church of the 1870's in Boston, with its tall and heavy square tower over the crossing of the naves, gave a foretaste of the skyscraper. It was not the stylistic details of Richardson's Romanesque—blind arcades, the turrets, the pitched gables, the string courses with arched corbel tables, the tripartite set-up of the facades—that counted so much as the new feeling for sturdy, rude, robust articulation behind the Romanesque vocabulary.

Richardson's pupil, Louis Sullivan, went much further than his master in emancipating American architecture from outworn classicist and historicist formulas; his rugged, quarry-faced stones, block-like cornices, and large plain surfaces, contrasted with bands of geometric ornament, cannot in actual fact be connected with any specific Romanesque forms. Sullivan's heaviness and dynamism betray an eminently modern feeling.

And it was Sullivan who carried this new impulse into synagogue architecture. In association with Dankmar Adler, a Jewish architect, he worked on the Anshe-Maariv Synagogue in Chicago, built in 1890-91. (This synagogue was converted later into the Pilgrim Baptist Church.) Its outstanding features, a huge entrance portal and an enormous barrel vault in the interior, show Sullivan's touch unmistakably, and its design was to have influence on synagogue-building in the United States. If to the over-emphasized doorway of the main facade, Richardson's central-tower motif is added, we get the main elements of what has become the most popular modern type of synagogue in this country.

Thus Schuchardt's, Rosengarten's, and Semper's rather cautious attempts in the late 1830's to create a distinctive synagogue style—which eventually turned out to be a church style stripped of its more ambitious features—now gave way to a more daring venture.

The Portal and the Dome

THE synagogue had struggled through the ages for a facade and a dome. In the Middle Ages, it had been the practice to enter syna-

gogues at the side—inconspicuously—and there was no doorway in the western facade. In order not to compete with the church, the synagogue portal had to refrain from bringing itself strikingly to notice. (This restraint can still be noticed in the synagogue facades of Schuchardt and Semper.) When, in the Renaissance and later, churches all over the world copied the glorious dome of St. Peter's in Rome, the synagogues continued to be denied the privilege of a dome, and had to keep the tiny canopy over the almemar (reading platform) low, hidden under an uninspiring roof. In the great 16th-century Maharshal Shul in Lublin, Poland, we have such an arrangement—a tabernacle built around the almemar in the center, with a substitute for a cupola showing outside. This layout was common among 17th- and 18th-century synagogues in Galicia, Volhynia, and Lithuania.

The ambition to have a dome crowning the prayer hall may have been the unconscious motive behind the popular acceptance of the Moorish influence in synagogue design in Europe. And now, in America, a number of Jewish temples sprang up in the 20th century that were vigorous cubic structures, with their central parts crowned by domes and their main facades accented by elaborate portals proclaiming the new freedom and equality of the Jew in America.

This departure seemed to promise an interesting, more authentically Jewish development. However, it was soon re-submerged in historical trappings. The desire to link the modern synagogue with Jewish tradition was in itself quite legitimate—particularly in view of the unsatisfactory modern trends in synagogue-building in Austria, Germany, and Holland; but what we saw was not a return to any real Jewish tradition, but a relapse into Romanesque, trimmed, inescapably, with Moorish and mild suggestions of Byzantine.

Thus the saucer cupola of the Hagia Sophia church in Constantinople became a hallmark of the American synagogue. The imposing Temple Emanuel in San Francisco (1925) by Bakewell and Brown is but one

example among many of this Byzanto-Romanesque revival in synagogue-building.

In synagogues in New York, the effect of the main doorway was particularly emphasized. Raised to sweeping heights, the portal challenged all human scale and reduced the surface of the facade to a mere framework. This effort to spotlight the doorway was sometimes pushed to extremes. In the now abandoned Temple Beth El at Fifth Avenue and Seventy-sixth Street, the cupola was shifted toward the front in order to lend the doorway even greater accent.

This tendency to overdramatize the portal is also to be found in the Park Synagogue (1926) by Deutsch and Schneider; the Temple Emanuel at Fifth Avenue and Eightieth Street (1927) by Robert David Kohn, Butler, and Stein; and, even earlier, in the Temple Beth El in Brooklyn (1921) by Shampman and Shampman. In lesser synagogues imitating the great temples, this overemphasis on the portal often results in a complete monotony.

How was it that a sound concept could so easily deteriorate? It seems that the mistake was made at the point where Sullivan's "ruggedness" was retranslated back into the more familiar and conventional forms of the historical styles. What the synagogue architects were anxious to achieve was a reconciliation between modern dynamism and established vocabulary. They knew that the public was afraid of such slogans as the one launched by Le Corbusier that "architecture has nothing to do with styles." And they did not want to follow Frank Lloyd Wright, Sullivan's pupil, who in his Church of the Unity had gone too far toward "modern rationalization." For neither church nor synagogue is prepared to renounce the emotional values of traditional form.

What is Jewish Style?

A. TAYLOR of Syracuse University, consultant to the Interdenominational Bureau of Architecture, recently stated: "History and logic to the contrary notwithstanding, the now familiar form of the Victorian and Neo-Gothic have become a tradition." Professor

Taylor disapproves of this state of affairs; but it is interesting to note that what he calls a tradition is no more than a hundred or so years old and does not run in a straight, continuous line toward the remoter past.

The Victorian and the Neo-Gothic are what is regarded as traditional and respectable. In synagogue architecture, "tradition" would mean something like the Central Synagogue on Lexington Avenue in New York. The Moorish style, it now appears, is our Victorian Jewish "tradition." But have we not outgrown it? Are we not mature enough to view it with the same indulgent smile with which we approach other specimens of the taste of the 1870's?

The synagogue style of the 1920's was a Byzanto-Romanesque revival adapted, to be sure, to modern dynamism. But, as we have seen, it still smacks too much of archaeology, and even in its hey-day was far from answering contemporary sensibility. The present and the future demand something new, expressive of the aspirations of a more self-conscious Jewishness, at home in America. What shall it be?

The architects York and Sawyer, who built the Interfaith Chapel in the Naval Hospital at St. Albans, New York, see the future house of worship as a streamlined auditorium with a three-way revolving altar for alternate use by Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Their experiment, however, could only have been carried out against a background of war and common sacrifice; in peace-time, every congregation will insist once more on its own house of worship and its own distinctive and exclusive décor.

In his "Notes on Post-war Synagogue Design" in the September 1944 *Architectural Record*, Ben C. Bloch discusses the coming trends in synagogue-building. He believes synagogues will assume a double aspect. The layout of the synagogue will be modernized and adjusted to present-day needs. The prayer hall will be designed to form a single unit with the social hall, and will be provided with a collapsible wall and reversible seats. The two rooms would be used separately on ordinary occasions and could

be joined together for services on High Holidays.

As far as the external appearance of the synagogue is concerned, Mr. Bloch believes that traditional design will predominate. He submits a synagogue project of his own from which it appears that what he holds to be a traditional concept is a structure resembling a business building of around 1910.

Exponents of the progressive camp, such as Ely Jacques Kahn and Percival Goodman, strongly advocate a frank display of new design in plan and elevations. They vigorously oppose all sorts of period trappings, whether Neo-Gothic, Romanesque, or Moorish. The main objection to the historicizing styles is not, however, that they express conservatism, but that they were artificially established mostly by Christian architects who adopted them as models on the basis of their own very limited knowledge of the Jewish background.

Meanwhile, the question of nationalism or assimilationism has become a dead letter for Jewish religious architecture. Neither nationalists or assimilationists take a real position on matters aesthetic—if only because it is impossible as yet to put your finger on anything in the plastic arts that constitutes an authentically Jewish style. This does not mean that a solution has been found to the problem of Jewish art. That problem continues to exist in and outside Palestine in one form or another. But Jewish architecture in Palestine is unconcerned with historical styles and is content to leave it to time and nature to produce what may or may not be a national style. This in itself is enough to keep Jewish nationalists in America from taking a position on art.

Jewish Architects at Last

ONE of the goals of religion is to preserve and protect the perishable values of the past and counteract the revolutionary forces of a technical civilization. In some contexts religion and art meet. Both respect the authentic, the genuine, heritage.

On this score, the Moorish tradition is revealed to have been greatly overrated. It

was based on a misconception; it was believed to be medieval, but now turns out to be Victorian. Today, more than ever, we may ask with Albert Rosengarten why a synagogue should look like a mosque.

Moreover, historical associations do not always have the desired effect. Semper thought that a theater resembling the Colosseum would necessarily convey grandeur and dignity—but to some people it may recall the arena in which Christian martyrs died. What can a Byzantine cupola possibly mean to us Jews? The Byzantine period of our history contains little to endear it to our hearts and make it worth remembering in prayer.

Historical associations have positive emotional value only when they refer to a common and cherished experience. This experience may be pleasant or sad; it may be associated with the recently re-dedicated Newport synagogue or with the Worms synagogue that was destroyed by the Nazis. But respect for tradition does not necessarily mean copying established styles or crowding the walls with repetitious, indifferently executed allegorical ornament. It may mean respect for the spirit and the desire to interpret in a personal way symbols that have acquired permanence and significance. Today, after the bitter lessons of the war, it may, on the other hand, mean a respect for the small, intimate, and humble things, for what is unpretentious and human in scale. It may mean a more thoughtful approach on the part of the architect, and a more acute awareness of the Jewish values reflected in history, literature, and art.

We are at least fortunate today in America to be no longer dependent, as former generations of Jews were, on non-Jewish builders unfamiliar with the true and essential spirit of the faith for which they tried to find an appropriate style. We now have Jewish architects outstanding in their profession and matured by experience.

Some of them may have believed in their

youth that structural logic and the frank expression of material were all that mattered. But the time for these slogans has passed. With the greater mastery acquired in steel construction, and with synthetic products bringing about a revolution in our attitude toward materials in this, our atomic age, structural logic and frankness have lost much of their former cogency and no longer force the architect's hand. Man can strive once more for self-expression—which is after all the ultimate goal of art.

New Synagogues in the West

WILL the Jewish architect today find the cooperation of the leaders of the congregations, the building committees, and the public at large for his ideas in synagogue-building? As I write this, many communities are planning to remodel or build synagogues or social centers. A social center incorporating a synagogue is to be built in Cleveland and a new synagogue in St. Louis. Eric Mendelsohn, known from his buildings in Palestine and England as well as for brilliant achievements in Germany, has been entrusted with both projects.

In St. Louis the synagogue will be set in a typical environment, which includes a Neo-Gothic Catholic church, a revivalist-Renaissance Methodist church, and an Egyptian Masonic Temple. No one today expects the architect to add another "period piece" to this 19th-century décor, and the problem requires daring. But respect for the given situation is also required. A 20th-century solution is necessary that will, nevertheless, harmonize with the surroundings.

Granted the necessity for tact, Mr. Mendelsohn will still have to make some bold departures; and it is precisely here that he will need the understanding and cooperation of the Jewish community. What Mr. Mendelsohn produces may supply at least a partial indication of the future of American synagogue architecture.

I KNOW ON A NIGHT OVERCAST

HAYIM NAHMAN BIALIK

I know on a night overcast, like a star my light will fade
Of a sudden; nor any star will know my grave.
Nevertheless: my wrath will go smoking on
As a volcanic mouth when the fire is dead,
To smoulder in you as long as the crash of the spheres,
And the rumble of mad Oceanus.

That your great anguish might be treasured
For all time in the huge lap of this world!
Might the deserts of sky and deserts of earth be watered,
—Stars and grasses!
Might it survive in them, age, quicken, revive,
Wither, as they; only to flower again!
Nameless, amorphous and alien
Might it stand to the last generation,
Monuments to oppression,
And then, mute, shriek unto heaven and hell,
“Hold up redemption!”

. . . For it shall come to pass at the end of days,
That a lying sun shall shine on your murdered graves,
And a false flag, crusted with your blood,
Waving above your butchers' heads
Shall brazen the face of the sky,
And the forged seal of the Lord
Put out the eye of the day;
And the haughty prance, and the festive blare
Will shake your enshrined remains. . . .

Then will the sheen of horizon waver, your sufferings gather black,
Then will the sun turn the hue of your innocent blood,
Cain's mark on the brow of the world, and mark of the Fall
Of the shattered seed of the Lord.

And star unto star will shudder:
“Lo, the enormity!
The agony!”

And *then* will the Avenger, heart-stricken, arise
And, roaring, set out with his awesome sword!

I Know On a Night Overcast, here translated from Hebrew by Jacob Sloan, was written in 1906, three years after the notorious Kishinev pogrom; the references to Jewish suffering in this poem relate to that event. In his earlier

City of Slaughter, Bialik had berated the Kishinev victims for their passivity. Here he identifies his personal destiny with theirs, and inveighs against a world that was turning their anguish into hypocritical slogans.

BEHIND PALESTINE'S ARAB "ARMIES"

Power Politics and Mid-East Intrigue

J. L. TELLER

TWO Arab armies, Najada and Futuwah, have been sharing the limelight of Palestine news dispatches with Hagana, central Jewish resistance movement, and the two Jewish dissident groups, Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern group.

Although their leaders swaggeringly call them "armies," Najada and Futuwah are listed with the government as boy scout organizations. These "boy scouts," ranging in age from the early twenties to the middle forties, and variously outfitted in green shirts of an earlier period and khaki from United States surplus stores, are now a frequent sight in Jaffa, Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, and Jerusalem's Old City. Barnstorming in clusters, they distribute the Mufti's picture for posting on store-fronts, raid Arab shops carrying Jewish merchandise, and stop buses rumbling in from Jewish neighborhoods to search their passengers in the manner of customs officials, and within sight of British and Arab policemen, for "contraband" Jewish merchandise. In a country whose emergency regulations forbid the wearing or possession of uniforms and even parts of uniforms, and prescribe imprisonment for those who take part in drills of any kind, Najada and Futuwah's public military posturings, including parades in city

squares, have aroused comment, and speculation as to government policy. Last month Palestine police raided a unit of seventy Najadites on their return from Egypt, found illegal arms in their possession, but detained only three of the group.

According to the most current of many opinions, government sufferance of the Arab armies is to be explained by the fact that their presence bolsters Britain's claim that she is a harassed arbitrator between two contumacious rivals. A harsher opinion accuses the government of actual complicity in the formation of Najada and Futuwah. The freedom enjoyed by the armies, the machine-gun training given Arab police officers but withheld from Jews, and an alleged government invitation to an Arab extremist, Jacov Ghoussein, to organize Arab "units" to fight Jewish "terror" are cited in support of this accusation. The eagerness of British intelligence officers to be in a position to control the Arab "army" from the inside, as well as the British desire to keep the Jews subdued and to have a native force ready in the event of war with the Soviets, is listed as the motive for Britain's complicity.

BY THE end of last summer, Arab estimates set the combined strength of their two armies at 25,000, as against a combined Jewish armed strength of 80,000 (70,000 in Hagana, and a maximum of 10,000 in Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern group). But the Jews estimated the total Arab strength at no more than 5,000 to 6,000—conceding, however, that this figure is likely to more than double by the end of the year. In reconciling these conflicting estimates, one should take into account the universally admitted inaccuracy of Arab statistics

J. L. TELLER, foreign correspondent and news editor now with the Palcor News Agency, recently returned from his third trip to Palestine—he was also there in 1937 and 1939. Mr. Teller is also on the staff of the *Jewish Morning Journal*. His articles have appeared in the *Nation*, *Commonweal*, *American Mercury*, and the *Palestine* and *Latin American* press; and his book *Presenting Palestine* is to be published by Thurston Macauley Associates. He was born in Poland in 1912 and came to this country in 1921.

and the fact that the Jews' estimate was made for their own use and not for publicity purposes: to over- or under-assess Arab strength might harm the Jews themselves. They arrived at their figures by estimating each of the Arab armies to number 3,000, and then deducting 1,000 from the total for those vacillating between Najada and Futuwah and temporarily belonging to both.

At loggerheads all last summer and this winter, Futuwah and Najada are now reported by their leaders for the nth time to have made peace and put themselves under the Arab Higher Executive. But their relations are still strained—marked by frequent clashes and disturbed by a jealousy like that between the Storm Troopers and the SS in the Nazi movement.

Najada's ranks are filled with shepherds, seasonal laborers, and *Lumpen* recruited from the villages, and day laborers, pimps, and plug-uglies from the Jaffa waterfront. Futuwah's membership is composed, primarily, of scions of the urban middle class, sons of shopkeepers, governmental officials, and professional men, with a comforting sprinkling of city toughs. Should the Arab armies ever go into action, Najada is likely to do the actual fighting, with Futuwah's largely Jerusalemite membership taking care of such administrative details as imposing military "taxes" on well-to-do city Arabs. This at least has been the nature of the city Arab's participation, from the lower middle class upward, in past disturbances. Acting as instigator, director, and political brain, he left the fighting to the villager—not, however, to the fellah, who is wary of political involvements, but to the dispossessed *Lumpen* Arab living on the fringes of village society, and to the habitual criminal who joined the "rebel" forces to find sanctuary.

NAJADA began its recruiting in 1945, at the time of the repatriation of Jamal Hussein, the Mufti's nephew and heir-apparent, and it registered itself with the government in February 1946. By last March, residents of Jerusalem, strolling on the city's

outskirts in the evenings, could hear rifle practice and see rockets flaring in the wadis between the hills and around Ramleh, "three peaks away" from the High Commissioner's residence. Hagana found out soon enough that this was Najada drilling.

Najada's "commander," Mohammed Numr Hawari, an ambitious Jaffa lawyer, is believed to be fronting for a triumvirate that allegedly includes Jacov Effendi Ghoussein and Izzat Darwuz, who still operates from "exile" in Syria.

Ghoussein, forty years old, and weighing 224 pounds, is the insolvent proprietor of large orange groves in the Nes Tziona area, was founder and president of the now defunct Arab Youth Congress, and is alleged to have been an organizer of the 1936-1939 disturbances in Jaffa. He is reported to have turned down an invitation from the Palestine government in 1944 to organize Arab military units to fight Jewish terrorists, but is believed to have reconsidered since.

Izzat Darwuz, forty-five-year-old nephew of the Mufti, has had an even more checkered career. He is accused of having used the funds of the Waqf (Moslem religious foundation), when he was its director in 1936, to finance the anti-Jewish disturbances. Banished from Palestine in 1937, he showed up in Damascus, where he took charge of the "central command" of the Palestine "rebellion" and its fund-raising. In 1938 he was accused by leaders of the rebel units of defalcating with funds he had collected in their name. In June 1939 the French authorities in Syria arrested him on suspicion of acting as the Mufti's liaison man with the Axis.

Najada's "command" is made up of "younger men" itching with impatience to seize the reins of Arab leadership in Palestine, and they had hoped in the beginning to keep the organization "non-partisan"—that is, independent of the "old men" of the Mufti's Palestine Arab party. This party regards all Arab activity not directed by the Husseinis as "irridentist" and to be brought arbitrarily under its own control.

For instance, Ghousein's efforts in the past to keep his Arab Youth Congress independent only resulted in the latter's disintegration under pressure from the Husseinis.

A similar end seemed fated for Najada when Mohammed Hawari, the Jaffa lawyer who is Najada's front, refused to be cajoled by Jamal Hussein into placing his organization under the clan's control. Rumors soon began to spread about Hawari's "Communist" connections and financial speculations, and Futuwah, a "boy scout" organization founded by the Mufti in 1936 but which collapsed soon after, was revived to compete with Najada in the summer of 1946 under the command of Kamil Ariqat, a former Palestine police officer, still alleged to be a frequent visitor at the headquarters of the CID (Criminal Investigation Department).

Clashes between Futuwah's "patriots" and Najada's "Communists" claimed a major share of the attention of Arab politicians all last summer. Faced with a choice between seeing his organization disintegrate or delivering it to Jamal Hussein, Hawari decided on the latter. To save face, he is reported to have put Najada under the orders of the Arab Higher Executive, which though ostensibly non-partisan, is dominated by the Husseinis. It is far from unlikely that Hawari's obstinacy in the beginning was inspired in part by the desire to force a higher bid from Jamal Hussein—or even that Izzat Darwaza double-crossed his two colleagues on the Najada triumvirate.

Emil Ghoury, graduate of the University of Cincinnati, class of 1933, a pre-war envoy of the Mufti's to the United States and Britain, and present secretary of the Mufti's Palestine Arab party, has been slated to become the real boss or "political commissar" of the Arab armies. He was liaison officer between this party and Futuwah before the reported unification of the two forces. But according to the most recent reports, the Nablus branch of Najada, financed by Arab political opponents of the Husseinites who had hoped that the organization would protect them against Hussein terror, has re-

nounced Hawari and is opposed to the merger.

WHAT the Arabs, given to boasting, have significantly failed to boast of are their well-stocked arsenals. The Bedouin's centuries-old need of firearms for raiding fellah villages and robbing travelers, the fellah's need of arms for protection, and the general Arab practice of feuds and belligerent ostentation have caused them immemorably to collect weapons of all kinds on a large scale. The arms they stored up during World War I came in handy in the 1920 riots, the 1929 riots, and the 1936-1939 disturbances. And it wasn't until late in 1939 that their supplies petered out. By assiduous application, they restored their replenished stocks during the World War II by stealing, purchasing, and bartering from soldiers. Unplanned and unorganized, these acquisitions were made more or less as a matter of hobby and were scattered throughout the countryside.

As early as 1944, Hagana intelligence estimates put the total of Arab arms acquisitions at vaguely "scores of thousands of rifles and guns, and several million rounds of ammunition." Even then, a large portion of these arms were dispersed in private homes in the Jenin-Nablus-Tulkarm vicinity, known as the "vicious triangle," for it was from there that the Mufti recruited most of his forces for the 1936 disturbances. Two and a half years have passed since Hagana made its estimate, during which arms-running has been incessant. Since the winter of this year, the inner markets of Nablus and the former German Templar colony of Wilhelmina have been used virtually as Vickers branch stores, with military trucks unloading enormous shipments of contraband arms there—a fact confirmed most recently by the Associated Press. There has been almost incessant arms-running across the Egyptian border in recent months. The Mufti is said to be heading the "purchasing commission," assisted by the religiously fanatic Moslem Brotherhood and by the fascist Green Shirts, whose chief, Ahmed Hussein,

is now in the United States. Thus, although Najada and Fatuwah units are reportedly still drilling with sticks, they apparently will not lack weapons when *Der Tag* comes.

EVEN so, the recruiting and arming of several thousand persons does not of itself bring an army into being, at least not one that could match the quarter century's record of Hagana and the decade's training and experience of Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern group. The Arabs have a hereditary familiarity with firearms, but it is mainly leadership, military planning, and morale that make a real army.

Morale was very low among the Arab units in 1936-1939, and there is little reason to believe that this morale is any higher now, considering that the same personalities still control Arab politics today.

Students of Arab affairs feel that had the British intelligence exploited the dissension within these units, the Arab troubles of 1936-39 might have been quelled within a few months. This claim is based on an examination of the correspondence between the Mufti's central committee and Arab zone-commanders that the British seized. Duplicates of the seized letters "strayed" into the hands of Hagana, which circulated their texts in an illegal little Hebrew book, *Documents and Portraits*, for the instruction of its officers. Privately, British intelligence officers do not deny the authenticity of this material, which shows that both "officers" and "privates" in the Arab units were mercenaries first and last. The Mufti's central committee, operating first from Jerusalem and then Damascus, permitted Arab unit-commanders to meet their expenses by supplementing the committee's own remittances with "taxes" on villages, cities, and individuals in the areas where their units operated.

This permission was exploited in the most outrageous fashion. Thus sixty thousand pounds was extracted from Jaffa's Arabs instead of ten thousand pounds originally fixed. "Military police" assigned by the Arab central committee to bar the zone

commander from the city proceeded to do on their own hook what they had been sent to prevent the commander from doing. Zone commanders from backwoods districts where the pickings were meager extended their operations to big-city districts even where these had been assigned to other zone-commanders and had already been thoroughly "taxed."

This interloping resulted in gang warfare of the kind we had here in America in the days of prohibition. City merchants and shopkeepers, the first to hail the Arab "revolt," were also the first to cry out under its "taxation"; their chorus was swelled by civil servants who, though willing to serve as stool-pigeons, intelligence officers, and finger-men for the terrorists, balked at going out on strike in sympathy with the Jihad—for this might mean loss of salary and possible loss of jobs. And, finally, resistance came from the villagers, who had at first contributed food generously to the "armies." As the revolt extended into months and years, the Arab bands began to specify the type, quantity, and quality of the "gifts" they were to be given, and they even began to engage in free-lance murders, killing for a price persons who had in no way obstructed the "revolt." The villagers, refusing to meet tax payments, were ripe for collaboration with the authorities, but for some reason or other the authorities took little advantage of this opportunity. Captain Orde Wingate (later killed in Burma while serving as a general against the Japanese), who did take advantage of it, was removed.

AS FOR the commanders themselves of the Arab units, they had for the most part already seen years of service in various prisons for crimes entirely unrelated to politics. The only son of a well-to-do family to head a unit fighting in the field was Abed el-Kader, a black sheep of the Husseini family, who finally had to flee the country because of a long list of crimes committed against villagers in the vicinity where he operated. His crimes included the kidnapping of young village boys for the orgies

with which he rewarded his "brigade." He has not been heard of since his flight.

Nor did scandal fail to touch even Fawsi el-Qauqji, the only professional soldier in the Mufti's service during 1936-1939; for several months in 1936 he was the hero of legends spun with such Levantine dexterity and finesse by Palestine's Arabs that even the British and the Jews were taken in. A rebel and exile from French-controlled Syria and a leading instructor in the Baghdad Military Academy, Fawsi el-Qauqji arrived in Palestine in August 1936 and immediately proclaimed himself "Commander-in-Chief of the Rebel Army." Retiring on October 20 after only two months' service, this Arab George Washington was said by that time to have deposited in Lebanese banks £15,000 (\$75,000 at the pre-war rate of exchange) skimmed from the funds assigned to him by the Mufti's central committee.

He went to Iraq at the time of Rashid el-Gailani's abortive pro-Axis putsch and fled subsequently to Berlin. There he was captured by the British and then, reportedly, kidnaped from them by the Russians. He emerged in Cairo last month, having flown there from Paris. En route he touched Lydda, Palestine, from where he was permitted to proceed to Egypt despite the fact that he is "wanted" by the Palestine police.

Now, as in the past, Palestine's Arabs will have to rely for military training on their own native officers, drafting them from the Palestine police, discharged soldiers, and brigands. The police officers have limited training, while Arabs with real military experience are few; none saw actual combat in the recent war, and nearly half of the eight thousand Palestine Arabs who volunteered for military service deserted after several months in uniform.

In 1936-1939, the Arabs received some training from German officers at the Wilhelmshagen and Sarnau Templar colonies. One of these officers, Adolf Eichmann, left Palestine early in 1939 to become Heinrich Himmler's technical adviser in the extermination of European Jewry. The Germans, however, may be replaced by officers and

ex-officers of the Polish forces now in Palestine. *Eshnab*, a clandestine Hagana publication, reported early in April that the Arabs had made an offer to the Poles, but there has been no further news of this. (Poles have been involved in numerous anti-Jewish incidents in Palestine.) *Eshnab* recently reported that the Mufti's aides obtained by means of bribes the illicit release of scores of German officers from internment camps in the Suez vicinity, and have "loaned" some of them to dissident armed organizations in the Arab lands, but have smuggled most of them into Palestine.

The Arab units in the 1936 disturbances included innumerable Hauranites who had drifted over from impoverished Syria for work in Palestine. Alone in a foreign country and away from their families, they gravitated, after their jobs gave out, to the outlaw bands. Iraqi recruited for work on military projects during the war years—and now, incidentally, depressing the wage level of the Palestine Arabs—are certain to replace the Hauranites of 1936. But these Iraqi illiterates, among the most primitive elements in the Middle East, are definitely not officer material.

Palestinian Arab legend has it that Aziz el-Masri, chief of staff of the Egyptian army until 1942—when he was seized with Allied military plans on his person as he was about to fly to a rendezvous with Rommel—will undertake the training of Palestinian Arab volunteers, that Palestinian Arabs are already receiving training in the armies of neighboring Arab countries, and that Yusuf Alkhaz, reputed by the Mufti to be a "military genius such as we never have had in Arab lands," will head the "rebels."

Alkhaz, son of a wealthy Jerusalem family, accompanied the Mufti on his exile through Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran to Berlin. There he studied at an officer's school, was commissioned a major, and was put in command of a Moslem unit fighting in Yugoslavia; later in the war he parachuted into Jericho on a mission for the Nazis, but he was captured on landing, and maps, money, and German sabotage-plans were found in his possession.

Alkhaz is now in prison and his future role depends entirely on British vigilance—which also goes for Aziz el-Masri.

PALESTINE Arab leaders boast of the help against the Jews they expect from the member states of the Arab League. These states have intimated that their help will be considerable, but one can only gauge the value of their pledges by their past promises and performances. Iraqi support of the Palestinian Arabs in 1936-1939 was semi-official, with the Baghdad League for the Defense of Palestine publicly raising funds, and the Iraqi army extending "leaves of absence" to officers and men willing to join Palestine's "revolt." Syria, on the other hand, was the "revolt's" headquarters. Yet the aid of both countries totaled no more than one hundred volunteers and a contribution of fifteen hundred dollars in gold from Iraq, some sixty men from Syria, and thirty Druses. Nothing came from Transjordan beyond permission for illegal traffic across its borders. Admittedly, this kind of help will be considerably larger now that all Arab countries have become relatively independent, but the Palestinian Arabs would be foolish to place too much reliance on assistance from their neighbors.

As for Ibn Saud—to carry out his extravagant and much publicized threats against the Jews of Palestine, he would have to cross Transjordan. But Transjordan, and Iraq, too, are ruled by Hashemites who have never forgiven Ibn Saud for driving the Hashemite king, Hussein, out of Mecca and forcing his abdication in 1924; they have been wary of the desert king ever since.

Then too, the Mufti has acquired powerful enemies in the Arab world since his return. The leaders of the Arab League who welcomed him on his return are now wary of him, having learned of his surreptitious connections with a group plotting to replace the league of Arab states with a new Arab peoples' league. All Arab leaders resent him as a contender to the title of spokesman for all the Arabs. They know that disturbances in Palestine would only enhance his prestige.

Palestine's Arab leaders are reportedly plotting to throw away hundreds of Arab lives in one initial and all-out action against Jews, hoping thereby to sting the Arab states into real action in their support. Hagana contends that it could cope even with this emergency, provided only that non-Arab powers do not intervene against the Jews. The Arab pro-fascist uprising under Rashid el-Gailani in Iraq was quelled, for instance, by a mere three thousand soldiers under British command. But no matter what provocation Palestinian Arab leaders may give, full-scale military aid from the Arab states is unlikely for several obvious reasons that have nothing to do with the Jewish capacity to resist.

An all-out action would result in intervention by the United Nations, throw the entire Middle East into turmoil, and give the racial and religious minorities of the Middle East, including the Kurds and twelve million Moslems of the Shiite sect, a long-awaited opportunity to rise against the Sunnite Moslems who now rule them. Furthermore, while diplomatic turmoil over Zionism may deflect the attention of the Arab masses from the economic misery in which they live, involvement in war would leave these rulers helpless to cope with internal rebellion in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. In Western countries, war has been the pretext for military dictatorship and the suppression of civil liberties, but in the Arab countries, where tyranny and autocracy are the rule during the time of peace, war would only weaken the hand of authority. Such being the case, any real showdown is likely to be restricted to the Arabs of Palestine alone. According to Winston Churchill's testimony in the House of Commons several months ago, the British High Command holds that the outcome of a direct test of strength between Jews and Arabs would be a victory for the former. This view was confirmed this spring by Jamal Hussein and Ahmed Shukheiri, chief of the Arab Office in Jerusalem. Each of these gentlemen told me separately, to explain their opposition to further Jewish immigration, that "one Jew equals three Arabs

in resourcefulness, skill, and ingenuity."

Hagana leaders now feel that the "*havlaga*" (restraint) on which they prided themselves in 1936-1939 was a psychological and tactical error. The Arabs mistook it for cowardice. Therefore, in the event of new Arab disturbances, the Jews will no longer stay behind stockades waiting to repulse attacks, but will take the offensive against the instigators and their armed followers. Hagana's leaders contend that the Arabs, goaded on as they are by the diversion-hungry British, would have already begun new troubles were it not for their fear of Hagana, which has acquired a solid reputation with them because of its recent resistance campaign.

Britain will naturally be the decisive fac-

tor. Some Jewish resistance leaders concede that a two-front war of defense against both the Arabs and the British would be a hopeless prospect. The ultimate victor would be Britain, who would then "solve" the Palestine problem in a most elementary and ruthless fashion by bearing down hard on both Jews and Arabs. Hagana suspects that Britain's aim in inciting the Arabs and permitting Najada-Futuwah to arm while disarming the Jews is to narrow the margin of Jewish military superiority over the Arabs as much as possible; in this way, should a conflict occur, violent intervention and arbitration would require relatively little expense of effort on Britain's part. Whether or not this is her true intention remains to be seen.

JEWISH CULTURE FOR AMERICA?

Two Commentaries

IN HIS article "Is America Exile or Home?" (in our November 1946 issue) ISRAEL KNOX declared that it was high time that American Jews began to create a culture of their own, indigenous to this soil. Obstacles to this development, in his opinion, included a persisting dependence on earlier European centers of Jewish culture and a sense of inferiority and defeatism, fostered by some Jewish nationalist ideologists and organizations who continue to talk of America as *galut* (exile) rather than as a homeland for Jews.

Dr. Knox's thesis aroused nationwide discussion and we present here two commentaries on it. It will occasion no surprise that these discussions on fundamental issues of Jewish thought are by men not professionally engaged with such problems: in the Jewish tradition there are no laymen in these matters.

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is a graduate of the Harvard Law School. HERBERT B. EHLMANN is a member of the law firm of Goulston and Storrs, Boston. He has been active in Jewish organizational life since his student days at Harvard, has written at least one play and translated poetry for the Hebrew. Mr. Ehrmann was, with William B. Thompson, counsel for Sacco and Vanzetti, and wrote *The Untried Case* about that international cause célèbre. Mr. Ehrmann was born in Louisville, Kentucky, in 1891.

Mr. Lasky is secretary of the San Francisco chapter of the American Jewish Committee; Mr. Ehrmann is chairman of the Boston chapter of the American Jewish Committee. They write here, of course, in their personal, not official capacities. (For a related discussion on the theme of Jewish culture in America, as it applies to a specific problem, readers are referred to Mrs. Wischnitzer-Bernstein's article "The Problem of Synagogue Architecture" in this issue.)

A Golden Age

Moses Lasky

IT IS a discouraging commentary on the world's sanity and its obtuseness to history that the question whether America is home or exile need even be asked. I happen to concur in the views expressed by Dr. Israel Knox. But American Jews, like other human beings, are capable of embracing the most contradictory beliefs at one and the same time. Consequently, something more than a bare endorsement of Dr. Knox's article may be useful.

America is home, as Dr. Knox reminds us, and unless the madness that makes Dr. Knox's question pertinent should destroy the hope and the possibility, America should yet be a center of Jewish culture to the extent that modern civilization permits any separate culture to exist within the one broader culture of a single large geographic area. Such a culture may fail to develop

here, but, if so, nothing worth having will develop anywhere for the Jews. What may continue to exist in most of Europe will be no more than anachronistic husks. What may come in Palestine is not likely to be of any real meaning to general civilization, and it therefore will hardly be in the great tradition of the Jewish cultures that have made Judaism a thing of value in the world's history. What may come in our own country offers, it seems to me, far greater promise. Indeed, America could well be the scene of the repetition of the Golden Age in Spain.

THE question whether America is home or exile could not be asked if it were not for the fact that Jewish religious education, through poetic license or the inertia of tradition, still teaches our children in terms of the Wandering Jew. I read in my children's Sunday-school books that the Jews "sojourned" in Spain from the year 711 until 1492! A "sojourn" is "a temporary stay, as of a traveler in a foreign land." Is a res-

idence of three-quarters of a millenium a temporary stay in a foreign land? Exodus to Nebuchadnezzar, the duration of the stay of the Hebrews in Palestine, was less than 750 years. Cyrus to Vespasian measures a second "sojourn" in Palestine of hardly more than 600 years, of which less than 100 were years of an independent state. Jews have already "sojourned" in the New World for nearly 500 years. A population of 5,000,000 Jews now resides in the United States. At no previous time and in no other place have so many Jews ever lived together, much less lived in circumstances of such freedom as to permit the development of an individual and useful culture.

Probably no Jewish culture has yet arisen in the United States. We cannot be sure, for cultures grow and are not manufactured. We may be in the midst of a new culture unawares. But it is doubtful. Until recently our Jewishness was constantly renewed by drops of the concentrated Judaism of Europe, latterly of East Europe. These infusions, like strong dyes permeating through the Jewish communities of this country, have supplied the essence of Jewishness here. At the same time they have served to retard the development of our own Jewish culture. The unspeakable catastrophe in Europe that has destroyed the retorts in which this essence was distilled might well have marked the beginning of a free native development in the United States, were it not for the fact that concurrently we have been seized by the frenzy of Zionism.

With no future possibility of the renewal of European Jewishness in this country, the question naturally arises whether the Jews in the United States will disappear as Jews. Members of any Jewish community are forever flying off into space, and when the pressure of the surrounding medium is reduced, the rate of evaporation is increased. If some internal cohesion can be found, a community will remain. If no cohesive force is discovered or developed, the community can be preserved by confining it in a sealed container, but its preservation will then be senseless.

WHETHER Jews will remain as Jews is the same question as whether a Jewish culture will develop here. Two other recent articles in COMMENTARY are pertinent to the question—Dr. Gaster's review of Rabbi Steinberg's *Partisan Guide to the Jewish Problem* (in the November issue) and the first two pages of Professor Paul Weiss' "The True, the Good, and the Jew" (in the October issue). Both Gaster and Weiss ask, in effect, "What is a Jew?" and each gives part of the answer, but I have yet to see the formulation of an answer both complete and completely satisfying. And until such an answer is both formulated and accepted by nearly all Jews, no Jewish culture is likely.

Dr. Gaster points out that to describe the Jews as a "people" merely designates them as an identifiable group but leaves it unclear why they are so identifiable. In an effort to avoid the term "race," which the anthropologists have made unscientific and the Nazis unpleasant, and to rise above the term "religion," which is too cramping to political aspirations of the nationalist type, even the term "peoplehood" has been manufactured, doubtless because of its resonant emptiness. As Dr. Gaster puts it, any such designation "merely restates the fact of Jewish existence without providing a criterion by which its continuance can be validated."

If by "validated" Dr. Gaster means "justified," the bald truth seems to be that the continuance of Jewish existence cannot be justified by any exercise of logic alone. We desire and we hope for that continuance for a compound of reasons. We do not know all the elements in the compound, any more than we know "what is a Jew"; the questions are the same. But one of the elements is pride in achievements in past ages when general culture and general civilization were built around and compelled the existence of peoples in separate cultural groups; another is a common history of sorrow (which, unfortunately, has bred too much of a defensive and self-pitying attitude). And the chief element is certainly religion, although one may regard oneself and be regarded as a Jew without conscious adherence to the religion.

When religions were the core of life, our religion was the great cohesive force. In an age when religions have receded from the center to the perimeter, religion will be a weaker force for the continuance of the Jews as an identifiable group. It so happens, however, that the recession of religion means less to Judaism than to other religions. Judaism as a religion has had far less mystical content and far more of the intellectual than other religions. Its essential nature has been expressed in fewer postulates. As long as religion is accepted by human kind, those postulates must be accepted, and they will be the last to be forsaken. As Professor Weiss says, "The theology of the Jews is theology at a minimum. It affirms nothing more than that God is One, leaving open even the question of what His nature is, what it means for Him to be, and what His Unity implies." The Jew's cosmology, too, is at a minimum, affirming little more than the dignity of man; his faith is the faith of the intelligence, of one who tries to understand truth by faithfully pursuing it, and the faith "that there are acts that are absolutely right and acts that are absolutely wrong." His ethic is the Golden Rule.

THESE are the fundamentals of our religion. They remain the same from age to age, but from age to age they have become overlaid with other things. Some of these additions have been merely modes of thought or expression, now alien to us, but clothing ideas we still hold; some have been excrescences. Of these, some have from time to time been shed, but others not. It is trite to say that the Judaism of Biblical times is not that of today. It is equally true that Judaism enriched by Talmudism cannot be the Judaism of today, and that Judaism encrusted with Kabbalism cannot be the Judaism of today. No more can the East European Judaism created by the last years of an over-prolonged dark ages be the Judaism of today. Yet so much of what we call Judaism is Talmud, Kabbala, and the like.

Similarly, as Dr. Gaster points out, it is absurd to talk of a Jewish culture as if it

were a "bundle of traditional mores and institutions which have somehow, willy-nilly, to be conserved and perpetuated." The culture of the Hasidim is not mine and, in Gaster's words, "I cannot see where the singing of Hebrew folk songs (which do not really emanate from my society) should make me any more a Jew than singing of hula-hula tunes would make me a Hawaiian." Nor can I see why the longings of the dispossessed Jews of Europe for settlements in Palestine and for a communal existence should determine the culture in which I and my children are to live.

The Messianic expectations that lay at the center of past forms of Judaism have ceased to be acceptable. They should have been transmuted into something wholly spiritual. Somehow, with many of us, they have been transmuted only into the lead of nationalism. If in some tiny speck of land, seized upon out of emotional romanticism and misvaluation of history, a Jewish nationality should develop, it may spell temporary rest for some Jews and it may therefore serve a valuable purpose. But as I have suggested, it is not likely to develop a Jewish culture for a modern world. Samaria, the Palmyra of Queen Zenobia, and Khazaria were Jewish states, but the Judaism that has contributed to the civilization of the world came not from them.

Each age in the past has produced its own Jewish culture. Some have been the cultures of spores, an encystment to preserve bare existence in unfavorable surroundings, something not to be cherished and preserved when the environment permits them to be shed. Others have been great. The Jewish culture of today must be of today and formed of the finest spirit of today.

Moreover, any Jewish culture must partake of the culture of the non-Jews among whom it is set. Apart from the periods of encystment, it has always been so. Even in Talmudic times it was so, for that was an age when each religion had its speech, its script, its laws, and its habit. Jewish culture flowering in Spain partook of the character of Moorish civilization, and Spain ceased to

be a home for the Jews only when it ceased to be a home for Moorish civilization.

Consequently, any Jewish culture to be developed in the United States must be primarily Western and American; it will be part of American civilization. American culture has doubtless not itself yet flowered. When it does, it will not be monolithic but multi-form. There will be room in it for many sub-cultures, of which Judaism can be one and, it pleases us to hope, one of the more important from the standpoint of what it will contribute. But it will be an American culture, not Biblical, not medieval, not Yiddish, and not Zionist.

Dr. Gaster asks whether it is "possible to be anything other than an intellectual and/or spiritual adherent of a Judaism which is now, in fact, a thing of the past, the expression of a society now defunct." And he adds that "until that problem is met squarely, all other discussion of the Jewish problem is futile." His question presupposes that Judaism is merely the expression of a society now defunct. The real question is something else. I doubt whether it is even correct to ask whether Judaism can express a living society, and I think the question is how we can demonstrate that it can. And it is that problem that must first be met, or all other discussion is futile and no new culture will be developed.

It is here that we still find no answer. The present-day national Jewish agencies have yet done little to find an answer. I would not blame those agencies for not creating a modern Jewish culture, since, as already observed, cultures grow and are not made. But they have done little to aid the natural process and, with their pre-occupation with anti-defamation and protection against anti-Semitism, their occasional seduction into leftist attitudes by false analogies, their bemusement by the glitter of far-off stars, their 20th-century chasing after David Rubeni and Sabbatai Zevi, they hardly create an environment conducive to a natural growth.

But, then, perhaps, these agencies are not the cause of the absence of a new and modern culture, but the effect of its absence.

WHO, then, will find the answer for us, and where may we look for a modern Maimonides? Just as it has been said that war is too important to leave to the military, this matter is too important to be left to the rabbinate, a professional group whose members in large part either give themselves over to the priestly preservation of ancient forms and the daily etiquette of the congregation or else, feeling that the forms and the etiquette are empty, meddle with equal futility in sociology and economics or, with baneful results, in racial politics. These strictures are doubtless far too severe. But, severe or not, the answer will probably have to be found by intelligent laymen. The best hope may lie, as Dr. Knox indicates, in lay organizations reorienting themselves to the task, such as the American Jewish Committee in its sponsorship of COMMENTARY. But all efforts must somehow be made pervasive and brought home to all who still regard themselves as Jews.

A great Jewish culture may flower in the United States. If it does not, it will be because Judaism has indeed served its mission and run its course. And whether such a culture flowers or not, America is home. And it will remain home for the Jews of this land and for their descendants unless in a frenzy of madness we forsake it, or our American civilization is itself destroyed.

Against Separatist Culture

HERBERT B. EHREMAN

DR. Israel Knox's thoughtful article, "Is America Exile or Home?" asks whether Jews in America can develop "The Good Jewish Life." His conclusion is that if we display sufficient "creative cultural activity," we can produce a center of "Jewish Life" in America not inferior to such centers in the past or Palestine of the future. However, in view of the vastly different conditions of life in this country, the real question is not the quality of such a proposed center of "Jewish Culture." Rather, it is whether

or not America is a place where Jews can or should attempt to develop the intensive segregated life suggested by his comparison.

Such words as "Jewish culture" and "Jewish life" are stock adjustable expressions made to fit almost any implied meaning. Dr. Knox, apparently, uses them to express a concept somewhat less ambitious and all-inclusive than that made famous by the cultural pluralists and it is possible that if he gave us more precise definition there could be little objection to his thesis. However, as Dr. Knox knows, there are those who would not accept any such restricted meaning. They view America as a place where peoples of different ancestries continue to develop their own nationally distinct "ways of life." Extreme Jewish nationalists and Reconstructionists are prominent among advocates of this plural-cultural theory for American Jews. Dr. Knox seems to accept their premise tentatively in order to reason with them. Since the premise itself, however, is unsound, the article loses in clarity what it gains in tact.

It is true, as Dr. Knox indicates, that the Nazi horror and organized anti-Semitism have made us more aware of being Jews. Many Jews who have given their "Jewishness" but little thought are now earnestly seeking out its spiritual values. They also realize more clearly that Jews, as such, have some interests in common and a cultural inheritance which should be explored and developed. This is a very different thing, however, from a desire to lead a special "Jewish way of life" distinct from our lives as Americans.

Surely no one who knows America through his own living experience could accept the plural-cultural theory that our nation consists of descendants of different ancestries busily creating separate and distinct "ways of life." True, some of these groups display considerable internal cohesion, but in the second and third generation their respective "ways of life" differ little, one from the other. Religious differences there may be and some slowly dissolving areas of Old World traditions, but no view of American

culture, except from a library window, could see it as a jig-saw puzzle pattern composed of the "Good Jewish Life," the "Good Italian Life," the "Good Irish Life," the "Good German Life," or for that matter, the "Good Polish-Catholic Life," the "Good Russian-Orthodox Life," the "Good English-Episcopalian Life," or the "Good Afro-Methodist Life." Even sociologists who once eyed the theory with sympathetic interest have since chopped it to a fragment and classified it as a transitional phase.

LET us see things as they are. Except as to religion and ethics in ancient Palestine, the Jews in America have probably surged far beyond the achievements of any "center" in the past.

It is grossly misleading to base the comparison solely on the specifically Jewish cultural output in this country. The comparison must also take into consideration the fact that American Jews are making an astonishing contribution to the *general* culture of this nation. They have already greatly enriched American music, law, art, literature, journalism, science, architecture, theater, motion pictures, medicine, education, finance, social work, trade-unionism, business, diplomacy, production, radio transmission, sports, and communal organization, and helped mightily in the good fight for democracy, social justice, and civil liberties. Their achievements have been woven into the fabric of American civilization according to the pattern of American life.

This miracle was accomplished only because repressed energies and talents were liberated by the opportunities of freedom. The spectacle has naturally bewildered those intensely Jewish scholars whose life experience has been largely that of the study. In their subconscious minds there still lingers a somewhat romanticized memory of life in a segregated European minority, turned in upon itself by the clamor of many nationalities each agitating for its own separate culture. They are, therefore, dismayed to see specifically Jewish activities in America devoted mainly to religion with its cultural

fringes, to philanthropic and communal endeavors, to Zionism, to defense against anti-Semitism, to literary and journalistic production of common or special interest to Jews, whether in English, Yiddish, or Hebrew. Unable as yet to evaluate the exuberant creative spirit of Jews on the expansive American scene, they seek to reconfine it within the snug and familiar shadows of the past. They propose to inoculate the Jews of America with such a "sense of being Jewish" that this injected feeling will be carried from the cradle to the grave in all secular activities of life. This theory of voluntary retreat from freedom has won some converts, especially among those so stunned by the sudden resurgence of barbarism in the modern world that they have lost faith in the underlying strength of democratic forces.

The synthetic nature of this movement is seen in the fact that indoctrination is felt to be a prerequisite to the production of this special way of life. The idea is to propagandize American Jews until they come across with the desired culture. Adult Jews are regarded as rather hopeless lost souls whose tastes, interests, and diversions resemble too closely those of their fellow Americans. Jewish children offer better possibilities, especially when they are gathered in Jewish centers, camps for Jewish children, and Jewish day schools. Jewish communal and social workers are regarded as the most likely agents of the propaganda.

It is much to be feared that this forced feeding will create not "culture," but only an unhealthy feeling of not belonging to the American community. For instance, camps attended by Jewish children now utilize fully the Indian camping tradition with its Indian names, trail-making, canoeing, and campfires. This, it seems, is all wrong—at least as to Indian nomenclature. Self-respecting Indians use Indian names, and self-respecting Jews should use Jewish names. Why not "Theodore Herzl Lodge," "Ibn Gabirol Canoe House," "Trail of Ahad Ha'am"? Of course, the effect of this sort of thing could only be to make Jewish children feel that the delightful Indian tradition,

the inheritance of all American kids, does not belong to them.

Again, the chairman of a meeting devoted to "Jewish" music recently betrayed his subconscious imagery when he thanked the musicians for not dedicating their talents to the "outer world." A fine Jewish leader, influenced by this separatist propaganda, inadvertently referred to the great non-sectarian agencies of his city as "their" philanthropies, although he well knew that these institutions belonged to Jews as much as to others. The editor of *Congress Weekly*, lamenting the failure of Jews in America to live "as Jews," recently wrote that it makes little difference whether we Jews are destroyed by gas chambers or by "granting us that equality which wipes out our identity!" Such a complex is the logical end-result of frustrated plural-culturalism.

Soon we shall celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of the first settlement of Jews in America. It seems a little late to ask whether America is "Exile or Home." On a thousand fronts, military and cultural, Jews with other Americans of many faiths and origins have fought to defend and develop in America a fine democratic civilization. We are moving closer together, not away from one another.

Dr. Knox has sought to soothe the anxieties of those who are beset with separatist and nationalist propaganda. Would it not have been just as effective, however, if the thoughtful author had said quite simply: "Stop worrying about producing a special 'way of life.' This business of being a Jew and an American is not such a problem. Just relax and do what comes naturally. If, as I suspect, plural-culturalism is merely a rationalization of fear that Jews, as a group, may not survive in America, then I suggest that those who are upsetting you with these notions have neither the knowledge of America nor the faith in freedom to qualify them as experts on the future. Certainly, neither they nor anyone else have the divine wisdom to direct the thinking of the coming generations. Leave the moulding of posterity to God."

THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT

Romantic Love and Jewish Literature

DAVID SCHEINERT

IN ALL simplicity the Shulamite confesses to the daughters of Jerusalem: "But mine own vineyard have I not kept." "My bowels were moved for him," the Shulamite sighs. "I am sick with love," the Shulamite cries out.

But Louis Golding's Serra Golda (in his novel, *Day of Atonement*) wears a wig on her shaven head, and if she speaks unctuously, it is to beguile the customers of her grocery store. Joseph Roth's Deborah (in his *Job*) has empty breasts, a concave belly, varicose veins. André Spire's girl student defends herself: "My clothes are chaste, almost poor." And all the women of the Galut are

A READER wrote in the other day pointing out that in fourteen issues of COMMENTARY there had not been a single story that as much as mentioned love between the sexes (a not unfamiliar subject in other magazines), and asking quite pointedly how this came to be. As it happened, the very same day this article by the Belgian critic DAVID SCHEINERT arrived, and it occurred to some of us that perhaps it might have some bearing on the question, in addition to its broader relevance. Born in Poland and brought to Belgium at the age of eight, Mr. Scheinert has already, at the age of thirty-one, made a reputation for himself as a writer on Jewish subjects. At sixteen, he joined the General Zionists, where he was active in the youth movement. He went underground in northern France during the war. After the liberation, he left the General Zionists and joined the Revisionists, whose leader he became in Brussels. At the same time, he was a member of the executive of the Council of Jewish Organizations of Belgium. He has abandoned all political activity since then to devote himself to writing. He contributes, or has contributed, to *Vendredi* and *La Terre Retrouvée*, both in Paris, to *La Gazette d'Israël* in Tunis, and *La Revue Juive de Genève*. He now lives in the country near Brussels, has finished a novel, and is working on a play.

pious, bent—one pictures them lighting the Sabbath candles or painfully supporting the weight of their full wombs. For "grace is deceitful and beauty vain, but a woman who fears God is deserving of praise."

Between the Shulamite and these women rises the Seventh Commandment, the seventh word, the chaste rock, chaste because it is bare. It is not only adultery that God or his legislators condemn. It is woman-worship itself—"shameful and savage embraces," in the words of J. Salvador—love for love's sake.

The Beloved can rejoice at the Shulamite's breasts, which are like "two goblets of spiced wine," for he sees her clearly. The shadow of the rock does not touch him; he is outside the pale of sin. But Spire is in the shadow of the Seventh Commandment. He must indict his girl student, not because she is guilty, but because she has begun to defend herself, because, being innocent, she becomes dangerous, because she is, because she is alive: "Woman, you are naked—cut off your hair, mutilate your hands, destroy your voice. . . ."

THE shadow of the high rock overlaps the shadow of the ghetto. To our didactic literature this Seventh Commandment is a godsend, an inexhaustible source of material. The ghetto must swarm with children. Insecurity calls forth solid marriage contracts, discreet *shadhanim*, family discipline—the only discipline that the Jews accept voluntarily. The young man studies the sacred texts; the appearance of youthful acne indicates that the moment has come for his marriage; and the marriage follows its course, punctuated by the holidays, by business deals, by the births of children.

In Jewish literature, female sterility is a greater tragedy than thwarted love in post-chivalric literature—which is to say, almost the whole body of world literature. "Not until she had fasted every Monday and Thursday for a whole year did Zillah win from heaven the child she had desired so long and so ardently," writes Zangwill (in *Those Who Walk in the Shadows*).

God does not want woman to be deified by man, and he organizes his propaganda accordingly. He makes the man say every day: "Blessed art Thou, oh Lord, who hast not created me woman." The deputies of God fear that man in love with woman's hair will lose the power that rests in his own hair. Samson will remain the *gibbor*—the strong one—so long as he does not bow to Delilah. And if strength was necessary to the Hebrews, it is indispensable to the Jews. The shadow of the seventh pillar remains. But the Jews do not become *gibborim* simply by separating themselves from women. It is the pillar itself, hard and erect, that is needed. In the end they find it again in the place where it was set up, and they begin to worship its image.

There is nothing more alien to our men, even to our dreamers, than the amorous charades, the serenades, the exquisite trumpery, the sentimental make-believe, the love without substance born of the Virgin, which in the end emasculates, thwarts, and diverts the senses of the most virile of the Christians; equally alien, on the other hand, are salty jests, refinements of the embrace, courtly dalliance, arts of love, transparent cards, and other erotic accessories. The Jew must struggle not to die among these haters, these fanatical adepts of the religion of love, these priests of sex and its odor. And for that he must give life: simply and prosaically, he must beget children. For that he must resist the liquors of love, the gratuities of love. He must cut the hair of his women, separate himself from them in the temple, direct his thoughts toward God, toward the child that is life, toward that life which brings him back to God and to the Land of God and of children.

IT is a natural circle. The most important motive in Jewish life—and consequently in the Jewish literature derived from this life—is the necessity to procreate in a world that persists in obstructing this procreation. It is this which makes for a literary attitude that sometimes approaches the political. The reinforcement of minorities. The politics of cadres. Novels in the service of history—the highest history, it goes without saying, that history which permits non-novelists to write thick volumes more boring and deceitful than novels.

Certainly, when they smell spring, our writers feel the sap rising inside them. But the shadow of a tree brings back to them the shadow of the seventh pillar. Out of their desires, they make stories full of perils. When they speak of love—and they do so very well sometimes—it means: "Danger for Jews," "Not to be imitated," or simply: "Forbidden." This produces a succession of clandestine couplings, piquant love-making in wheat fields, in dark rooms, by the shores of lakes, in the woods at nightfall. And always extra-conjugal embraces between Jews and Christians. In *The Day of Atonement*, it is Leah, the shopkeeper's daughter, and Sergei, the peasant's son. In *Moschko of Parma* by K. E. Franzos, it is Moschko the blacksmith and the "heavy" Kasia; in *Job*, it is Miriam with Stepan and later Ossip; in Brod's *Reubeni*, it is Monica and David. And Ludwig Lewisohn even brings in his transparent little moral: in his *Stephen Escott*, Ruth and David in their perfect union serve to emphasize the disastrous experiences of Paul and Janet and of Dorothy and Stephen.

Affairs of sex, our writers tell us, turn out badly. And to prove their point, they write about "mixed relations." Excuse the monstrosity—I mean love between the worshippers of Adonai and the mistresses of Jesus Christ. In *Solal* it requires all the fire of Albert Cohen's temperament to carry off the failure of the love affair between Solal and Aude. The association is broken off; but we pardon him this sermon—in itself so un-Mosaic, so animal, so sensual—because

of his characters with their free, unbuttoned bodies, bursting with splendor, living the life of virile men escaped from every prison.

As in all other departments of life, here, too, the return to the land, to fresh air, brings a return to normal proportions and to books as nourishing as milk just come from the cow's udder. Finbert, in *Le Fou de Dieu*, can couple Hillel Schwartz with the Bedouin girl Khadra on the yellow sands of Egypt without any shadow at all, whether of the seventh column or of remorse, just as he couples the same Schwartz with his Jewish fiancée Rachel, "whose supple body was amenable to all the tricks of the flesh."

The writer—Cohen or Shneour or Finbert—crushes men into pills of print, which, when swallowed, feel like something molten. There they are, these men—Jews, politicians, creatures of sexuality, chaste giants, attractive or repulsive, feverish enjoyers and conformists, or men of affairs. The movements of life turn them over and over in the pan like beefsteaks, giving them diverse shad-

ings, yet leaving them, all the same, rather underdone. . . .

After the departure of the Germans, I found an old volume of Heine in my parents' house, among dirty papers in a bare room with walls perforated by bullets. A ribbon marked the page—the last page my mother had read, as she read every night before going to sleep and in the morning before rising.

The old book is before me. And without being an apostate, I can say that it is almost a Bible. And so the reader may not take offense when I say that to this prophet it was permitted to sing a little and to dance a little around the seventh pillar—and even the second—and to cry out: "*Ich liebe alleine, die Kleine, die Feine, die Reine, die Eine!*"—permitted to live and die as a prophet, with his clock set ahead, scoffing at shadows and pillars, raising up his own rocks, hating and loving, standing against everything, even God, blaspheming extravagantly—poor wretch!—because the time for *Kaddish* had not yet come. . . .

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

A Viable Socialist State

THE problem that the British Labor government faced was whether it could establish a viable socialist state in the inadequate area of the world known as the United Kingdom.

The obstacles were formidable. Britain faced an impossible economic situation resulting from the financial strain of two wars, the technological inadequacy of its industrial system, expensive military and administrative commitments abroad, loss of markets, a shortage of workers, and a plethora of consumers.

Whether or not socialism could be established in one country was a problem that had long agitated socialist theorists. There was some doubt that socialism could be established in large self-sufficient areas such as the United States and the Soviet Union. There was very serious doubt that socialism could be established in the British Isles unless its economy could become integrated with stable economies abroad.

Britain's Labor government had to make cruel choices between foreign trade and domestic consumption. It had to readjust political relations with its empire so that it could establish friendly economic relations. The Labor government systematically proceeded

to dismantle the imperial structure that had once supported an uneasy world order. This process, in the subdued and astringent announcements of Clement R. Attlee, seemed almost routine. It was the anguished thunder of Winston Churchill that served to warn the world that it was witnessing a turning point in history.

In India, the British had offered full independence on May 16, 1946, and established a procedure whereby the Indians could set up a fully representative government to which the British could turn over power. But the Moslems could not be persuaded to follow this procedure. The British decided that this fact would not prevent their departure. Last month the British Labor government announced that it would definitely turn over sovereignty to the Indians by June 1948. If sovereignty could not be relinquished to a single Indian authority, the British would distribute the sovereignty around, probably giving some of it to Moslems and princes.

In the Middle East, the British relinquished a substantial interest in their oil rights to American companies, and were pulling out of Egypt. In Burma, the British offered independence.

In Palestine, the British made a final stab at a solution and, promptly after its rejection by Zionists and Arabs, the Cabinet decided, on February 14, to turn over the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

The British seemed to be possessed of an overwhelming desire to be rid of the White Man's Burden. "The present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged," the British White Paper on India said. "His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because the Arabs and the Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them," the British memorandum said. This time they meant it. Divide and rule had once been the path to imperial

SIDNEY HERTZBERG devotes most of his department this month to charting the intricate and confusing currents and cross-currents that have marked Palestine developments in the period following the Basel World Zionist Congress. During this month a milestone in history was passed with Britain's declaration of her intention to refer Palestine to the United Nations. Mr. Hertzberg, recognized as an outstanding news analyst, strives for concision, clarity, and impartiality in these monthly summaries and interpretations of events and their implications; and the editors of this magazine here acknowledge with much gratification the numerous comments we have been receiving from readers testifying to his success in achieving these difficult aims.

riches. It was now the path to political and economic bankruptcy.

Zionism and the United States

FOR Zionism, the British decision to take Palestine to the United Nations meant the beginning of a new book in its history. Modern Zionism was based on the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, which the British had held for twenty-five years. Though the Mandate, in some vital respects, was unclear and subject to varying interpretations, it had yet provided a solid juridical base for most types of Zionism. Suddenly this foundation was removed. The United Nations was a new organization. It could do as it chose with the Mandate. It was not bound by the Balfour Declaration or by any other previous commitments to Arabs or Jews. New forces and new conditions had arisen in the world since the writing of the Mandate and they would influence the United Nations' disposition of the Palestine problem. In effect, the world and the Zionists now faced a clean slate.

The Zionist movement itself was now jolted out of a familiar and well-worn routine. Overnight the long background of Zionist diplomacy, which established valuable contacts and modes of operation vis-à-vis the British, became almost worthless. The tactic of using humanitarian appeals in the United States to extract political concessions from Britain was now played out. The United States, like Britain and every other member of the United Nations, now would be called upon to take responsibility for working out and implementing a specific solution in Palestine.

Balance of Risks

"We shall plead our case in the capitals of every member state of the United Nations and defend it before the Assembly," Moshe Shertok, chairman of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, pledged. It was an arduous prospect. In the United Nations, procedures were still uncertain and in some vital instances non-existent. The motivations with which the Zionists would have to deal were no longer simply British; they were now as complicated as all the cross-currents of the total world scene.

Among those directly concerned, only the Arabs had cause for rejoicing over the new

situation. Three days before the British announcement, Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey, secretary-general of the Arab League, announced that the Arab states, anticipating the failure of the London Conference, had already decided to take the problem to the United Nations. A week previous the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem had announced his support of such action.

For the Arabs, it might mean the unwelcome involvement of the Soviet Union. But it would also mean the formal involvement of the Arab states in the fate of Palestine and the possible triumph of Arab nationalism on the basis of the generally accepted principle of self-determination.

For the British, there was the risk of a weakening of their strategic domination of the area. But a new directive might mean some relief from the economic and military burden, and from the moral onus under which Britain had been suffering. Best of all, it meant the formal involvement of the United States as a responsible participant rather than as a critic without responsibility—an aim that Ernest Bevin had tried unsuccessfully to achieve since he took office.

For the Zionists, there seemed to be no advantage at all. After World War I, Britain was in a position to satisfy Zionist aspirations, and the Arabs were not able to thwart them. After World War II, Britain was no longer the power she used to be, and the Arabs, now violently anti-Zionist, had strength and allies. The prospect emphasized the ironic fact that, despite all the bitterness, Britain was still the best friend Zionists had among the nations of the world. At no time did the Jewish Agency propose to take its case to the United Nations and, even after the British announcement, Agency leaders said they would want the British to remain if the Mandate were "observed."

Yet everyone, including the Zionists, had to pretend to be happy about the move. The United Nations, so the story ran, was the hope of the world. It was where the oppressed turned for justice. Any public questioning of this belief was not being done in responsible quarters.

The Principle of Self-Determination

The British decision was to take Palestine to the General Assembly, in which all members of the United Nations were represented.

No recommendation would be made. The British would simply present a review of their twenty-five years as the mandatory power, a summary of current Arab and Zionist demands, and the latest British proposal.

Exactly what procedure the British expected the General Assembly to follow was not at first made clear. The General Assembly had virtually unlimited power to discuss and make recommendations. The most logical course would have been to refer it to the International Trusteeship Council, which is specifically empowered to deal with mandates. Though Bevin described the Palestine Mandate as "unworkable," he did not offer to turn it in. Yet the obvious intent of the UN Charter was that mandates should be incorporated into the trusteeship system. If Palestine was accounted a threat to international peace, it could have been taken to the Security Council. Otherwise, it would probably end up, sooner or later, in the Trusteeship Council. In any case, whatever action the General Assembly took was likely to be based on the articles in the Charter relating to the international trusteeship system. Therefore these articles were worth careful scrutiny.

The basic objectives of the system were set down in Article Seventy-Six. It required that these objectives be in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations itself as stated in Article One of the Charter, which included the declaration that the United Nations should develop friendly relations among nations "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

Article Seventy-Six itself declared that in the trust territories there must be "progressive development toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." It also encouraged "recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world."

The provisions stressing self-determination would no doubt be stressed by the Arabs. The Arab case "is that of a people desiring to remain undisturbed in possession of their country and to safeguard their natural existence and freedom," Jamal Husseini, spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs, told the London Conference on January 27. "This

natural right happily coincides with the highest principle of self-determination." The Arabs would no doubt make use of this happy coincidence, since self-determination under existing circumstances would mean an independent Palestinian state in which the Arabs would be a two-to-one majority. A decision based on this principle would destroy all hope of a Jewish state, except in the highly unlikely event that the UN decided deliberately to postpone self-determination until the Jews were a majority.

Conceivably the principle of self-determination could be interpreted to mean self-determination for the Jews in Palestine, which would give them a separate partitioned state. But this would involve the setting of a precedent which many nations would find extremely uncomfortable. Under such a precedent, India would hardly be able to refuse Pakistan to its Moslems and Sikhistan to its Sikhs; China could not refuse to grant independence to the Communist-held areas. It would be a precedent under which any minority in any existing sovereign state could demand independence.

However, under the various provisions in the Charter for respect of human rights, an independent Palestinian state would have to commit itself to the protection of minority rights which, if carried out, might make possible the development of a non-political Jewish national home.

States Directly Concerned

Article Seventy-Nine of the trusteeship chapter read: "The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandates by a member of the United Nations."

This meant that the terms of the trusteeship for Palestine must be approved by Britain as the mandatory power and by "the states directly concerned." No matter how many other members of the United Nations approved the terms, they could not be adopted over the veto of any one of these states.

For the Zionists, the phrase "the states directly concerned," was a mined field. In setting up the International Trusteeship Council in the fall of 1946, the great powers

were unable to agree on how to define it. At the insistence of the United States, the Trusteeship Council was set up without a definition. The Soviet Union objected and there was some doubt that the Soviet Union recognized the legality of the Trusteeship Council.

Among the ten nations on the Council was Iraq, the most violently anti-Zionist of the Arab states.

However the phrase might be defined for general purposes, it would be difficult to maintain that the Arab states were not states directly concerned in a Palestine trusteeship. The Arab claim would be based on geographical proximity, racial and religious affinity, and economic connections. "What business have these Arab states to discuss the future of Palestine?" Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, president of the Zionist Organization of America, had demanded at a Zionist conference on January 26. The question was now answered.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States could also claim they were states directly concerned. The Soviet case would be at least as strong as the United States case, though neither would be presented frankly in terms of power strategy. If the United States claim were based on the presence of Jews within its borders, Moscow could point to the presence not only of Jews but also of many Moslems in the Soviet Union. American investments in Zionist enterprise and Middle East oil could be balanced in part by the Soviets' interest in Middle East oil. The Soviet Union could also point to a geographic proximity which the United States could not claim.

Article Eighty-One of the Charter provided that a trust might be administered by "one or more states or the organization itself." This meant that the Soviet Union and one or more Arab states might not only be able to veto the terms of any trusteeship agreement, but they could also demand to be represented in the administering authority over the trust itself.

Power Politics

If the Arabs should lose their demand for the immediate independence of Palestine, and if a trusteeship agreement satisfactory to the Zionists and unsatisfactory to anti-Zionists should somehow survive the veto

of the Arab states, the Soviet Union, or the United Kingdom, there would still be the General Assembly itself.

Under Article Eighty-Five of the Charter, the terms of a Palestine trusteeship agreement and of any subsequent alteration or amendment would have to be approved by the General Assembly. Any action by the General Assembly on Palestine would require a two-thirds vote.

At this point the realities of international power politics would come into full play. Arrayed against Zionist demands would be the Arab bloc and the Soviet Union. Some observers felt that Moscow might allow its satellite states to vote as they pleased. Unless their own self-interest were directly involved, the rest of the United Nations could be expected to avoid antagonizing either the Arab bloc or the Soviet Union. Scandinavia and the small Western European nations would be inclined to follow Britain's lead. Opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine could be expected from Turkey, India, Iran, China, Ethiopia and the Philippines. The Latin American bloc had a kind of working agreement with the Arab bloc and was not likely to vote against it on a matter in which the Arabs felt so violently.

The prospects of getting a Jewish state, either in all or part of Palestine, from the General Assembly seemed hopeless.

Until the United Nations acted, the situation was in status quo. Article Eighty of the Charter provided that the rights "of any states or any peoples" in mandated territory must remain unchanged until a new agreement was concluded. Therefore Britain's authority in Palestine continued undiminished. Jewish rights under the Mandate also remained in force.

Britain announced that immigration would continue at the rate of 1,500 a month.

The Zionist Reaction

The British decision suddenly exposed the futility of Zionist maneuvering. The great debate at the World Zionist Congress in Basel over the precise terms on which the Agency might attend the London Conference, the heated controversies over the tactical nuances now seemed silly. They were meaningless even in terms of the London Conference itself. The only practical meaning of the bitterly fought Basel decision was

that the Jewish Agency met with the British in the Colonial Secretary's office rather than in St. James Palace where the Arabs met them.

Zionist comment on the new situation made no effort to display happiness, but neither did it recognize the bitter implications of the British action. The official statement of the Jewish Agency said:

"Another stage of negotiations has ended in a complete deadlock and the Government apparently envisages another period of delay. The policy of procrastination has been pursued ever since the end of the war with disastrous results to the peace of Palestine and to the hopes of the Jewish remnants in Europe. If the Government intends to go to the United Nations with a constructive proposal for the solution of the Palestine problem, it should at least appear before an international tribunal with its mandatory trust intact and inviolate. The Mandate is binding on Great Britain until a new policy is authorized by the United Nations. The British Government should therefore remove its restrictions on immigration and land settlement which are incompatible with the provisions of the Mandate. This is the only way of allaying the feelings of tension and despair which have manifested themselves in the past two years."

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, rarely at a loss for full-blooded pronouncements on Zionist developments, told an emergency conference of all American Zionists in Washington on February 17 that the British move involved both disadvantages and advantages but required further study.

The conference itself adopted a long declaration in which it referred to the British action as "another maneuver which, while seemingly leaving the decision of Palestine's future in the hands of the United Nations, is calculated to secure the prolongation of arbitrary British rule pending time-consuming deliberations, the results of which Britain may negate with her veto power."

The declaration was typical of American Zionist documents in its persisting interpretation of Zionism according to the Biltmore line, despite disasters and change of political climate, in the Zionist movement as well as externally.

The Biltmore line was finished as most Zionists admitted privately. But there was

no sign of it in official statements. The declaration began by stating that the British obligation was "the development of the Jewish National Home," the phrase used in the Balfour Declaration. The Jews, it continued, "ask only the elementary human rights of life, work and home." One thousand words later the purpose of the Mandate, though the Mandate was not specifically mentioned, had become "to end for all time Jewish national homelessness and to re-establish Jewish nationhood." Having reached "nationhood," the final jump was inevitable. The solution which the United Nations had to spell out "in clear and precise terms" included "the establishment of the Jewish state."

In appealing directly to the United States government, the declaration used the omnibus phrase, "Jewish national aspirations," the support of which, it said, was the "traditional policy" of the country. Since the United States now was forced to adopt a concrete policy in the United Nations, it was unlikely that this kind of unprecise rhetoric would continue to pay off.

America was establishing other traditions in its foreign policy. Two days after the Zionist conference met, President Truman decorated Crown Prince Amir Saud of Saudi Arabia with the Legion of Merit in the degree of Commander, and gave him another Legion of Merit, in the degree of Chief Commander, to give to his father, King Ibn Saud, "for services rendered to the Allied cause in World War II." The Crown Prince had just completed a tour of the United States looking for things to buy with royalties his father was getting from American oil companies. Next day he left for London in the President's personal plane.

Bevin and Palestine

IN THE experience of Ernest Bevin, the labor leader, any dispute between capital and labor was susceptible of settlement by negotiation. On the whole, this experience proved valuable for Ernest Bevin, the diplomat. The great exception seemed to be Palestine.

The fullest revelation of Bevin's approach to Palestine came in his statement to the House of Commons on February 25 in explanation of the Cabinet's decision to refer the problem to the United Nations. It put on the record what had long been suspected: that the British Foreign Secretary was a solid

and immovable opponent of a Jewish state in any form. It showed him completely impervious to Zionist dialectics of the Biltmore period.

In talking to Commons, Bevin made no effort to conceal his annoyance over his failure to achieve a negotiated settlement. What his statement lacked in grammar and precision it made up in vigor and plain-speaking.

Why the United Nations

The decision to take Palestine to the United Nations, Bevin declared, was based on the conclusion that the Mandate was "unworkable," though Britain had done its best.* "If we take the ratio of immigration and development inaccentuated [*sic*] by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate as visualized in 1922 has, in fact, been carried out," he said. "What we have not been able to do is to meet with this Mandate the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany."

Bevin complained that all proposals looking toward independence for Palestine were judged by Arabs and Jews in terms of the kind of state it would be. The Jewish national home, as he interpreted it, was no longer the issue, he said.

"The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is (1) shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish state be admitted? or (2) shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab state with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a national home be admitted? or (3) shall it be a Palestinian state in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible?"

Britain, as the mandatory power, had no power to make the choice, he said.

Immigration

In describing his efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, Bevin said: "To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy." However, in the face of repeated challenges from members of the House of Commons, he vigorously denied that he could have

torn up the White Paper. He insisted on continuity in British foreign policy and said that the White Paper was an undertaking that could be changed only "by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy."

Of the decision to permit immigration at the rate of 1,500 a month despite the White Paper ban, he said: "I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to do that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month."

This, he said, was "the first step in the opening of negotiations." It was, he added, "not a bad rate of entry" and had been exceeded only five times in the history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of Nazi rule.

"But," he continued, "I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States: in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and we were carrying the responsibility. (Hon. Members: "Hear, hear.") And if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing, then we could have informed them. But instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison was sent out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavoring to produce in the Arab states, and it set the whole thing back."

Later in his speech Bevin expressed his belief that "if it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews," a settlement could be found.

"Unfortunately, that is not the position," he said. "From the Zionist point of view, the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency was thinking in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, hav-

* Excerpts from Bevin's speech are from the full official transcript.

ing regard to the European situation—and I emphasize this—immigration after that was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.”

His final word on immigration was an offer to “take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world,” of Europe’s one million displaced.

Partition

Bevin opposed partition because of the “tremendous row” it would have caused over the drawing of frontiers.

“We really cannot make two viable states of Palestine however we may try. We cannot do it. We can make one viable state and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest nearer to one of the Arab states, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. . . .

“The best partition scheme and the most favorable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in the Jewish state. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say ‘if it is wrong for the Jews to be in minority of $33\frac{1}{3}$ or 40 per cent in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 380,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?’ I have no answer to that.”

National Home

Bevin declared he was unable to give an accurate definition of the Jewish national home, but he said that the Arabs were ready to accept it within a unitary state in which they were a majority. Asked what was the good of the Arab’s accepting something he could not define, Bevin replied: “Because they agreed in their plan—Hon. Members have it before them—that you can have your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything. . . .”

At this point some of the Hon. Members made noises of disdain, and Bevin retorted: “My Hon. Friend says very kind of them, but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that there would never have been a problem.”

The Basic Bevin View

In summarizing his presentation of the most recent British memorandum, Bevin expressed his ultimate hope for Palestine:

“We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasize in Palestine—are given a chance to work together they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency’s dictates it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially. . . .

“In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a state of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations.”

America Accused

The world press largely ignored Bevin’s views, to play up his sensational charge that an act of the President of the United States had “spoiled” his negotiations with the Zionists in the fall of 1946. He described his failure to get the Arabs and Zionists to meet together and then moved in:

“I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated I did not mind whether it was five years, or ten years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, ‘If you will work together for three, five or ten years, it might well be you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference.’ At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling. I do not think I overestimated it, when they left me in the Foreign Office that day that I had the right approach at last.

“But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day, I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion, I forget which, My Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United

States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

"I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.

"One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine is to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish state. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish sovereign state. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought that by being in New York I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with Secretary of States, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end he made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain was proposing to hold the conference in his view merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results."

America Replies

Next day came a formal communique from the White House which read as follows:

"The impression that has arisen from yesterday's debate in the British Parliament that America's interest in Palestine and the settlement of Jews there is motivated by partisan and local politics is most unfortunate and misleading.

"The President's statement of October 4, 1946, which was referred to in that debate, merely reaffirmed the attitude toward Palestine and Jewish immigration into Palestine which the United States Government has publicly expressed since the summer of 1945.

"This attitude was and is based upon the desire of the President to advance a just solution of the Palestine problem. Our position on this subject was communicated to the British Government by the President in his letter to Prime Minister Attlee on August 31, 1945, which was publicly released by the President on November 13, 1945, when he announced the establishment of the Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. That statement of October 4, 1946, reiterated this Government's position, which was already fully known to all parties to the Palestine negotiations.

"America's interest in Palestine is of long and continuing standing. It is a deep and abiding interest shared by our people without regard to their political affiliation."

In denying that the President's statement of October 4 was political (while ignoring the charge that it upset Bevin's negotiations), the White House was expressing the opposite of general feeling. Few observers had doubted that the President's statement was a campaign document (see "The Month in History," November 1946), but apart from Bevin's assurance, there was no evidence that it had spoiled the possibility of an agreement.

The White House disclaimer was misleading in its main point. The President's October 4 statement was not simply a reaffirmation for 100,000 refugees. The most significant part of the October 4 statement was the President's declaration of his readiness to support the partition of Palestine. This was a new and unprecedented position for the United States government. Conceivably, this aspect of the statement, rather than repetition of the immigration request, might have stiffened the attitude of the Jewish Agency in its dealings with Bevin.

The British Memorandum

The British were no doubt aware of the fact that their memorandum made public on February 10 would be unacceptable to both the Arabs and the Zionists. It took only four days after its publication for the British Cabinet to decide to refer the whole matter to the United Nations. It was made clear that the settlement proposed was not to be imposed. The fact that it was called a "memorandum" rather than a plan or a White Paper indicated a realization of the transitional nature of the document.

However, though the memorandum may not have been the last word on the subject from the British, it was certainly an authentic picture of the thinking of the British Cabinet on the subject and, more particularly, of the specific proposals that Ernest Bevin would have in mind in discussing the matter with the United Nations.

A Unitary State

The general intent of the document was stated in its last sentence:

"The proposals contained in the present memorandum are designed to give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent state."

This determination to see Palestine develop as a unitary state would be implemented in various ways.

Provision was made for "areas of local administration" which would include "a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews." But these areas would not necessarily be unbroken Jewish or Arab provinces as anticipated in the Morrison-Grady proposals. "As the local administrative boundaries would not have the character of state frontiers," the memorandum said, "it would not necessarily follow that all the Arab or all the Jewish territory need be contiguous."

The British High Commissioner would "endeavor to form" an advisory council which would be so composed "as to include representatives not only of Arab and Jewish local administrations, but also of labor and other organized interests." The specific inclusion of "labor and other organized interests" was clearly designed to encourage bi-national elements in Palestine.

Herbert Morrison had made it clear that

the separate provinces set up in the earlier plan might ultimately have developed into either separate independent states or into a single federalized nation. Obviously, in the six months between the propounding of the Morrison-Grady plan and the issuing of the new memorandum, sentiment within the British Cabinet for partition as against a unitary state declined rather than grew, a fact which could lead to the conclusion that Zionist tactics during this period, including resistance in Palestine and maximalism in diplomacy, failed to achieve its end.

Elimination of the Agency

On the conclusion of the trusteeship agreement which the memorandum envisaged, "the Jewish members of the advisory council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner."

This provision would eliminate the official connection of Jews outside of Palestine with the administration in Palestine, and concentrate responsibility on the Jews of Palestine. Elimination of non-Palestinian Jews would have meant elimination of some of the most intransigent advocates of a Jewish state.

The nineteen-member Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine contained six non-Palestinian Jews and was chosen by the World Zionist Organization. However, while the World Zionist Organization was not a body to which the Mandatory power was permanently bound, "an appropriate Jewish agency" was, under Article Four of the Mandate.

Elimination of the Jewish Agency might have been interpreted as a violation of the Mandate unless it were done with international approval. But some had questioned the legality of the current Jewish Agency itself. The Zionist Organization which the mandatory power had to recognize was required "to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home." For some years there had been little or no cooperation between the WZO and substantial Jewish groups outside of it who wanted to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

The unitary tendency was carried into the economic field. The memorandum declared

that "it would be the duty of the central government to stimulate the economic development of the country through the agency of development boards including both Arab and Jewish members." At the same time, the central government was given the responsibility "for insuring that adequate provision was made by local administrations for the enforcement of minimum wage rates and conditions of labor."

The memorandum said nothing about American financial aid for economic development. The Morrison-Grady proposals, which were produced by a group of Anglo-American experts, suggested American grants and loans. The new memorandum was a purely British document.

Immigration Guarantee

The memorandum contained a specific commitment from the British to increase substantially the rate of immigration. Since the effectuation of the White Paper, the British had been permitting 1,500 immigrants a month into Palestine. The bulk of these were refugees held in detention camps until the monthly quotas opened up. The Morrison-Grady plan promised that "every effort would be made" to get 100,000 Jews into Palestine within a year; however, it was not a hard commitment and there could easily have been difficulties which would have thwarted such efforts and meant extending the entry of 100,000 over a longer period.

The new memorandum guaranteed Jewish immigration at a rate of 4,000 monthly for a period of two years. After this time, the "continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his advisory council; and, in the event of a disagreement, the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations."

Since the advisory council had no real power, it was not clear what would constitute "a disagreement" with the High Commissioner to be taken to the United Nations. Jewish representatives would presumably be a minority on the advisory council. If a disagreement meant the disagreement of a majority of the advisory council, there was not much likelihood of appeal. However, Bevin, in his statement to the House of Commons,

declared that the UN would be appealed to "if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party."

Some further guide to action by the High Commissioner was given in another section of the memorandum. After stating that the advisory council would include representatives of interests other than the Arab and Jewish local administrations, the memorandum admitted that voting in the advisory council would probably tend "at first" to follow communal lines. "Since however," it continued, "the functions of the council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities."

The immigration provisions were preceded by a rejection of the Jewish Agency claim that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. At the same time, the memorandum refused to accept "the demand of the Arab delegation that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith." This refusal seemed to be a specific repudiation of the 1939 White Paper declaration that the British, after five years, would permit no further Jewish immigration "unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."

Minority Safeguards

The memorandum provided for a series of specific safeguards for the rights of the Jewish population in the Arab areas and of the Arab population in the Jewish areas. These would include:

"(a) Adequate representation in local legislatures; (b) a reasonable proportion of posts in the local administration; (c) freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo, including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status; (d) the right to maintain their own educational institutions; (e) the right to use their own language in their communications with the administration in courts of law."

These provisions seemed to be designed to have a double effect. They would protect the religious, educational, and cultural integrity of the minorities, but they would also, by providing for legislative and administrative representation of the minorities, encourage their working together.

Interim Trusteeship

The memorandum established a time limit to the Mandate. It was not a definite and unchangeable date as in the case of India. It proposed that Britain "should administer a five-year trusteeship over Palestine with the declared object of preparing the country for independence." The achievement of this object would have meant independence for Palestine three years later than projected by the 1939 White Paper, which embodied the objective of freeing Palestine "within ten years."

It was significant that the trusteeship now proposed was a small "t" trusteeship and was not specifically described as a United Nations Trusteeship. During the five-year period, the British proposed to carry on "the obligations which already rest upon them under the Mandate" and at the same time to act "in full conformity" with the provisions of Article Seventy-Six of the United Nations Charter, which set forth the basic objectives of the trusteeship system. If "substantial acquiescence" for this policy were obtained from Jews and Arabs, "interim arrangements in harmony with this policy could no doubt be made in advance of its formal approval by the United Nations."

The procedure for the termination of the trusteeship was described in the memorandum as follows:

"At the end of four years a constituent assembly would be elected. If an agreement was reached between a majority of the Jewish representatives and a majority of the Arab representatives in the constituent assembly, the High Commissioner would proceed forthwith to take whatever steps were necessary to establish the institutions of the independent state.

"In the event of a disagreement in the constituent assembly, the various drafts prepared for its consideration and the record of its debates would be submitted to the Trusteeship Council, which would be asked to advise upon future procedure."

The ambiguity concerning the precise relationship of the United Nations to the proposed "five-year trusteeship" was no doubt purposeful.

Pending final independence, the British High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. Local administrations would receive "a wide range" of legislative, administrative, and financial powers, including "some share in the responsibility for the police."

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

THE LOGIC OF MY AUNT YETTA

A Portrait

ETHEL ROSENBERG

MY AUNT Yetta examined the display of cookies on the counter. Her eyes roved restlessly from pan to pan. Finally her fingers swooped down. She was happily "feeling" some pieces to see if they were fresh.

"Lady," the baker roared, "don't handle the cake."

"That's cake?" my Aunt Yetta said in utter amazement. "I thought it was zweiback."

How my aunt arrives at such conclusions no one knows. The baker—like everyone else treated to the operations of my aunt's mind—opened his mouth. He closed his mouth. He raised his hands in a gesture of helpless defeat. I wouldn't be surprised if he sold out the next day. My Aunt Yetta affects people that way.

Please. I wouldn't like you to misunderstand. My Aunt Yetta is a woman whose heart is as big as her logic is peculiar. If somebody is sick, who is the first one to go rushing over with chicken soup—what am I saying, chicken soup?—a whole meal! And

ETHEL ROSENBERG wrote "Uncle Julius and the B.M.T." (our November issue), which in some quarters has been hailed as a significant addition to American folklore. Be that as it may, a second piece about Uncle Julius, which this magazine has in proof, has been temporarily pushed aside by an apparently even more indomitable creature from Mrs. Rosenberg's pen. With some misgivings we introduce Aunt Yetta. Some of our editors believe Aunt Yetta humorous; others think her a product of the naturalistic tradition in modern letters, pushed just a little too far. As for Mrs. Rosenberg, she lives—and practices housewifery and writing—in the Bronx (New York).

if, God forbid, us to long years, there's a death in the neighborhood, who takes care of the unfortunate family during the week of *shiva*? Ask anybody. Where there is trouble, there is my Aunt Yetta, to 120 years. And she's not a young woman any more. But some people find her a little upsetting.

I'LL never forget the day she stopped one of her neighbors on the street.

"Mrs. Zelowitz," my aunt said. "Where are you going?"

"Where am I going? I'm going shopping."

"Shame on you!" my aunt said vigorously. "Shopping on Saturday. What's the matter, the week isn't plenty big?"

"Please, Mrs. Rivkin, I have no time to stand and argue. My boy is coming home for lunch any minute."

"Make time," my aunt said sternly. "You know why we have Hitlers? Because Jewish people who should know better go shopping on Saturday."

Mrs. Zelowitz, irked at his heavy responsibility, replied with some relish, "What's the matter you don't talk to your girl Sylvia? I see her, I thank you nicely, practically every Saturday in the stores."

"Oh, Sylvia," my aunt dismissed her with a wave of the hand.

"Sylvia," Mrs. Zelowitz said firmly.

"She's an American," my aunt said.

Mrs. Zelowitz bristled.

"I am also an American."

"Mrs. Zelowitz," my Aunt Yetta looked her right in the eye. "You are a married woman with children."

Such logic cannot be refuted. One sputters, one protests, Aunt Yetta remains su-

premely confident and right. Take the time the poll-taker ran afoul of my Aunt Yetta's reasoning.

THE poll-taker rang the bell and poised his pencil.

"How do you do?" he said. "I'm taking a poll. . . ."

"My goodness!" Aunt Yetta was thrilled. "Come in. Come in," she urged him.

He entered and perched on the end of the chair.

"We're taking a poll," he said, "to determine which type of radio program is most popular. We. . . ."

"And you're asking me," my aunt interrupted excitedly. She sighed. That such a wonderful thing should happen to *her*! "All right. So I'll tell you. My favorite program is Eddie Cantor."

The young man put a check in the box opposite Cantor's name.

"You like Eddie Cantor's program," he said as he wrote, his head bent over the page.

"Excuse me," my Aunt Yetta said. "Positively not. For his program I don't care altogether."

He lifted his head and stared.

"I beg your pardon," he said. "Didn't you just say. . . ."

"I said my favorite program is Eddie Cantor, but his *program* I don't like." My Aunt Yetta smiled encouragingly. The young man sat very still, digesting this slowly.

"Would you mind . . . I don't think I quite understand."

The young people today!

"The program I don't like," my Aunt Yetta explained. "But Eddie Cantor is a fine man." She waited for the light of reason to brighten his face. It remained unlit. "You know how he was brought up? By a grandmother. A poor boy on the East Side." She emitted a series of sympathetic *tsks*.

The young man said anxiously that he failed to see what all this had to do with his poll.

"So look at him." My Aunt Yetta's patience is not too durable. "A fine house. A swimming pool. A fine family. Plenty of money. Still and all, he doesn't forget what he was. For everybody he has a heart."

The poll-taker agreed Mr. Cantor's heart was of purest gold.

"For the veterans. For the crippled chil-

dren. A camp for boys," my Aunt Yetta said, counting off his munificence finger by finger. "And what's the matter with Deanna Durbin?"

Nothing, absolutely nothing, the young man admitted nervously.

"A man like that should live forever, to 120 years."

Could they, the young man suggested, go on with the poll? It was getting late and he still had a number of calls to make.

Listen to that! First he asks a question, and then all of a sudden he has no time to wait for an answer.

"So that's why I listen to the program," my Aunt Yetta said. "Because a man like that you have to look far to find. But the program. . . ." My Aunt Yetta wrinkled her nose.

The poll-taker cleared his throat.

"Getting back to the poll," he said. "I have to put down a yes or no answer. Shall I leave it at no?"

"No? You'll put down *no*?" My Aunt Yetta was so excited she could hardly speak. "A black mark you'll put beside Eddie Cantor? Please leave my house," she said.

The young man gathered his pad, his pencil, his shattered nerves, and left.

"Imagine," Aunt Yetta mourned to Sylvia later. "Such a nice-looking boy, and he wants to put down I don't like Eddie Cantor's program."

"Well, you don't," Sylvia said, "and why you listen to him like clockwork every week I'll never understand."

"What has this to do?" Aunt Yetta said coldly. As I remember, she felt Sylvia's defection for a long time.

"I forgive," Aunt Yetta frequently brooded, "but I don't forget."

As I say, the simplest matters tend to get involved when my Aunt Yetta steps into the picture. Even standing on line becomes charged with explosive possibilities. As it happens, standing on line is something particularly abhorrent to her. She feels it's a new kind of foolishness. What was wrong with the way it used to be, when you pushed right into the mob and shouted for your "next"? My aunt is a woman who likes to mix with the crowd.

Well, there was this line, extending half-way down the block outside the A & P. (One

doesn't question what it is for. They're giving something out, or else why are all these people milling about? Exactly.) Suddenly, or so it certainly seemed to the two end women on line, my aunt materialized out of nowhere and placed herself, like a sandwich filling, between the two. Immediately there was a shrilled protest.

"Lady. What do you think you're doing?" cried the last person on the line. "The line starts in back of me, not in front of me."

"Never mind," my aunt said decisively. "I was watching the line while I was crossing the street. You saw me coming so you hurry up quick ran ahead of me. Don't worry. I was watching."

"You hear that?" the woman shrieked. "She was watching. You hear? In my whole life. . . . Listen, Mrs. You want a place in line, so stand in line, like a person. Behind me."

"Please," my Aunt Yetta said loftily, raising her hand. "No discussions."

"Mrs. Society Lady," the woman cried passionately. "She doesn't want discussions. Wait. I'll give you discussions." She glared at the woman standing in front of my aunt, who was listening with interest. "So why didn't you go ahead of her too already?"

"You think I'm a hog?" was my aunt's dignified reply.

SO FAR AS I know, only one person ever got the best of my aunt. That was, and what could be more logical, the landlord. Do I have to tell you about landlords? Now, what was it that my aunt wanted, do you think? Something big? A combination sink, maybe? A new stove? A little bit of heat? My aunt wanted, listen to this, all my aunt wanted was awnings. And how many awnings do you imagine? Two. Two awnings. This is the way it was.

My Aunt Yetta likes to sit at the window and look out at the street. The street is her world. She leans her elbows on a small pillow and drinks in the scene before her. The only trouble is, the sun is extremely strong during the hot summer months. The glare, she says, is blinding. Now it isn't as

though the attachments for the awnings aren't already in place. Everything required is there.

"What am I asking for?" my Aunt Yetta said to the landlord. "Diamonds? Two old awnings."

"You'll get them. You'll get them," the landlord said. "Did I ever break a promise to you?"

"I should have so many good years," my aunt said bluntly.

"Mrs. Rivkin," the landlord said reproachfully. "If I said you'll get them, you'll get them." But when? Ah. The first year they had to be repaired. The second year they had to be cleaned. The third year . . . did my aunt want *old* awnings? Pfeh! He would give her new awnings. Why didn't she have a little patience? If he said he would do it, he would do it. Such things take time. Finally my Aunt Yetta drove him into a corner.

"One thing I ask," she said desperately. "Give me already the old awnings. Let them be torn. Let them be dirty. As long as they keep out the sun."

The landlord studied my aunt.

"Awnings?" he said slowly, rolling the word on his tongue. "Oh," he said, as though my aunt hadn't quite made it clear to him before, "*awnings!*"

"What am I talking for three years? Of course, awnings," my aunt said impatiently. The landlord swore by his health that if it were up to him, personally. . . .

"Mrs. Rivkin, you know. I don't have to tell you. But what can I do? My wife doesn't like awnings."

"Your wife?" my Aunt Yetta said, stupefied. "Your *wife*? What has this to do with your wife?"

The landlord shrugged his shoulders.

"That's life," he said earnestly. "One doesn't like. The second doesn't get." And shaking his head thoughtfully in contemplation of this philosophic gem, he eased himself from my Aunt Yetta's grasp.

He must have known my aunt would understand. After all, my aunt is a logical woman.

CEDARS OF LEBANON

MY RETURN TO HAMBURG

A Chapter of an Autobiography

SOLOMON MAIMON

SOLOMON MAIMON, whose admiration for Maimonides led him to adopt his name, was born in a Lithuanian village in 1754. His proficiency in rabbinical studies made him locally famous by the time he was eleven, at which age he was married, becoming a father at fourteen. Restless within the confines of an intellectual tradition already becoming petrified, he abandoned his family and the Jewish world of Eastern Europe at twenty-five to make his way, first as a sort of physician, then as a student, and finally as a philosopher and bohemian pure and simple, in the milieu of learning and culture in Germany. An adventurer in almost every sense of the word, he met a fate that shifted like a kaleidoscope from poverty to ease back to poverty, from humiliating ostracism to recognition by Kant, Goethe, Schiller and Mendelssohn, from squalor and drunkenness to the heights of philosophical distinction.

During the course of all this, Maimon published an important comment on Kant's philosophy, *Essay on the Transcendental Philosophy*, also a *Philosophical Dictionary*, several treatises and books on science and psychology, a commentary on Maimonides' *Moreh Nebuchim*, and, lastly and most lastingly, his *Autobiography*, which appeared in 1792-93. De-

spite the fame Maimon won through these endeavors, his rude manners and improvident ways prevented him from stabilizing his material situation, and it was only the charity of an aristocratic Prussian admirer, Count Adolf Kalckreuth, that saved him from ending his days in misery. This nobleman, more indulgent than bourgeois Jews or Gentiles toward the eccentricities of genius, granted the vagrant intellectual a hospitality that made it possible for him to spend the last five years of his life in relative comfort.

Readers further interested in Maimon are referred to the note by Leo Lowenthal that prefaced an earlier excerpt from his autobiography (usually published as a supplementary chapter in editions of that work), which was printed in the "Cedars of Lebanon" of the May 1946 issue of COMMENTARY, under the title "A Rational Exposition of the Jewish Faith."

The present excerpt forms Chapter XXI of Maimon's *Autobiography*, in an old translation by J. Clark Murray that has been revised by Dr. Moses Hadas. This new text is shortly to be published by Schocken Books of New York, and will be introduced by an essay on Maimon from Dr. Hadas' pen. The excerpt appears here by Schocken's permission—Ed.

MY RETURN journey to Hamburg was agreeable, but here I fell into circumstances of the deepest distress. I lodged in a miserable house, had nothing to eat, and did not know what to do. I had grown too enlightened to return to Poland, to spend my life in misery without rational occupation or society, and to sink

back into the darkness of superstition and ignorance, from which I had hardly delivered myself with so much labor. On the other hand I could not count on success in Germany owing to my ignorance of the language, as well as of the manners and customs of the people, to which I had never yet been able to adapt myself properly. I had learnt

no particular profession, I had not distinguished myself in any special science, I was not even master of any language in which I could make myself perfectly intelligible. It occurred to me, therefore, that for me there was no alternative left but to embrace the Christian religion and get myself baptized in Hamburg. Accordingly, I resolved to go to the first clergyman I should come upon, and inform him of my resolution, as well as of my motives for it, without hypocrisy, in a truthful and honest fashion. But as I could not express myself well orally, I put my thoughts into writing in German with Hebrew characters, went to a schoolmaster, and got him to copy it in German characters. The purport of my letter was in brief as follows:

"I am a native of Poland, belonging to the Jewish nation, destined by my education and studies to be a rabbi; but in the thickest darkness I have perceived some light. This induced me to search further after light and truth, and to free myself completely from the darkness of superstition and ignorance. To this end, which could not be attained in my native place, I came to Berlin, where by the support of some enlightened men of our nation I studied for some years, not indeed after any plan, but merely to satisfy my thirst for knowledge. But as our nation is unable to make use not only of such planless studies but even of those conducted on the most perfect plan, it cannot be blamed for becoming tired of them, and pronouncing their encouragement to be useless. I have therefore resolved, in order to secure temporal as well as eternal happiness, which depends on the attainment of perfection, and in order to become useful to myself as well as others, to embrace the Christian religion. The Jewish religion, it is true, comes nearer to reason in its articles of faith than Christianity. But in practical use the latter has an advantage over the former; and since morality, which consists not in opinions but in actions, is the aim of all religion in general, clearly the latter comes nearer than the former to this aim. Moreover, I hold the mysteries of the Christian religion for that which they are, that is, allegorical representations of the truths that are most important for man. By this means I make my faith in them harmonize with reason, but I cannot believe them according to their common meaning.

I therefore most respectfully beg an answer to the question whether after this confession I am worthy of the Christian religion or not. In the former case, I am ready to carry my proposal into effect; but in the latter, I must give up all claim to a religion which enjoins me to lie, that is, to deliver a confession of faith which contradicts my reason."

The schoolmaster to whom I dictated this was astonished at my audacity; never before had he listened to such a confession of faith. He shook his head in perplexity, interrupted the writing several times, and wondered whether the mere copying was not itself a sin. With great reluctance he copied it out, merely to get rid of the thing. I then went to a prominent clergyman, delivered my letter, and begged for a reply. He read it with attention, likewise showed astonishment, and on finishing entered into conversation with me.

"SO," HE SAID, "I see your intention is to embrace the Christian religion merely in order to improve your temporal circumstances."

"Excuse me, Herr Pastor," I replied, "I think I have made it clear enough in my letter that my object is the attainment of perfection. For this, it is true, the removal of all hindrances and the improvement of my external circumstances are a prerequisite condition. But this condition is not the chief end."

"But," said the pastor, "do you not feel any inclination of the soul to the Christian religion without reference to any external motives?"

"I should be telling a lie if I were to give you an affirmative answer."

"You are too much of a philosopher," replied the pastor, "to be able to become a Christian. Reason has taken the upper hand with you, and faith must accommodate itself to reason. You hold the mysteries of the Christian religion to be mere fables, and its commands to be mere laws of reason. For the present I cannot be satisfied with your confession of faith. You should therefore pray to God, that He may enlighten you with His grace, and endow you with the spirit of true Christianity; and then come to me again."

"If that is the case," I said, "then I must confess, Herr Pastor, that I am not qualified

for Christianity. Whatever light I may receive, I shall always illuminate it with the light of reason. I shall never believe that I have fallen upon new truths if it is impossible to see their connection with the truths already known to me. I must therefore remain what I am, a stiff-necked Jew. My religion enjoins me to *believe* nothing, but to *think* the truth and to *practice* goodness. If I find any hindrance in this from external circumstances, it is not my fault. I do all that lies in my power."

With this I bade the pastor good-by.

Meanwhile a young man, who had known me in Berlin, heard of my arrival. He called on me to say that Herr W—, who had seen me in Berlin, was now residing in Hamburg, and that I might very properly call upon him. I did so, and Herr W—, who was a very clever, honorable man, of a naturally benevolent disposition, asked me what I intended to do. I represented my whole circumstances to him, and begged for his advice. He said that in his opinion the unfortunate position of my affairs arose from the fact that I had devoted myself with zeal merely to the acquisition of scientific knowledge, but had neglected the study of language and was therefore unable to communicate my knowledge to others or make any use of it. Meanwhile, he thought, nothing had been lost by delay; and if I were still willing to accommodate myself to circumstances, I could attain my object in the gymnasium in Altona, where his son was studying; he himself would provide for my support.

I accepted this offer with many thanks, and went home with a joyful heart. Meanwhile Herr W— spoke to the professors of the gymnasium, as well as to the principal, but more particularly to the syndic, Herr G—, a man who cannot be sufficiently praised. He represented to them that I was a man of uncommon talents who wanted merely some further knowledge of language to distinguish himself in the world, and who hoped to obtain that knowledge by a short residence in the gymnasium. They acceded to his request. I was matriculated, and had a lodging assigned me in the institution.

HERE I lived several years in peace and contentment. But the pupils in such a gymnasium, as may be supposed, make very slow progress; and it was therefore natural

that I, who had already made considerable attainments in science, should find the lessons at times somewhat tedious. During the whole period of my residence in the gymnasium the professors were unable to form any correct idea of me, because they never had an opportunity of getting to know me. By the end of the first year I thought I had attained my object of acquiring a good foundation in languages. I had also become tired of the inactive life, and therefore resolved to quit the gymnasium. But Director Dusch, who gradually grew acquainted with me, begged me to stay at least another year, and as I wanted for nothing I consented.

It was about this time that the following incident in my life took place. My wife had sent a Polish Jew in search of me, and he heard of my residence in Hamburg. Accordingly, he came and called on me at the gymnasium. He had been commissioned by my wife to demand that I should either return home without delay, or send a bill of divorce by his hand. At that time I was unable to do either the one or the other. I was not inclined to be divorced from my wife without cause; and to return at once to Poland, where I had not yet the slightest prospect of getting on in the world or of leading a rational life, was to me impossible. I represented all this to the gentleman who had undertaken the commission, and added that it was my intention to leave the gymnasium soon and go to Berlin. My Berlin friends, I hoped, would give me both their advice and assistance in carrying out this intention. He would not be satisfied with this answer, which he took for a mere evasion. When he found that he could do nothing with me, he went to the chief rabbi, and entered a complaint against me. A messenger was accordingly sent to summon me before the tribunal of the chief rabbi; but I took the position that I was not at present under his jurisdiction, inasmuch as the gymnasium had a jurisdiction of its own by which my case would have to be decided. The chief rabbi sought government support to make me submit to his wishes, but all his efforts were in vain. When he saw that he could not accomplish his purpose in this way, he sent me an invitation a second time, saying that he wished merely to speak with me. To this I willingly consented, and went to him at once.

He received me with much respect; and when I made known to him my birthplace and family in Poland, he began to lament and wring his hands. "Alas!" said he, "you are the son of the famous Rabbi Joshua? I know your father well; he is a pious and learned man. You also are not unknown to me; I have examined you as a boy several times, and formed high expectations of you. Oh! is it possible that you have altered so?" (Here he pointed to my shaven beard.) To this I replied that I also had the honor of knowing him, and that I still remembered his examinations well. My conduct hitherto, I told him, was as little opposed to religion properly understood, as it was to reason. "But," he interrupted, "you do not wear a beard, you do not go to the synagogue: is that not contrary to religion?" "No!" I replied, and I proved to him from the Talmud that under the circumstances in which I was placed all this was allowed. On this point we entered into a lengthy dispute, in which each maintained his right. As he could effect nothing with me by such disputation, he adopted the style of mere sermonizing; but when this also was of no avail, he began to cry aloud, "*Shofar! Shofar!*" This is the name of the horn which is blown on New Year's day as a summons to repentance, and of which it is supposed that Satan is horribly afraid. While the chief rabbi called out the word, he pointed to a *shofar* that lay before him on the table, and asked me, "Do you know what that is?" I replied, quite boldly, "Oh yes! it is a ram's horn." At these words the chief rabbi fell back upon his chair, and began to lament over my lost soul. I left him to lament as long as he liked, and bade him good-by.

AT THE end of my second year I began to reflect that it would favor my future success as well as be fair to the gymnasium if I should make myself better known to the professors. Accordingly, I went to Director

Dusch, announced to him that I was soon to leave, and told him that as I wished a certificate from him, it would be well for him to examine me on the progress I had made, so that this certificate might correspond to the truth. To this end he had me translate some passages from Latin and English works in prose as well as in verse, and was very well pleased with the translation. Afterwards, he entered into conversation with me on some subjects in philosophy, but found me so well versed in these, that he was obliged to retreat for his own safety. At last he asked me, "But how is it with your mathematics?" I begged him to examine me in this also. "In our mathematical lessons," he began, "we had advanced to somewhere about the subject of solids. Will you work out yourself a proposition not yet taken up in the lessons, for example, that about the relation of the cylinder, the sphere, and the cone to one another? You may take some days to do it." I replied that this was unnecessary, and offered to perform the task on the spot. I then demonstrated not only the proposition prescribed, but several others out of Segner's *Geometry*. The director was much surprised, called all the pupils in the gymnasium, and represented to them that the extraordinary progress I had made should make them ashamed of themselves. Most of them did not know what to say to this; but some replied, "Do not suppose, Herr Director, that Maimon made this progress in mathematics here. He has seldom attended the mathematical lessons, and even when he was there he paid no attention." They were going to say more, but the Director commanded silence, and gave me an honorable certificate, which became a constant spur to higher attainments.

I now bade good-by to the teachers and officers of the gymnasium, who all complimented me by saying I had done honor to their institution. I then set out once more for Berlin.

THE STUDY OF MAN

IS THERE A BIGOT PERSONALITY?

A Report on Some Preliminary Studies

JEROME HIMELHOCH

IN DIGGING down to the roots of prejudice, social scientists have long been dissatisfied with the conception of the individual as a bundle of separate likes and dislikes. It is fairly common knowledge that if a person is anti-Jewish or anti-Negro, he is usually both. Indeed, experience indicates, such people hate "other races" in general, and are often political reactionaries to boot.

Common sense has often been wrong. But Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert in their extensive study of the relationships between the different attitudes held by college students, *Public Opinion and the Individual* (Harper 1938) proved fairly decisively what had been suspected: anti-Jewish, anti-Negro, and other

Those concerned with the problem of race hatred have been turning increasingly to the fields of psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis for light. It has become recognized that along with political, social, and economic factors, we need to know the psychological patterns and inner motivations of the prejudiced human being. This month this department reports on a number of scientific studies aimed at discovering the inner roots of hatred, and at testing the hypothesis, now held quite widely, that prejudice is only one expression of a certain type of personality. JEROME HIMELHOCH, who here attempts to translate the professional terminology of these studies into language understandable to the thoughtful layman, has taught sociology at Drew University and the University of Rochester. He has been a psychiatric social worker in the Army and a public-opinion poll analyst for the American Jewish Committee. He is now doing research for a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University in the field of prejudice in minority groups. Mr. Himelhoch was born in Detroit in 1916, is a graduate of Harvard and has been a Rhodes Scholar.

anti-minority prejudices generally ran together and both were found predominantly in persons who were conservative or reactionary on domestic and international issues. Tolerance, conversely, went together with liberal and radical attitudes, and with dissatisfaction with the status quo in American culture generally.

More crucial for the study of prejudice than its simple presence and absence, many social scientists consequently felt, was the way it was bound up with a total personality. What did it imply about the individual's other attitudes, his general outlook and behavior? What apparent role or purpose did prejudice play in his life? The focus of the study of prejudice shifted from its horizontal distribution in the community to its vertical depth in the individual. The results to date, while only preliminary, and, like so much other social psychological research, limited primarily to college students, have been highly suggestive.

This article reports on four recent studies in this field. What we shall have at the end of our survey is a number of portraits of the bigot. We will then try to see where they coincide, and where they conflict.

THE study described in "The Anti-Semitic Personality" by Else Frenkel-Brunswick and R. Nevitt Sanford (in *Anti-Semitism, A Social Disease*, edited by Ernst Simmel, New York, International Universities Press, 1946), is only a preliminary report in a very extensive research project, indeed the largest psychological study of prejudice ever undertaken, the University of California Public Opinion Study, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee. While the project has advanced far beyond the stage described in the Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford article, this article remains the most significant

published contribution on the prejudiced person.

The study began with the filling out of a questionnaire covering both attitudes toward the Jews and other minorities and towards general social and political questions. Two hundred and sixteen college women and a smaller number of male students at the University of California received the questionnaire.

The first results were in line with the conclusions of other tests: anti-Semitism, in this group, was part of a more general attitude or reaction—"ethnocentrism." Ethnocentric individuals indiscriminately include in their antagonism Negroes, foreigners, etc. Furthermore, they tend to have a conservative social and political outlook. Automatically they prefer to support the status quo. (But in some cases the authors also detect a "pseudo-conservatism" that does not hesitate to use force and violence.)

Twenty subjects—eight drawn from the group revealed as most anti-Semitic, eight from the least anti-Semitic, and four from the average group—were then selected for detailed study by means of personal interviews and projective tests—the Rorschach test and the Murray Thematic Apperception test. (By his reaction to the inkblots or pictures presented in these tests, the subject unwittingly reveals his characteristic ways of approaching life and his unconscious motivations.)

The outstanding characteristic of the bigoted girls, as it emerges in this study, is the sharp cleavage between the conscious and unconscious layers of their personalities—between what they think they are and what they really are. On the surface they are poised, polite, self-confident, optimistic, conventionally moral, untroubled by guilt or anxiety, kindhearted, devoted to their parents and friends, and apparently making a "good social adjustment." But deeper probing reveals that underneath this conventional exterior lurk powerful destructive and sadistic impulses (often directed at parents), unsatisfied sexual desires, and intense anxiety about social status.

The villain in this psychological drama is, according to the authors, a tyrannical and childish conscience. Largely unconscious, this conscience retains intact all the taboos of childhood and fails to make a mature adjustment to adult reality. (In Freudian language, the conscience is the "super-ego," the internalized image of the parents in their disciplinary role.) Having been made to feel guilty about their normal aggressive and sexual impulses, the

prejudiced girls repress them, becoming unaware of both impulses and guilt. In essence, they take over their parents' puritanical social attitudes. Because of their upbringing, these same girls also have an intense desire to raise their social status, and while they are actually economically secure as members of the middle-or upper-middle class—they are wealthier than the non-anti-Semitic girls—their intense anxiety about rising in the social scale leads to the fear that they may fall.

The puritanical conscience and the drive for status make them conventionally "proper," stereotyped, lacking in individuality. They have little interest in personal achievement. They believe in an "externalized causation"—that is, they think of things as happening to them rather than as caused by them. They tend to accept superstitions, such as astrology, and they "conceive of fate not only as threatening, but as providing care, protection, and support in critical situations." Their tendency is to "project" their own unconscious repressed impulses on to *objects* in the environment, including supernatural forces, and to see these as causes. (What more likely objects than Jews, Negroes, foreigners?)

Their repressed hostility toward their parents finds partial expression in exaggerated suspicion and distrust, particularly towards older, parent-like individuals, and so we find them reluctant to talk about themselves. They express admiration for power and scorn for the underdog, advocate harsh punishments, and view human relationships in terms of dominance and submission.

SINCE ethnocentrism is part of the conservative social outlook of the typical middle-class parent, it would seem that the bigoted girls, in the process of taking over their parents' outlook, would also adopt prejudiced attitudes toward minority out-groups. This is a simple explanation and is probably correct. But it fails to account for the *function* of prejudice in the personalities of the bigots. It is in this regard that Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford make a significant contribution. They stress repressed hostility, repressed sexual wishes, and status anxiety as the mechanisms and dynamics of prejudice. "Basic impulses which are conceived as low, destructive, and dangerous, have to be kept repressed and can find only devious expressions, as for instance, in projections and 'moral indignation.' Thus, anti-Semitism, and intol-

erance against out-groups generally may have an important function in keeping the personality integrated. Without these channels or outlets . . . it may be much more difficult, in some cases impossible, to keep the mental balance. Hence, the rigid and compulsive adherence to prejudices."

This seems to be in harmony with the widely-accepted "frustration-aggression" theory of prejudice: the child in our society, this theory asserts, is frustrated by his parents and by other persons towards whom he cannot express conscious hostility; consequently, to maintain his psychic equilibrium, he "displaces" his hostility on to culturally sanctioned scapegoats. (It should be added that adult frustrations as well as those of childhood engender aggression.) At the same time the repressed individual projects his own socially disapproved hostile impulses upon the scapegoat groups. He is convinced that it is *they* who hate *him* and his group.

Repressed sexuality and status-anxiety support prejudice in the following way: "The fear of losing status . . . seems to be connected . . . with the possibility that with respectability gone they [the anti-Semitic girls] will be tempted to release their inhibited tendencies in the way they believe Jews and proletarians do." The authors here may be indulging in the Freudian practice of putting the psychological cart before the sociological horse. It seems more likely that the fear of losing status is primary, and that this in turn leads to the fear of releasing inhibited tendencies because that would identify them with lower-caste groups and cause them to lose status. It is possible that prejudice also serves to exclude minority-group competitors from the contest for social prestige.

The root cause of race prejudice in these girls, to sum up, appears to be their middle-class parents' anxiety about status, anxiety which is aggravated in times of social confusion and unrest. There arise "feelings of insecurity in both parents . . . and these in turn give rise to unreasoning concern and overaction in the mother and to desperate aggressiveness in the father. . . . The mischief is done when those trends which are taboo according to the class standards become repressed, and hence, no longer susceptible to modification or control. This is most likely to happen when parents are too concerned and too insistent with respect to their positive aims for the child and too threatening and coercive with respect to the 'bad' things."

It will help point up this portrait to describe the unprejudiced group. In comparison with the bigots, the unprejudiced girls are relatively unafraid of facing reality both in themselves and in their environment—they acknowledge their own impulses and do not lean on fate. They have more insight into their own motivations, are willing to discuss their shortcomings, and do not hesitate to criticize their parents. Not as well-groomed as the prejudiced girls and less at ease socially, they do not seem to be making as good an adjustment to society at large. Non-conformist in personal behavior and ideology, they have broken with the conservative beliefs of their parents. Instead of a childish super-ego, they apparently have a mature moral outlook that does not require the complete repression of sexuality and hostility. Accordingly, they have no need for displacement, projection, and reaction-formation.

Perhaps this is a bit too rosy a picture. Almost all individuals, in our society at any rate, face problems in dealing with their destructive and sexual impulses. The equalitarian girls *do* have guilt-feelings, which, being conscious, are much in evidence. Perhaps they have merely used a different psychological defense-mechanism: "introjection." Turning their aggression inward upon themselves, they blame themselves for the sins of the world. Their life-histories, we notice, are less happy than those of the bigots (or perhaps they have not repressed the unhappy memories) and their suffering has made them introspective. They identify with the downtrodden instead of with the powerful.

The girls with intermediate scores on anti-Semitism shared the conventional morality and the strong drive for status of the bigots but exhibited less repressed hostility and were more introspective.

The authors caution us not to generalize about prejudiced types that may be found in other cultures from the bigoted type they describe. The Nazi leaders, for example, and our own home-grown fascists certainly don't seem conventional or inhibited, although, like the puritanical anti-Semites, they do have aggressive and authoritarian tendencies.

Nevertheless, the biography of Homer Loomis Jr. of the Columbians, in the January 12 PM, shows to what an extent this personality type can be duplicated in a real American fascist. It is also probable that this pattern of character traits is not limited to the upper-

middle class, since the causal factors—for example, the striving for status advancement—exist in all strata of the population, even among factory workers.

IN THE study described in "Some Roots of Prejudice" (July 1946 *Journal of Psychology*), Gordon W. Allport and Bernard M. Kramer tested 437 college undergraduates from Dartmouth, Harvard, and Radcliffe with a paper-and-pencil test and a smaller number of these with a "racial awareness" test (the subject guesses whether persons in photographs are Jews or non-Jews). Some of the items in their test were taken from the questionnaire used by Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford, and other items were inserted to test hypotheses on the relations between prejudice and personality raised in that and other studies.

The "racial awareness" tests showed that prejudiced persons not only judged more of the faces to be Jewish but were more accurate in actually picking out faces of Jews. Their prejudice, the authors suggest, may have sensitized them to "Jewishness."

Quite interesting are the relations between prejudice and early experience revealed in the questionnaire. The more prejudiced a respondent, the greater the number of unpleasant experiences with members of minority groups he is able to recall. The authors consider it quite unlikely that there should be such a precise relationship between prejudice and the actual number of unpleasant experiences. They suggest as more likely the hypothesis that those who are prejudiced more easily recall or invent unpleasant experiences to justify their attitudes.

Another question asked how much and what kind of contact students had had with members of minority groups. The results show that mere contact has no clear-cut impact upon prejudice, but intimate association with members of minority groups of the same status as one's self—neighbors, friends, students—is positively correlated with tolerance. One wonders, though, just how seriously the unverified reports of contacts are to be taken. Might not the unprejudiced tend to forget unpleasant equal-status contacts, just as the prejudiced forget pleasant contacts?

Those who report that they have taken over their parents' attitudes toward minorities are generally prejudiced, while those who say they have reacted against their parents' attitudes on minorities tend to be unprejudiced. (This

is in agreement with the Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford results; there, the prejudiced reported less ideological friction with their parents than the unprejudiced.) But those who report that their parents have had no influence on them *at all*—that is, those who say they have neither taken over nor reacted against their parents' attitudes—are the *most prejudiced*! This result was completely unexpected, yet it fits in beautifully with the hypothesis that the prejudiced lack any sort of psychological insight into themselves. For obviously we are all influenced by our parents; to deny it is to be unaware of it.

The same lack of insight becomes clear in the questions dealing with school influences. Those who say that school has had no influence on them at all tend to be most prejudiced.

A further finding illustrating lack of insight; when asked whether they think they are more or less prejudiced than the average, the prejudiced misrate themselves far more often than do the less prejudiced.

Those who report having been considerably influenced by religion are more prejudiced than those who assert religion has influenced them only slightly or not at all.

One part of the test was designed to test the "frustration-aggression" theory of prejudice referred to before. The authors asked the respondents to indicate to what extent they felt they themselves had been discriminated against because they were members of minority groups, and discovered a slight tendency for those who felt themselves more victimized to be more prejudiced. Jews who felt they had been victims of discrimination were not only more prejudiced toward other groups but also checked more anti-Semitic items. This is in line with the "frustration-aggression" theory. But at the same time many Jews who felt themselves victimized also tended to show strong sympathy for Negroes. In other words, the Jews that felt themselves victimized concentrate around the extremes of prejudice and tolerance.

But the fact that Jews in general, in this and other tests, have less ethnic prejudice than any other religious group shows that identification with the oppressed, rather than prejudice against other groups, is the predominant Jewish reaction to discrimination. Since most Americans are members of minority groups, the effect of such membership upon ethnic prejudice is an extremely important problem for research. It has not yet received the attention it deserves.

The most interesting results are those that

illuminate the respondents' general attitude toward people and the world. The prejudiced believe that "the world is a hazardous place in which men are basically evil and dangerous"; they believe that "there is not enough discipline in the American way of life"; they are not prone to sympathize with underdogs. They are more afraid of swindlers than of gangsters (which is completely in line with the suspicious attitude toward people and the fear of "prying" reported by Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford).

One of the items reads: "Often when I meet a Negro I am slightly ashamed of the fact that I think of him as a Negro. Yes—, No—." It is the less prejudiced who are more ashamed. "We are reminded of Myrdal's characterization of the American Dilemma. Each American is susceptible to sharp conflict when his prejudices clash with his American Creed. Those who are conscious of the conflict and who suffer guilt feelings from it are closer to freedom from prejudice than are those who repress their shame and suffer no conscious discomfort. Shame is thus one step toward emancipation from bigotry."

Besides Myrdal (*An American Dilemma*), Lynd, Dollard, Powdermaker, and a host of other social scientists have described the sharp conflict in American culture between equalitarian and discriminatory mores. The democratic emphasis on equality and the Judeo-Christian emphasis on brotherhood clash with the deprivations our society imposes upon subordinate classes and minority ethnic groups. The conflict between love and aggression, between cooperation and competition, between equality and status hierarchy are found in American economic and political life, in the home, the church, the school, and the community—and in the personality structures of most Americans.

EUGENE HARTLEY, in his *Problems in Prejudice* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1946), reports on a number of experiments.

The most interesting for our purposes is that in which he asked thirty-four male City College students—for the most part Jewish—who had previously been tested for prejudice to prepare a description of their "personality" in accordance with an outline. The papers of the five most prejudiced and of the five least prejudiced students were then turned over to Ruth E. Hartley, a clinical psychologist, for analysis.

Without knowing who were in the prejudiced group, and who in the unprejudiced,

she divided the papers into two groups according to various criteria. While she was successful in placing eight of the ten papers correctly with reference to general tolerance (and the two misplaced were very short and had not followed the outline), it turned out that when divided according to certain other character traits, the prejudiced and the unprejudiced papers were not differentiated. The traits which seemed unrelated to prejudice were inferiority feelings, feelings of having been cheated, repressed aggression, super-ego conflict, projectivity, and integration of ego ideal. Most of these factors, one would think, should be correlated with prejudice if the Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford results are correct. Of course, only eight acceptable papers were under study here.

Ruth Hartley then drew up composite personality portraits for the two groups of papers. The unprejudiced tend to be imaginative, introspective, and theoretical, while the prejudiced have a practical, "tangible mechanical outlook." The relatively tolerant group shows the following characteristics: "A strong desire for personal autonomy associated with a lack of need for dominance, a strong need for friendliness, along with a personal seclusiveness, fear of competition, a tendency to placate others along with lack of general conformity to the mores. [They are] likely to be fairly serious, to be interested in current events, to have ideas about bettering society, to be a member of a political group, and to have great need for personal achievement in the vocational area." They dislike violence, appreciate the contributions of others, and adopt "a nurturant rather than a dominant attitude toward those younger than [themselves]. [They are] conscious of conflicts concerning loyalties and duties, and think very seriously about moral questions."

The relatively intolerant show: "Unwillingness to accept responsibility, acceptance of conventional mores, a rejection of political interests and desire for groups formed for purely social purposes, absorption with pleasure activities, a conscious conflict between play and work, emotionality rather than rationality, extreme egocentrism, interest in physical activity, the body, health." They dislike "agitators, radicals, pessimists. [They are] relatively uncreative, apparently unable to deal with anxieties except by fleeing from them. Often [their] physical activity has in it a compulsive component; it may be that this compulsion to be on the move

... serves for [them] the same function that study and activities with social significance serve in the case of the individual with high tolerance."

Hartley makes what may be a very important distinction between the *magnitude* of a prejudice and its "*salience*," that is, its prominence or key position in relation to the other attitudes of an individual. He argues that a weak prejudice which is at the center of the individual's attention can be more dangerous than a strong prejudice which is secondary to the individual's dominant interests. Further research will be necessary before it can be determined whether a prejudice can be "salient" and at the same time "weak." Judging salience by tendency of students spontaneously to make ethnic classifications in describing a series of photographs of people, Hartley found slightly less ethnic salience among the relatively intolerant than among the relatively tolerant. This would seem to be contrary to Allport and Kramer's findings on their similar test of "racial awareness."

ROSS STAGNER, in his "Studies of Aggressive Social Attitudes" in the August 1944 *Journal of Social Psychology*, presents conclusions that conflict at important points with the other studies.

An attitude questionnaire administered to 111 college students showed that the intolerant tend to be nationalistic and "fascist" ("Fascism" seems to mean politico-economic conservatism), to accept the institution of war, and to approve of violence and capital punishment. Statistical analysis—which isolates general "factors" out of a large number of specific attitudes—revealed that there were two factors underlying all of these attitudes—"conservatism," which influences the "fascist," nationalist, and intolerant attitudes, and "a pure aggressive factor" (not further defined), which influences attitudes in regard to war, capital punishment, and violence.

The questionnaire also included items relating to satisfaction with childhood and affection for parents. The responses indicated that those who liked both parents tended to be slightly more intolerant, "fascist," and nationalistic, but at the same time slightly more opposed to capital punishment and war, than those who disliked both parents. When a revised form of the questionnaire was given to 157 Dartmouth men, no difference in prejudice was found between those liking both parents and those disliking both. However, students

who liked their fathers but not their mothers tended to be more intolerant than those who liked their mothers but not their fathers. Twenty-seven members of the Young People's Socialist League, staunch advocates of racial equality, had much more antagonism toward both parents and were much less satisfied with their childhood.

While his correlations are low, Stagner believes that the consistency and statistical significance of his results justify emphasis upon the attitude toward parents as a determinant of intolerance. His interpretation is that a happy childhood, involving affectionate relations with parents, leads to socio-economic conservatism, of which race prejudice is a manifestation. No explanation is given of the function of intolerance in the conservative's personality structure. Moreover, no mention is made of the problem of whether affection for parents always engenders conservatism or does so only in the case of college students whose parents happen to be conservatives (as appears to be the case with the overwhelming majority of the Dartmouth students). On the other hand, an unhappy childhood and dislike for the parents, or at least for the father, Stagner asserts, engenders an equalitarian, liberal, or radical outlook coupled with more "aggressiveness" in regard to war and capital punishment. Symbolically associating their parents with the status quo, the equalitarians reject both.

Stagner's findings, on the surface, are in complete opposition to the frustration-aggression theory of prejudice. For here it is the smug and satisfied who are prejudiced, while it is the frustrated and hostile who are tolerant. But this can be reconciled with the frustration-aggression theory if we assume that the bigot's expressed affection for his parents is in reality but a disguise for repressed hostility. Yet Stagner explicitly rejects this possibility on two grounds. First, prejudice, he states, is primarily a function of conservatism rather than of "aggression." Second, while an attitude-test score favorable to the father "does not disprove the existence of repressed aggression against the father. . . it is somewhat less likely that a boy expressing conscious attitudes of hostility has a repressed affection for the father." Thus, he considers men high on a parent-antagonism scale are on the average more basically hostile to their parents than those making low scores.

In rebuttal, it may be said that "repressed affection" is beside the point. If we assume

that virtually all children (in our society at any rate) have some hostility toward their parents, then it is reasonable to expect that children with the most hostility will repress it, while children with the least hostility will be sufficiently secure to acknowledge their hostility consciously. The only question, then, is whether Stagner's scale is capable of revealing unconscious antagonism. The argument could be settled scientifically by giving Stagner's attitude questionnaire and Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford's interviews and projective tests to the same group of subjects.

It may be, of course, that we deal with two kinds of prejudice. Some persons in the upper-middle class may take over prejudice from their parents, without it meaning more to them than an appropriate social attitude, while to others it is an essential part of the psychic mechanism, serving as a release for repressed impulses.

One should point out that the frustration-aggression theory cannot be conclusively tested until the distressingly vague concept, "aggression," is defined. At the present time it is used variously to mean desire to inflict pain, self-assertion, tendency to lead other people, energy in competitive activity, unjustified attack on others, and a host of other things.

ASSUMING that the personality and prejudice categories used by each of the investigators can be translated from one study to another—a somewhat risky assumption, as we can see from the case of aggression—what areas of agreement do we find?

The most striking fact is that Allport and Kramer, who conducted their investigation upon a large and heterogeneous sample, nevertheless emerged with results that were almost identical with those arrived at by Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford in their smaller but more intensive study. Similarly, the two intensive clinical studies, Hartley's of a predominantly lower and lower-middle class immigrant male Jewish group and Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford's of a predominantly middle-class "old American" female Gentile group, produced many similar conclusions which cut across these sex and cultural differences. Both studies revealed the prejudiced individual as relatively conservative, conformist, stereotyped, and unproductive, and the unprejudiced person as relatively liberal, or radical, individualistic, non-conformist, and intellectually creative. Both

showed the bigot as immature, escapist, optimistic, and lacking in insight, while the equalitarian dealt objectively with his frustrations and anxieties and worked out his moral conflicts on the conscious level. In both cases, the intolerant were preoccupied with social life, egocentric, and unable to identify with the oppressed, while the tolerant were introspective, manifested great interest in social problems, and had a strong drive for socially-constructive achievement.

However, much of this is personality description. On the level of personality dynamics—how did they get that way and why—there is less said and more disagreement. Murphy and Likert (in *Public Opinion and The Individual*), and Hartley stress the importance of conformity to liberal parents in explaining the development of tolerance, while Allport and Kramer and Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford stress a critical attitude toward conservative parents as the important factor. Differences in the samples (the former studies use many New York students) may explain this. Hartley states without explanation that "projectivity" is unrelated to intolerance. Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford are alone in finding that status anxiety and a puritanical attitude toward sex characterize the prejudiced. Perhaps these factors can only be discovered through the projective techniques that Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford use.

We have already referred to the disagreement concerning the frustration-aggression theory, defended by Allport and Kramer and, although not referred to explicitly, by Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford. Once again Hartley gives us only a cryptic statement, asserting that "repressed aggression" is not among the factors that are related to intolerance. Stagner's attack on the theory can be refuted if it is proved that his "parent-antagonism scale" measures conscious hostility only—and that a high score may therefore actually represent relatively weak unconscious hostility and a low score disguise strong unconscious hostility.

Scientific efforts to define the bigoted personality and to trace the roots of this personality in family and social environment are, of course, only in their infancy. Actually, only a few score persons have been intensively investigated and only a few hundred more have taken questionnaires. Yet the personality type that emerges from these studies, we can be quite sure, is no figment of the imagination,

no accidental product of statistical errors. One need only look, for example, at the personality so brilliantly described by Jean-Paul Sartre in his "Portrait of the Anti-Semite" (*Partisan Review*, Spring 1946) and see how closely it parallels the studies we have summarized. We deal with a real product of our society, described alike by philosophers, psychoanalysts, novelists, and scientists: the human being who cannot look into himself, who cannot look at or understand the real world, who is himself driven by unknown forces and is unaware of the real forces that drive the world.

Much is lacking in this picture, much is unclear and contradictory. When we have the full results from the monumental researches of the University of California Public Opinion Study—which have by now covered many groups in the population (not only students) with questionnaires, interviews, and projective tests—many of the present disagreements will probably be settled.

Meanwhile, the following would seem to be useful working hypotheses in regard to the causes and dynamics of prejudices in the individual in American society:

(1) The individual participates in a culture that has an established pattern of prejudice against certain groups. But this culture also contains the conflicting pattern of equality.

(2) The prejudice pattern, along with the conflicting democratic pattern, is transmitted to him by one or more of his primary groups, usually by his family.

(3) He will tend to accept and maintain the prejudice pattern at the expense of the democratic pattern if he has certain personality tendencies for which prejudice provides an outlet and if other, more satisfying, outlets are not provided.

(4) Among these personality tendencies there may be repressed hostility toward members of his primary group, status anxiety, authoritarian tendencies, repressed sexual wishes, and insecurity arising from self-hate.

(5) His early family, school, and clique

experiences are most important in creating these personality tendencies, but they are also influenced by adult experiences.

(6) Prejudice tends to be strongest in those families and cultural groups in which the child-rearing practices are such as to produce the prejudice-supporting personality tendencies.

(7) Once prejudice is established, it is often reinforced by its usefulness as a rationalization for obtaining economic, sexual, or prestige gains at the expense of subordinate ethnic groups.

If these hypotheses are valid, what are their implications for the future of intergroup relationships—in fact, for the future of democracy itself—in this country? American culture, by creating personalities that need race prejudice in order to maintain their psychic balance, has created an enormous potential for fascism. This article has dealt with the personality tendencies that make many Americans *ready* to support a fascist movement, providing that social distress and confusion are present on a scale large enough to make people willing to give up their "American Creed"—and providing that in such an eventuality (another prolonged depression or another war, for example) the democrats are unable to provide more effective leadership than the fascists.

By and large, social conditions and tactics of leadership will determine whether prejudice will become sufficiently "salient" to come out of the club and go into the streets. The immediate problem, then, for democrats is to produce social conditions and political leadership that minimize the prominence of the prejudice pattern and maximize the prominence of the equalitarian pattern in the personalities of Americans. The long-run problem is to modify our institutions, particularly our child-rearing institutions, the home and the school, in such a manner that secure and loving, rather than insecure and hate-ridden, personalities are produced. How these things can be done—if they can be done at all—is, of course, no simple matter.

LETTERS FROM READERS

We have received many interesting letters, some lengthy, on Will Herberg's article "From Marxism to Judaism" in the January issue and Harold Rosenberg's commentary on it, "Pledged to the Marvelous," in the February. We will print a selection of these in our next issue, as well as Mr. Herberg's commentary on Mr. Rosenberg.—Ed.

Our Need for Immigrants

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The publication of "Democracy Needs the Open Door" by Professor Handlin in the January COMMENTARY is both timely and useful. For reasons better known than understood, literature in support of the idea of a more liberal immigration policy in the United States has practically ceased to exist. It is important that the public be made aware of the fact that there is another side to the question and that there are sound and important economic and social reasons why a more liberal policy would serve the interests of the United States.

JUDGE SIMON H. RIFKIND

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have read the article by Professor Handlin with great interest. Everything he says is sound, economically. Yet, unfortunately for the success of the campaign to liberalize immigration, people who think on the subject are still under the influence of the doctrine of Francis A. Walker, that the coming of the immigrants produced a corresponding decline in the natural increase, and that for every million Europeans we took in, we lost a million native born.

We need to grapple with the problem that the United States is seriously underpopulated today. Away from the overcrowded cities, life languishes for want of population. To be fully prosperous we should have 300,000,000. And we should welcome the millions of able workers whose upbringing has been paid for abroad.

ALVIN JOHNSON

New York City

The Parlor Terrorists

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I agree with Nathan Glazer about the ter-

rorists ("The Parlor Terrorists," January COMMENTARY). I think it is better to get ulcers than to commit political errors. Of course, in one sense it is as wrong to sit in New York in a comfortable chair and condemn the terrorists as it is to sit in the same chair and egg them on. But one can only offer advice in the light of one's best judgment and I happen to agree that the trouble with terrorism is that it won't work. I'm not sure of the moral issues, but I'm pretty sure of the practical consequences.

... But I don't think Mr. Glazer is doing justice to Koestler's book when he makes it appear that the whole thesis of *Thieves in the Night* is a defense of terrorism. Koestler, to my mind, carries through his thesis expressed in *The Yogi and the Commissar*. He points up again and again the terrific dilemma of any man who wants to retain his reason on the one hand, and give vent to his emotions on the other. You recall on page 230 he is in a bad way and it says, "Oh, for the supreme gift of irresponsibility. The gift to translate feeling into direct action. Oh for the relief of having one's wrath exploded with a good home-made bomb." But he can't quite carry it through because he is a rational human being and understands what a bullet does to the human flesh.

... Koestler does more than give both sides of the question of terrorism. He tries to understand the drive of the Jew to Palestine altogether. Recall his closing pages, which I believe are some of the best in the whole book. I think Glazer is unfair in ascribing to Koestler the description of the Western Jews; "greasy and pushy and noisy and argumentative and just too clever." On page 355 he has quite a different description. "The Jews were not an accident of race, but simply man's condition carried to its extreme—a branch of the species touched on the raw. Exiled in Egypt, in Babylon, and now over the whole globe, exposed to strange and hostile surroundings, they had to develop peculiar traits; they had no chance nor time to grow that hide of complacency, of a specious security, which makes man insensitive to and forgetful of the tragic essence of his condition. They were the natural target of all malcontents, because they were so exasperatingly and abnormally human. . . ."

This is quite different from blandly handing

out epithets. And then, the whole discussion of nationalism vs. homesickness I believe is very touching and very true. Finally, there is the great and climactic dilemma: "There is that urge in us for the return to earth and normality and there is that other urge to continue the hunt for the lost paradise which is not in space. This is our predicament. It is not a question of race. It is a human predicament carried to its extreme."

I think those of us who ever had the yen to settle in Palestine, and still have it, understand Koestler's words very deeply and we are profoundly moved by them. In brief, I think it is a vulgarization of the whole book to make it seem like a debate on terror.

IRA EISENSTEIN

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have read with interest Mr. Glazer's article, "The Parlor Terrorists," in which he psychoanalyzes Arthur Koestler, his book *Thieves in the Night*, the "terrorists" in Palestine, and the Jewish mind in general. Indeed, Mr. Glazer does not limit his examination to the Jewish mind; he includes the minds of non-Jews who happen to be of the same mind as Mr. Koestler. . . .

I wish to remark only on Mr. Glazer's thesis that "practical politics" is what is needed to meet the "Jewish condition" and that what he calls terrorism has no relation thereto. Mr. Glazer's development of this thesis impresses me as remarkable because of its complete lack of analysis of what goes on in Palestine.

Before anyone can pass an intelligent judgment upon the use of force which the world now witnesses in that unhappy Holy Land, he must be able to draw the illusory line between what is called hoodlumism, gangsterism, defiance of law and order, or whatever bad label one cares to attach to such conduct, on the one hand, and what civilized mankind has come to recognize as a justifiable resistance to oppression. . . .

This is a distinction which almost any intelligent person can at once recognize but which, on the other hand, is extremely difficult to draw. Certain factors, however, seem inescapably pertinent.

In the first place, the objective is important. If the objective is a political one, as distinguished from a purely personal or selfish one, the use of force at once takes on a political significance. Now there is obviously a standard by which judgment may be exercised as to the good or bad character of political objectives. The Nazis had definite political objectives and so did the fascists in their ruthless use of force. It is clearly fallacious, however, to reason, as

Mr. Glazer appears to reason, that any movement which relies upon force to attain political objectives is necessarily Nazi or fascist in character. If such reasoning were accurate, then all political revolutions are necessarily evil. I doubt that Mr. Glazer is prepared to embrace such a conclusion. . . .

If it is conceded that some revolutions are good and some are bad, it becomes difficult to deny that the present resistance in Palestine is good. Certainly there can be no greater injustice to any group than that which the Hebrews in Europe and in Palestine have endured and continue to endure. The moral issue, therefore, must be resolved in their favor. If it is conceded that the legality of the resistance is a debatable issue, then their case can be supported under British as well as international law. . . .

Finally, a relevant factor is to be found in the character of the organization and use of force in resisting political decisions and activities. Sporadic, irresponsible, uncoordinated and undirected force can hardly attain the dignity of a revolution, if for no other reason, because it is unlikely to be effective. By the common usages of men and nation, it is regarded as a crime rather than a war. Warfare requires tactical planning, coordinated operations, and responsible direction. This we find in Palestine to a high degree of skill and effectiveness. Whatever one may say about the resistance, he must admit its military operations are carried out with daring and with success.

A consideration of all these factors may very legitimately lead to the conclusion that what is today happening in Palestine should be characterized as an authentic revolt against oppression and in defense of political and civil principles which have come to be accepted by western civilization as the minimum conditions of a tolerable society.

FOWLER V. HARPER

American League for a Free Palestine
Washington, D. C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The clear analysis of Koestler's position in "The Parlor Terrorists" in January's COMMENTARY is certainly one of the best yet presented, and but for the unhappy choice of the incorrect word "parlor" (which indicates a misunderstanding of the situation), might well be the basis of a much needed educational program on the Revisionist terrorists. Unhappy, I say, because of the connotations the word "parlor" has of the despised "parlor reds" and "parlor pinks" of previous days.

We have to realize that the "parlor terrorists" and "parlor reds" are not analogous types of individuals. The "parlor reds" were (or should

I say, are) intellectual socialists, engaged in constant chatter about the millenium to come, charting the class struggle for others, and *fully aware* of the fact that they would do nothing to endanger their own slightly preferred position in capitalist society. "Let the other fellow do what is necessary. We will intelligently discuss among ourselves the errors he is making."

However, the "parlor terrorists" are of a different nature. They are the Jewish youths bombarded with misinformation and lies by the very vocal Revisionist terrorist supporters in the United States. Witness the American League for a Free Palestine and Ben Hecht's play, *A Flag is Born*. A terrific emotional appeal is made and it is up to the responsible Jewish organizations who are doing the necessary work in facilitating Palestine's immigration to combat this appeal with the type of reasoning set forth by Mr. Glazer. In this job they have failed miserably. They have not reached the American Jew, especially the newly awakened Jewish youth. Thus the "parlor terrorist" knows only one side of the story, and feeling a desperate urge to alleviate the plight of the Jews, is forced into the only road he knows or has heard of—the road to terror. . . . He believes, as these organizations tell him, that he is helping Jews get into Palestine. The very urgent need now is for responsible Jewish organizations to educate him—let him know he is being taken in. The Revisionists must be shown up—now.

The statement toward the end of the article "consciousness is quite enough" is what one would expect from a "parlor intellectual." Certainly action for action's sake is not to be commended or urged, but when intelligent reasoning leads one to believe that a specific form of action is necessary to alleviate the condition one is concerned about, a sincere individual will not be satisfied simply with consciousness. And if the reasoning leads to the conclusion that no "action" is feasible at the moment, then there is still action to be taken—education. . . .

SAM ALTON

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

At the risk of being lumped by Mr. Glazer as one of the "new Zionist extremists," I want to suggest that the title of his piece in the January COMMENTARY should have been "The Parlor Terrorists As Seen By The Parlor Intellectual." Although I was, until quite recently, an anti-Zionist, and for that matter, still preserve several profound doubts about the eventual wisdom of the Zionist program, I find such an article as Mr. Glazer's so completely beside the point that my passing regard for the job Koestler did in *Thieves in the Night* has now

been turned into unequivocal admiration. . . .

Koestler's propaganda job is thus far the best job of its kind in interpreting the Jewish fight in Palestine for non-Jewish Americans. I refer Mr. Glazer to the words of praise we have all heard from many non-Jewish lips lately for the fight "they're putting up in Palestine." (I admit that newspaper accounts as well as Koestler's book have been responsible.) I get no feeling whatsoever of Koestler calling for the "abdication of intelligence" in his story; on the contrary, I think that Koestler succeeded in showing how utterly barren and fruitless "intelligence" can become without appropriate action.

Koestler also succeeded, at least for me and many of my friends, in once and for all demonstrating the awful and tragic error made by the old-line Zionist groups in their continual "struggle" to keep convincing themselves while exchanging members. . . . Certainly, one of the main jobs of the Zionists should have been to gain the sympathy and support of the American people. This they have failed to do. And I say this with full awareness of the pious resolutions passed by both major parties.

The Koestler book has had more results in winning over general American opinion to the Jewish fight in Palestine than all the talk and all the work of all the regular Zionist adult, youth, women's, collegiate, and kindergarten groups put together and laid end to end since the first rally was held in Carnegie Hall and the Great Hall of City College. . . .

JOSEPH FIELD

New York City

Defending "Barabbas"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It is sad that the obsessed anti-Semite who sees everywhere evidence of a Jewish plot should breed the obsessed anti-anti-Semite who sees everywhere evidence of anti-Semitic propaganda. (It is understandable, of course. Have we not seen the zealot enemies of pornography become "smut hounds" who make censorship ridiculous? Or enemies of Communism who lose their sense of balance and, as the expression goes, "look for Communists under the bed?") After reading in your issue of January 1947 the review of Emery Bekessy's religious-historical novel, *Barabbas*, I can only conclude that the reviewer, Mordecai S. Chertoff, in contending against anti-Semitism, has surrendered the control of his own thinking to the enemy he fights.

This is evident in his approach. *Barabbas* is a novel, an imaginative construction based upon a great dramatic scene in the literary heritage of the Western World, and as such the natural

and normal approach would be that of the literary critic. Mr. Chertoff, however, approaches this novel in a specialized political frame of mind and makes demands that one might make of a tract—with the result that the foremost questions to be asked of a work of the imagination are not raised. Moreover, to make plausible the working hypothesis he forms about the novel, he has to exclude without even a mention the fairly obvious parallel the author and his colleague suggest between the Barabbas, the high priests, the Jerusalem mobs, and so on which they depict, and Hitler, the German industrialists, the Nazi mobs, the German concentration camps, and other phenomena threatening the values of civilized living in the years they were composing their novel. Why does Mr. Chertoff not see that Bekessy and his colleague were thinking much more in terms of the Central Europe that was alarming them than in terms of the scanty historical materials offered by the Jesus-Pilate-Barabbas story? Would Mr. Chertoff assert that there is nothing universal about the sadism of mobs or the appeal of demagoguery or the lust for power? One cannot put national or racial tags on these things except in an exemplary sense. Or would Mr. Chertoff claim that the New Testament as a literary storehouse should be closed to imaginative writers because certain dangers of misinterpretation exist? Fortunately, Mr. Chertoff is in a minority of one or two in misinterpreting *Barabbas* as a "hate-book against Jews."

The tip-off on Mr. Chertoff's mind being occupied by the question of anti-Semitism to the exclusion of literary judgment is given in his conjectures about the author and his colleague. The jacket of *Barabbas* is in error in giving the date of Bekessy's departure from Europe as 1940. It was 1939 when he fled from Hungary and the increasing influence of Hitler. Bekessy's colleague, Andreas Hemberger, remained in Central Europe until his death in 1946, but not because he was acceptable to the Nazis, as Mr. Chertoff hints. A native of Upper Bavaria, Hemberger was imprisoned for several months by the Gestapo when Hitler came to power and then expelled from Germany and his writings were banned. He worked as a journalist in Austria until 1938 when Hitler marched in and again Hemberger was jailed. Released, he was forbidden to write for publication. After Austria was liberated, Hemberger was installed by the American occupation forces as editor of the *Wiener Kurier*. It is regrettable that neither your reviewer nor you, sir, the editor of COMMENTARY, took the small amount of pains required to check on your reviewer's guesses about the authors of *Barabbas*.

Why was *Barabbas* published, Mr. Chertoff

asks. He answers for Prentice-Hall, the publisher, but may we speak for ourselves? The book was brought to Prentice-Hall by Marie Ginsburg, a former employee of the League of Nations and a friend of one of the authors on our list. A digest of it in English was read by Mr. Irving Fried, formerly an editor at Doubleday and known personally to me as a man of liberal sympathies, who reported very favorably on the story. The German text was then read by a well-known figure in the book trade, Mr. A. v. A. van Duym of Scribner's Bookstore, a man of emphatic liberal convictions. Mr. van Duym was particularly enthusiastic about the portrait of Pilate. Subsequently, I read *Barabbas* in English translation and found it living up to the enthusiastic endorsements given me. It is relevant to note that not only have I personally combated anti-Semitism in my own articles and in such political activity as I have engaged in, but also that through marriage I am personally and deeply concerned about any advance anti-Semitism may make. Finally, Mr. Bekessy, who is the father of the novelist Hans Habe, has liberal affiliations. None of those who "screened" *Barabbas* for publication found any anti-Semitism in the work, yet all of us are sensitive to the problem of anti-Semitism and can hardly be described as naive on the subject. Mr. Chertoff did "find" anti-Semitism, but the point of this letter is that the over-determined can always "find" what they are looking for. To answer Mr. Chertoff's question: Prentice-Hall accepted *Barabbas* because in our editorial judgment it was a novel of considerable literary merit which had an anti-Hitler message and held out the promise of a sizable sale.

GORHAM MUNSON

Trade Book Editor, Prentice-Hall
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In reviewing *Barabbas* in your January issue, your reviewer states: "As to the motives of the liberal and well-reputed Religious Book Club—they must remain a mystery."

Our motives are by no means mysterious. Not one of our editors who read *Barabbas* got the impression that the book was either anti-Jewish or pro-Nazi. On the contrary, we felt that the book was an obvious parallelism, with *Barabbas* as the ancient counterpart of Hitler who sought personal power by invoking hatred and violence to stir the latent nationalism of his people to a war pitch. Virtually every reviewer felt, as we did, that the book's anti-Fascist message was obvious.

We would, of course, be extremely regretful if we were to find ourselves in the position of having unwittingly recommended a book whose

purpose was to foster racial hatred. But we do not believe that *Barabbas* falls into this category. And our twenty-year record offers ample evidence that we are active on the side of those who work for tolerance and interracial understanding.

JONATHAN D. SPRINGER

Managing Director, the Religious Book Club
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Your letter with the enclosure from Mr. Munson was waiting for me when I arrived in Jerusalem on Sunday. Without the volume itself, but only my own review at hand, the references I need for a full reply are lacking. But most of Mr. Munson's objections can be met nevertheless.

With no way of checking the records of either Mr. Bekessy or Mr. Hemberger, I must of necessity accept the righteously indignant defense of them. I must say, though, that on the basis of the novel alone my own opinion of them seems valid. That a publisher should rush to defend a novel that "held out the promise of a considerable sale" I can well understand, but that in the process he should provide the material for a rebuttal of that defense is an unexpected convenience. "*Barabbas* is a novel, an imaginative construction based upon a great dramatic scene . . ." and a "religio-historical" novel at that. Nylon stockings are "based upon" coal and air; surely one is justified in demanding of a historical novel that it bear closer resemblance to its origin than nylons to theirs? There would be no point in recopying the original list of historical offenses which was included in my review; I am sure that Mr. Munson has a copy to which he can refer.

A novelist may authenticate his point by pointing to historical prototypes, but finding such prototypes where they do not exist can hardly be condoned because of the imagination and cerebral gymnastics required. Mob sadism may be universal—but the mob-Pilate scene as Mr. Bekessy paints it—indeed, the whole rise of *Barabbas*—is an example of such invoking of non-existent prototypes. And the reference to the eventual extermination "of the whole pack of you" (in addition to numerous other references, the quoting of which is difficult at a remove of 5,500 miles) would seem to provide more than enough anti-Semitic notes, particularly when taken in context, for me to resent being so cavalierly classified as an "obsessed anti-anti-Semite."

That "certain dangers of misinterpretation" exist in the utilization of the New Testament as a literary storehouse is undoubtedly true, and it is likewise true that certain dangers exist in

crossing the street. And just as I would prescribe care in the latter, I demand it in the former. It is not the danger to which I take exception, but the misinterpretation. Thomas Mann has used the Old Testament, and Sholem Asch and others the New; Bekessy is almost alone in having fallen prey to those "certain dangers." No, Mr. Munson, I would not close the New Testament to imaginative writers, as you imply, but I would feel better if undisciplined, unscrupulous writers, anxious for a market regardless of their imaginative complement, would avoid it. And I hardly think that I am in a "minority of one or two" in being opposed to the distortion and desecration of what to a goodly portion of the civilized world is still Sacred Writ.

An honest reviewer does not judge a book by its testimonials, and in his last paragraph Mr. Munson asks me to do just that. I stand by the views expressed in my original review in the columns of *COMMENTARY* as to the work's literary merit and ignore Mr. Munson's ultimate criterion, which is so well expressed in his last few words. I presented my view—subsequently confirmed by him—of what his firm expected: that it sell, and added my analysis of why it would, surely a legitimate attempt.

MORDECAI S. CHERTOFF

Jerusalem

In Approval

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I cannot refrain from sending you a line or two of appreciation for *COMMENTARY*. The quality of the articles you secure is altogether remarkable. Any editor who can within the issues for three months secure such contributors as Handlin, Alvin Johnson, Rabbi Finkelstein, Karl Polanyi, and A. H. Raskin, to mention only a few, must have positive genius for editorship. Not only do you get extraordinary contributors, but you give them space enough to handle their themes adequately. For all of which I am thankful.

FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL

(Bishop of the Methodist Church)

Nashville, Tennessee

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Daniel Bell's paper "Adjusting Men to Machines" seems to me virtually epoch-making, and Karl Polanyi's "Our Obsolete Market Mentality" is a worthy successor of his book, which when I read it, I found the most enlightening account of the important historical events in the last century-and-a-half I had ever read.

JOHN DEWEY

Key West, Florida

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Americans Without Distinction

GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT. By LAURA Z. HOBSON. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1947. 275 pp. \$2.75.

Reviewed by DIANA TRILLING

It is interesting that Mrs. Hobson's novel about anti-Semitism should be published, and evidently very happily, by the same house that a few years ago voluntarily suppressed a book by Jerome Weidman on the ground that its unattractive Jewish characters would increase anti-Jewish feeling in this country. In the course of Mrs. Hobson's story, as a matter of fact, the Weidman kind of thing is spoken of; we are given to understand that Mrs. Hobson too disapproves of calling attention to unpleasant Jewish examples. The hero of *Gentleman's Agreement* has been assigned to do a series of articles on anti-Semitism for a magazine of mass circulation; in search of a fresh "angle" for the series—for an angle, and a fresh one, the subject of course demands—he browses through his library and comes across three books each of which has a "dishonest, scheming, or repulsive" Jew as its main character. "Did it never occur to one of them," Phil Green thinks angrily of their authors, "to write about a fine guy who was Jewish? Did each one feel some savage necessity to pick a Jew who was a swine in the wholesale business, a Jew who was a swine in the movies, a Jew who was a swine in bed?"

Well, there are no swinish Jews in *Gentleman's Agreement*. Indeed there are scarcely any Jews at all, just two supporting characters—a scientist and a fine, personable veteran—and three or four minor figures who appear in its pages only long enough to demonstrate that although noisy Jews are no noisier than noisy Irish they are noticed more, or that Jews themselves are often ashamed of their birth. In Mrs. Hobson's novel about the Jews their cause is both explained and fought for them by Gentiles—especially by the hero, who spends eight weeks masquerading as a Jew in order to learn what it feels like to be discriminated against:

this is Phil Green's angle—and Mrs. Hobson's—and it not only leads him to a condition of acute sensitivity bordering on paranoia but also nearly costs him his girl Kathy, who only in the last chapters learns a tolerance as intransigent as Phil's own. Here, we gather, is a way of writing about Jews that Simon and Schuster can be comfortable with.

But if Mrs. Hobson in some part shares responsibility with her publishers for a "strategy" which refuses to grant Jews their human right to be unattractive, she is at least innocent of the error that is usually a corollary of this attitude. She does not think that the Jewish minority should slink off into a respectable corner, call no attention to itself, and ask no better than that no attention be called to it.

If it is nothing else, her novel is a strong appeal for Gentiles to bring the Jewish issue full into the light and fight it. Even the easy identification Mrs. Hobson makes between Jew and Gentile cannot fairly be interpreted as an evasion. For instance, although she allows her Gentile hero to pass as a Jew, she does not permit Jews to pass as Gentiles—a double standard which may not be easy to argue but which surely rests on a sound moral distinction. If *Gentleman's Agreement* regards Jew and Gentile as but two profiles of the same face, it is because Mrs. Hobson recognizes no valid differences between them except the differences created, on the Gentile side, by a state of mind ignorantly and usually only half-consciously perpetuated from person to person and generation to generation, and, on the Jewish side, by the awareness of being discriminated against.

And indeed, in the world Mrs. Hobson examines, there are no other differences. There are certainly no religious Jews in her section of American society, and there are no Jews to whom historical or cultural criteria have any meaning. Dave Goldman, the Jewish veteran and Phil Green's childhood friend, is as little Jewish as Phil himself, except that, because of an accident of birth, Dave has been called a Jew all his life whereas Phil is called a Jew for only eight weeks and then by his own

choice. And Professor Lieberman has only his Semitic features to set him apart from his Gentile fellow-scientists. Similarly, there are no religious Gentiles. The Gentiles in *Gentleman's Agreement* who, like Phil and his editor, are without anti-Jewish emotions, are not thereby the more Christian; they are simply the more decent.

In other words, Mrs. Hobson's book is entirely logical within its own purview, which is also the purview of a large group of middle-class Americans. It undertakes to show that even supposedly non-sectarian people—people who inhabit a universe in which religion, if it is present at all, is present solely as a general code of morality and wisdom, and in which there is neither fact nor virtue in cultural pluralism—are guilty of direct or indirect anti-Semitism.

Thus, it is Kathy, Phil's girl, who suggested the articles on anti-Semitism; but Kathy is capable of tolerating such "natural" expressions of prejudice as restricted neighborhoods and hotels. Or there are Kathy's friends, liberals all, who, while their left hands are busy with such worthy enterprises as the Springfield Plan, with their right hands shield their eyes from their own well-bred prejudice. Or even Phil's editor, entirely without prejudice himself, is shown to have overlooked the discrimination that operates in the personnel department of his magazine. The very people who think of themselves as the vanguard in the struggle for social decency allow anti-Semitism to exist and even help it flourish; prejudice, Mrs. Hobson is saying, is not limited only to the reactionary elements in the population, but also obtains among liberals, however successfully they may disguise the fact from themselves. The purpose of *Gentleman's Agreement* is perhaps more limited than Mrs. Hobson recognizes: it is not an attack upon anti-Semitism at its deepest sources or in its widest manifestations, but merely in a single group—the so-called "liberal" group. It is an attempt to close a gap between the ideals of current liberalism and liberalism in practice.

But even this is a highly commendable purpose, and Mrs. Hobson's book is already being saluted by the enlightened reading public, as one must hope it would be. On the other hand, as a novel it is poor—dull, non-dimensional, without atmosphere. Of course, thesis novels usually are poor; we have learned to abrogate certain standards of aesthetic judgment in read-

ing them. And yet, even by such standards as we might apply to a book like Lillian Smith's *Strange Fruit*, *Gentleman's Agreement* is peculiarly empty.

We wonder what accounts for its sterility, and are forced to find the explanation in the nature of Mrs. Hobson's liberalistic view of life. There can be no doubt of Mrs. Hobson's deep unconscious as well as conscious commitment to the present-day progressive belief. Her criticism of liberalism is self-criticism within a faith as binding as any religion from which she might have emancipated herself. And it is the sterility of our fashionable liberal ideal that permeates *Gentleman's Agreement*, deadening even such human effects as we might look for in a problem story.

THERE is scarcely a cliché of liberalism missing from *Gentleman's Agreement*, not an opinion or attitude that does not repeat or sum up the progressive lesson of the day. PM, the whole intellectual-cultural school represented by PM, has done its work well on an apt pupil. Mrs. Hobson knows, for example, just what a conscientious citizen is expected to know about the economic motive in religious bias; she is just properly alert to the connection between anti-Semitism and anti-Negroism, jingoism and anti-unionism. She has the prescribed liberal attitude toward marriage (it is normal, and should be civilized), toward sex (it is no less normal than marriage: Kathy is piously mindful of her good mating with Phil), toward child-rearing (Phil's child by a previous marriage is a little monster of reason and adjustment), toward literature (it is writing liberal articles for mass-circulation magazines), toward death (it must be accepted).

Were such values Mrs. Hobson's alone, they would not be worth noting. But these identical touchstones of moral and psychological health appear in novel after novel of the liberal persuasion. Surely no totalitarian ideal has ever projected a more complete regimentation of the psychic life of a nation than our present-day liberal ideal. Does the liberal society that Mrs. Hobson envisages allow no distinctions between Jew and Gentile? For that matter, it allows no distinctions between human beings.

And just as our crude contemporary materialist view of life is moving people, by its spiritual emptiness, to look once more to religion for something that will give grandeur or quality to existence, just so Mrs. Hobson's view of the

Absolute Liberal Man or Woman moves one, if only for the sake of variety, to underscore rather than eliminate minority differences.

Cultural pluralism is a complex political business. It creates social problems perhaps faster than it creates social values—and I do not oppose it to Mrs. Hobson's monism as a "solution." But it has at least this virtue, that it complicates our notion of both society and the individual, and makes a place for the saving human differences which can often be even political salvation.

The Rediscovery of Judaism

IN TIME AND ETERNITY: A JEWISH READER. Edited by NAHUM N. GLATZER. New York, Schocken Books, 1946. 225 pp. \$2.75.

Reviewed by HAROLD ROSENBERG

MODESTLY offered as a "reader" in Jewish literature from post-Biblical times through Hasidism, Dr. Glatzer's anthology goes beyond its claim. For out of these extracts—few of them more than a page or two in length—from the Talmud, the Zohar, the thoughts of Jewish philosophers, historians, theologians, travelers, emerges the over-all pattern of a type of man, the Jew who stood fast for his view of the world during eighteen centuries of hostility and change. In his speculation, his beliefs, and his behavior, this Jew had certain fixed points of support; what some of these were is indicated by the material arranged under such section-titles as "Between God and Man," "The Pure in Heart," "Turning to God," "Parents and Children," "Mercy and Truth."

Dr. Glatzer seems to have had a clear idea of why he selected what he did out of the endless expanse of writings available to him, and his conception of Jewish living and thinking as having at least as much to do with eternity as with time is justified, of course, by the history of the Jews before the Enlightenment—though a similar weight of concern with the other world could be found in contemporaneous Christianity.

Many of the selections in *In Time and Eternity* are of the same order as those contained in that part of Lewis Browne's *The Wisdom of Israel* which covers the period, and in Louis Newman's large Talmudic and Hasidic anthologies. The special virtue of Dr. Glatzer's collec-

tion lies in his having occasionally stepped past the official display of pearls of wisdom to gather certain secular communications in which Israel's actual existence during those rigorous centuries is suggested. Thus we get the letter of Ibn Tibbon to his son on how to organize his studies and run his library, or the message of Maimonides to the Jews of Morocco. One of these descriptions, "The Debate on the Messiah at Tortosa" (published in COMMENTARY, September 1946), which shows Jewish theology in a desperate defensive action, is a small masterpiece. "And some of us rejoiced at the pope's words, and others were sad thereat—as is usual with Jews."

The documents on provocations, expulsions, and executions, in the section on "Suffering and Martyrdom," outline the general shape of the situation in which Jewish thinking was carried on in power- and dogma-ridden Europe. They begin with Josephus' account of the mass suicide of the Jews of Masada as a gesture of defiance and freedom against the conquering Romans, they recite tortures and exiles in century after century, and they conclude with the Testament of Alexander Süsskind of 18th-century Lithuania upon the obligation of every Jew to take upon himself "the potential surrender of life . . . with wholehearted joy."

Jewish thought was born and lived during those centuries in a state of siege, both physical and moral, and the gates could be opened but rarely. To dare to remain erect in that beleaguered world, the Jew had to assume a posture of more than usual moral rigidity. Powerless to hold back the flood of evil at his feet, he had to keep his eye fixed at a point above events, securing himself to the eternal by the strands of the Law. Desire, the Evil Nature, had to be beaten to nothingness within his mind and his community, lest the recognition of its reality and power should cause him to sink down in helplessness. For the universe was decisively out of balance, its entire metaphysical structure was sagging—on account of the Exile. Says the Zohar: "At the present time this door [of righteousness] remains unknown because Israel is in exile; and therefore all the doors are removed from them, so that they cannot know or commune; but when Israel will return from exile, all the supernal grades are destined to rest harmoniously on this one."

Suppressing "this world"—which was tainted by the absence of the Jews from the Land of the Fathers, an absence equivalent to Original

Sin in contaminating the Creation—became the supreme vocation of the Jews of the Diaspora. And the instruments of this suppression had to be those inherited and tested for generations, and perpetually refined and officially safeguarded. Some notion of what this meant for thinking may be drawn from the item "Not in Heaven" quoted from the Talmud. Rabbi Eliezer, disagreeing with the rest of the sages, brought "all the proof in the world" to support his argument, including, finally, a voice from heaven which declared that Eliezer was right. Yet Eliezer was overruled, and heaven with him. For since the Torah had been given on Mount Sinai, it was no longer for the divine to decide issues, but for the collectivity, the custodians of tradition. It is to the immortal glory of the rabbis, and a sign of their security, that he who had heaven on his side against them was not dispatched to the gallows, excommunicated, or even silenced, but that instead the Talmud was willing to teach that the opposition of one against all is possible, even if futile. Yet the firm moral of the story is that revelation had ceased long ago, that heaven itself could not open a new door, that the world had been left to the exegetists and commentators, and that community discipline was the highest law.

With heaven closed, tradition prevailed over originality, rationalism over revelation and intuition, salvation by good works over faith, the community over the individual, authority over freedom. It is only with the rise of Hasidism near the close of the period under consideration that the scholastic formula is breached.

MUCH as we may admire the steadfastness and moral dignity of the Jew produced by this authoritarian world-negating thought structure, we must face a fundamental question with respect to it: to what degree and on what level are we today really interested in the main body of post-Biblical Jewish ideas, with its unremitting moralizing, its image of man as a child doing good and bad deeds and being rewarded and punished for them, its overemphasis on the rights and awesomeness of parents, its teleology? "The more important a thing is for living creatures the more common and the cheaper it is. . . . This is a revelation of the mercy of God, blessed be He . . . etc., etc."

There is no doubt that the bulk of medieval literature generally is lacking in permanent meaning; and the state of intellectual affairs among the Jews of those centuries was not such

as to lead them to outstrip the rest of Europe. Their own personality they had, one very fascinating when seen from certain sides, but their ideas are not *necessarily* significant to us. "It must be remembered," says Dr. Glatzer, "that the ideas offered here have not lost their relevance with the passing of their time." But that these ideas are relevant is not something that can be "remembered": the relevance must be established. The fact that they were Jews is in itself no reason why "the reader of today should enter into a living relationship with the men who speak in these documents," nor is it a guarantee that with all the good will in the world the modern reader *can* enter into such a relationship with them. When typical Talmudic passages are given to us as thought (not as history), without a new perspective, the effect is frequently to revive the sense of boredom and constriction that Jews of this century invariably experienced in their early religious training. The surface of Jewish "time and eternity" since the Dispersion is for the most part the bleak steppe of a literature of conscience, of submission to precept, the father, the congregation.

Under these circumstances the problem of our relation to the past, and such a past, can no longer be solved in traditional Jewish fashion by declaring it a moral duty to become one with it. It would seem rather a matter of the creative discovery of what in it is *actually still alive*. In such an enterprise, an obscure phrase, an isolated insight, an unintentional stroke of fancy—like the beautiful detail about the flame of a candle quoted from the Zohar—is likely to show more vitality and unveil more about Jewish genius than a score of representative pages. A mind that has begun to yawn over Raba's assertion that "the final goal of wisdom is to turn to God and do good works," that has drowsed over repeated listings of the virtues, has gone to sleep over Maimonides' proof of moral design in the universe (which has no specific Jewish quality and can only represent to us a characteristic weakness of medieval speculation)—this mind, smothering in "typical" Jewish thinking, will awake with a start when Rabbi Tarfon lets fall the observation that "It is not incumbent upon you to complete the work, but neither are you free to withdraw from it"; or at the remark of the beggar in the *Massiyoth*, "No one despairs of goodness in the world save the dead"; or the account of Reb Susia whistling to amuse God because he loved

him and wanted to do something for him; or the Baal Shem's interpretation of "Cast me not off on the time of old age" to mean "Do not let my world grow old . . . that the world is new to us every morning—that is Your great faithfulness."

At these points a living Jewish face suddenly flashes through the mesh of traditional concepts. A heroic love of the real world calls to us from behind the muffling shroud of penitence and rectitude. It is where the concrete individual insight has risen above the pattern that we glimpse the direction in which a re-discovery of the Jewish mind and imagination is possible in the perspective of modern intellectual interest.

The extent to which Dr. Glatzer has hunted out the revealing at the expense of the merely typical is the measure of the superiority of his collection. That he has not done so more than once in a while is probably less the fault of his taste than of an undue mindfulness of the accepted notion that what Jews need most to be told about their fathers is that they were good men.

Yet the revival of Jewish culture in terms of our own lives requires, besides scholarship and devotion, the keenest and most sensitive acts of criticism as well as self-analysis, and the utmost intellectual daring of which we are capable.

The Native Fascist Threat

THE PLOTTERS. By JOHN ROY CARLSON.
New York, Dutton, 1946. 408 pp.
\$3.50.

Reviewed by WILLIAM PETERSEN

CARLSON's new book, like its predecessor, *Under Cover*, has climbed to the best-seller lists. That the problem of fascism here, in the United States, is presented in any form to so large an audience is certainly an advantage. And that it is presented so concretely, naming names and dates and places, is no less of an advantage. But one could hope that the only book many Americans will ever read on fascism was a better one. For though Carlson's energy as an investigator is boundless, his sense of historical perspective on fascism, as well as his accuracy, unfortunately leave much to be desired. . . .

In 1923 Hitler was called a crackpot; in

1933 he took power. That statement, which is the dominant theme of both of Carlson's books, is a historic fact of undeniable truth, in a certain setting—that of postwar Germany. During the fifteen years following its defeat in 1918, Germany was the scene of continual civil strife, sometimes simmering just beneath the surface, but periodically breaking out into street-fighting, nationwide general strikes, full-scale civil war. An inflation wiped out the middle class. The working class, split down the middle, spent its energy in internal struggle.

In 1943, when *Under Cover* appeared, the situation in the United States was by no means so desperate. But as long as the war continued, a possibility existed that this country would lose it and the German situation be duplicated. In 1946, however, Carlson is able to make *The Plotters* the "smashing exposé" his publishers advertise only by accepting our native fascist groups at their face value, and occasionally even inflating their exaggerated claims. He speaks, for example, of "a fascist international, the Western Hemisphere Committee Against Communism," whose only international aspect was the appearance at a Detroit meeting of the Canadian nationalist, Norman Jaques. Again: the "defeatist, anti-Administration . . . plans now in operation could influence more than 12,000,000 veterans. When the number of their parents, wives and other relatives is added to this, the figure reaches a formidable total." The link between the small organizations he describes and these large results is never given. Or again:

"Working according to a well-knit, long-range plan, a hierarchy of like-minded, like-souled, democracy-hating nationalists *can* bring about the conditions for the enthronement of extreme nationalism here. One may or may not prove the existence of the plot through an interception of documents. One may or may not learn of the technical details in the performance, transmitted by secret couriers. . . ."

"One may or may not"—but the point is that Carlson has not.

The Germans who called Hitler a crackpot in 1923 were not intrinsically wrong: Hitler was a crackpot, judged by the relative sanity of pre-1914 Europe. The people who called him that, however, did not merely fail to see the future, they failed equally to see the reality of the Germany before their eyes. Similarly, Carlson, when he discusses McWilliams, say, does so not against the background of America

in 1956 or even in 1946, but in the mood created by surgent Nazism of 1936-40.

Fascism has had its historic opportunity; will it have another? More specifically, is there an important trend in the United States toward fascism? Will we see an ever-expanding depression, street-fighting, general strikes from New York to San Francisco, civil war? Will the CIO, whose strength has not yet been tested, be wiped out? Nothing indicates the level of Carlson's books on American fascism better than the fact that he fails to ask this kind of question. Overwhelmed by the terrible reality of Hitler, which for him has not become less real either by Hitler's death or by the crumbling of the Third Reich, he pole-vaults the little American Hitlers into power in one jump. McWilliams is in any case important, but his importance is of a different order if the American scene is, or looks to be, ripe for him.

IF THIS country is indeed fated to go through a social debilitation and paroxysm such as that which produced Hitler in Germany, the long-range analyst must examine not merely the handful who today seek an out in fascism, but the large section of the population that will be pushed toward that "solution" by war and depression, by fear and hopelessness. How does Carlson see that larger group, and the danger of its turning to fascism?

"The word 'nationalism' can mean patriotic devotion to one's country," he writes, "and among decent, democratic Americans it still does. But America's hate-mongers and saboteurs of democracy call themselves 'nationalist' to deceive the unwary. Throughout the book I use the word in both senses, depending on the type of group or individual discussed."

Carlson here seems oblivious to various clear intimations in his own book that, under pressure, the difference between "nationalist" and nationalist, "patriot" and patriot, will tend to disappear.

Thus, Moseley is described as "an intimate friend" of Talmadge; he wants to be "in the same camp" with McWilliams; he thinks Gerald L. K. Smith "a very capable man" with "great ability." Yet Carlson remarks that he "meant well, but he was a dupe of Nazi and Nationalist propaganda." For he is, after all, General George Van Horn Moseley, United States Army, Retired! And take the case of Captain Frank S. Flynn, a small-time fascist

leader in Washington, D. C. "I did not mention him in my former book, disliking to report on a man of his professed heroism in the First World War. But . . ." Carlson seems unaware that between the lunatic fringe and many perfectly respectable nationalists there can be common ground.

If fascism is to come to power in America, not merely Moseley and Flynn, but hundreds of Army officers, who are today good conservative American patriots and only mildly anti-Semitic, will be involved. If America is to go fascist, the Leader is likely to be thoroughly American in background and attitude. He will attack certain American institutions, but he will also exploit the inbred acceptance of others to gain adherents. He may well be a patriot (without quotation marks) for whom the army is sacrosanct, and its weapons. America, the land of opportunity, the land of freedom, will be his rallying cry. But Carlson, who to my mind exaggerates the immediacy of the fascist threat in the United States, would be the first to deny that there is, deep in American folk mores, what may be called a "pre-fascist" tradition. A serious opponent of fascism must not fail to see and call our attention to the fundamental attitudes that fascism has exploited in every country where it has taken power.

And what kind of program of counteraction does Carlson suggest? "As an individual American one can: (1) Join a democratic group. . . (2) Express oneself vigorously in speaking and writing. . . (3) Broaden one's horizon. . . (4) Oppose discrimination. . . (5) Fight greed. . ." Hitler would not have needed ten years to take power if all he had against him was vigorous speech and broadened horizons. In Germany any program that did not include rifles was obsolete from 1918 on, but if we judge by Carlson's cries of alarm rather than his program of action, we find ourselves perhaps in 1928 on a comparable timetable.

CARLSON'S superficiality of approach can also be discerned in his indiscriminate attack on all those who did not support the war. Opponents of the late war may be divided into three quite separate groups—those who supported Nazi Germany (or until June 21, 1941, Soviet Russia); those who opposed, on principle, any war; and those who did not think it was possible to fight race hatred with a Jim Crow army, or fight totalitarianism in alliance with the Soviet

Union. Whether any or none of these positions was correct is not here relevant; they were different, and cannot be lumped together without distortion. Carlson writes, for example:

"Peace Now . . . became a repository for the same verminous elements which had flooded the America First Committee. Its branch offices in the East began to distribute Representative Jeannette Rankin's writings, as well as hate-inciting 'educational literature' by others greatly admired by the nationalists."

Jeannette Rankin, a life-long pacifist, a courageous and gentle woman, is not called either verminous or hate-inciting, but no one reading the passage with only ordinary care would fail to get the impression that she is both. John T. Flynn, a one-time leader of the American First Committee, an anti-New Dealer, is mentioned eleven times in the book. He is never once called a fascist or anti-Semitic, but eleven different times, by innuendo and half-truth, he is linked to people who are. Carlson not only fails to mention that he wrote a book, *As We Go Marching*, to expose and fight fascism; he says specifically that "in Flynn's writings one finds little criticism of the Japs and their lengthy preparations for Pearl Harbor, of Hitler's aggressions, or of the Hitler-Tojo pact."

IN VIEW of the present sharp conflict of national interests between the United States and Russia, one might expect Carlson to devote a good deal of his energy to investigating the activities of American Communists. But here his nationalism (without quotation marks) begins to falter. Of the various Communist veteran fronts, only one is so labeled—the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America, but this is so openly Communist that the Communist party, Harlem branch of the party, and Abraham Lincoln Brigade all had advertisements in its conference booklet. Neither the Veterans Division of the Independent Citizens Committee nor the Veterans Committee of the New York CIO Council is mentioned, although at the time Carlson was writing his book, Communist influence was sufficient to be dangerous in both of these outfits.

Nor has "the sixth sense which most investigators develop" helped Carlson uncover the Communist influence in the larger veteran organizations. He says that the first choice of the Communist party was the American Legion. "It's doubtful, however, that the Communists can bore from within successfully. Federal

agents are on the job like watchdogs." He does not mention the fact that the Communist party also has a strong faction in the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He does not tell us that in February 1946 there was a closed Communist party meeting at Manhattan Center, New York, which was attended by some 3,500 veterans, and that it was there decided to go into the American Veterans Committee, too. Carlson's account minimizes Communist influence in AVC. In general, he says "American Communists make claims as lavishly as they make promises"; it is necessary to depreciate their statements because of their "strategy of boastfulness." On the other hand, he singles out for special recommendation the indubitably anti-Communist Veterans for Better Government.

Carlson is no more a Communist than, say, some of the editors of *PM*. That is to say, at one time he was definitely pro-Communist: in 1935, he was associated with a pro-Soviet journal, *The Armenian Spectator*; in 1936, an article under his original name, Derounian, appeared in *Soviet Russia Today*. Since then, his ardor has cooled, but he regards fascism as so much the main danger that he is now willing to overlook certain Communist peccadillos. The anachronism of this attitude, it seems to me, becomes more obvious with each country absorbed into the Russian orbit, but it is none the less a legitimate point of view. My objection is rather that Carlson does not state it frankly. My objection is that he says, "I have always strongly expressed my opposition to Communism." My objection is that he says he wrote this book "primarily to expose the methods, appeals and objectives of fanatical extremists of the Right and Left and of their fellow travelers" in their effort "to capture postwar America's most precious prize: the mind of the veteran." Concerning his exposé of the Left, one might quote Carlson himself on another reporter: "one could have gotten this 'evidence' merely by reading the *Daily Worker* at five cents a day."

Carlson's deep concern with the fascist groups' vicious campaigns against Jews, Negroes, Catholics, and other minorities is the best aspect of his book, and his insistence that Jew-baiters and Negro-baiters be aggressively fought is in the right direction. A most effective weapon here, however, would be accurate information about them. There are a dozen agencies in New York that have collected large

files on American fascists. One of these could perform a real service by publishing a sort of *Who's Who Among the Totalitarians*, including Communists, and listing persons and organizations alphabetically.

Such a book should be as sober as Carlson's books are "sensational." It should be scrupulously accurate. It should be as well written as Carlson's books are badly written. It should, above all, be based on more than fervor, no matter how well intentioned. It should be edited by people who have a greater knowledge and understanding of world fascism and Communism than the "on-the-spot" investigator Carlson has so far evidenced.

The Salve of Self-Pity

THE SPIRIT RETURNETH. By SELMA STERN. Translated by LUDWIG LEWISOHN. Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946. 265 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by HAROLD KAPLAN

THIS historical novel, by a German historian now in this country, deals with the massacres of German Jews in the 14th century, and is an effort to put the past and the present in a juxtaposition shedding clarity on both. Unfortunately, the attempts fails—especially as a novel. Issues and characters are drawn in sharp black and white; understanding and sympathy are frightened away by the author's unrestrained emotional treatment. Whatever trust we can place in Miss Stern's understanding of the historical background is weakened by her book's romantic simplicity and dense religious revivalism.

The story deals, in thinly related episodes, with a series of pogroms that swept the Rhine towns of Germany during the years of the Black Death. The massacre of the Jews is causally related to the superstitious fears of the townspeople in the face of the plague. Their terror is brought to its climax by rumors of a new plot of the Jews against Christendom. At the same time, the Jews play a part in the class struggle between trade-guild workmen and the ruling aristocracy of the cities. Aroused by the confessions tortured from individual Jews and by demagogic appeals of guild leaders and religious fanatics, the masses burn and kill in one ghetto after another.

The romanticism of the Jew who writes and reads in the vein of Selma Stern is of a particularly self-protective kind that comforts but does not cure. Every tragedy finds relief in a universal extension, and in this book the chain of previous suffering and exile is used to create a final reassurance. Miss Stern's book imitates the style and mood of the Bible, and also the atmosphere of the *Beth Hamedrash*, presenting the concept of a unique historical and religious mission for the Jews. The comfort offered here is that of the prophecies and lamentations of the Bible, which regard exile, suffering, and death as the Jews' particular service to humanity. Since God takes the responsibility for their suffering, and since God cannot be blamed, the necessary consequence is a mystical consecration of Jewish martyrdom: throughout history the Jews must provide a series of blood sacrifices in order to make God's purposes clear, and fulfill them.

Another thread that runs through this novel is the legend of Esau, of Edom, the eternal enemy of Israel. Esau, the disinherited, will seek Jacob out to destroy him, and Jacob must flee or meet him trembling—and so the Bible never leaves us, and we relive its inevitable and rigorous patterns. The breach between the Jews and the rest of the world is confirmed, eternal enmity between the Chosen People and the Gentile is justified, and, by implication, we retreat gladly into the ghetto and await the next attack.

Fundamentalist Judaism of this type asks the Jews to accept isolation and martyrdom. As a religious justification, it takes away the impulse toward corrective social programs in which Jew and Gentile meet on a non-religious level. Remedies, cures, the break in the historical pattern—these are actually resisted unless they come as part of the machinery of revelation. Considered in this way, the spirit of Miss Stern's book should arouse antagonism in those readers who would personally like to be committed to more mundane agencies of restoration in the world.

Perhaps this novel belongs in the category of romantic and edifying tales for children, for its tone is that of the Sunday school, and we hear echoes of our childish understanding of the stories of Esther and the Maccabees. One is reminded of the monotony of some Jewish songs and liturgy, where all the scales of life have run down to one, and the resulting tones are morbid, self-pitying, and weak.

The Economics of Palestine

THE PALESTINE YEAR BOOK. New York, The Zionist Organization of America, 5707-1946. 658 pp. \$3.75.

Reviewed by ALVIN JOHNSON

THIS is an uncommonly interesting year book. Instead of the usual compilation of facts assembled by a routine staff, without warmth or light, we have here a series of articles prepared by distinguished scholars and leaders of the Zionists, together with the year's important political documents relating to Palestine. The writers and editors have had the good sense to let the situation speak for itself. Only in rare instances do they yield to their burning indignation over the inhumanity of British policy.

It is good to have this general material readily available, although it adds little to what we all know. We all know that two of the most uncompromising forces in the world are struggling with locked horns over Palestine: British imperialism and Zionism. British policy is solidly planted on the principle that Palestine belongs to the local Arab population, and no concessions can be made to the Jews except by consent of the Arabs. The Zionists stand squarely on the Balfour Declaration, justified, they feel, by the failure of the British government through many years to repudiate their interpretation. Their position is that the "homeland in Palestine" means a Jewish national state including the whole of Palestine. Neither side is willing, at this writing, to publicly offer any compromise.

Everything that can be said in support of either the British or the Zionist position has been said so often that any comment here would be waste of time and space.

What is most interesting in the Yearbook are the chapters bearing upon social and economic conditions in Palestine and in the surrounding Arab world. We are presented with a picture of Arab life within Palestine, and in Iraq and Syria. It is everywhere essentially a tribal life, with nothing to correspond with Western conceptions of organic nationalism. The fellaheen do not participate in political activity as individuals, but only as agglutinations of endogamous groups. The small minority of landowners, officials, and intellectuals may talk in terms of political parties, national sovereignty. It is only talk. British policy insists on Arab consent to the immigration of Jews and their

acquisition of land. There is no Arab organ that can give or withhold consent except the autocrats of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Syria, who have a voice only by British imperialist courtesy.

The Arab communities of Palestine are pre-eminently rural. By hard work and abstemiousness they manage to get a meager living out of the soil. The men may indeed supplement their income by jobs on construction, transportation, or in the factories. The women remain at home, bearing children. The Palestinian Arabs have the highest birth rate in the world, fifty per thousand of the population. Their death rate is high, sixteen to nineteen per thousand. But the net increase is such that the non-Jewish population, mostly Moslem, now 1,256,000, will be 2,500,000 in twenty years, and 5,000,000 in forty years. While we debate endlessly the immigration of 100,000 Jews, the Arab population increases 4,000 a month. What are the prospects of the Jews establishing and maintaining a majority? At best, their natural increase is equal to one-half that of the Arabs.

How large a population can the land of Palestine support? The Yearbook presents an excellent brief account of the project for a Jordan River Authority and accepts the conclusion that the full utilization of the Jordan valley and adjacent drainage areas for reclamation and power will provide farms, industry, and security for at least 4,000,000 Jewish refugees in addition to the 1,800,000 Arabs and Jews already in Palestine and Transjordan.

One who has followed reclamation experience knows that only a city-bred optimist could expect a Jordan Valley Authority to work its magic in less than forty years. But at the end of forty years there will be 5,000,000 Arabs, even if there were no Arab immigration from Syria and Iraq.

All economic forecasts are suspect, but the worst forecasts available are those pertaining to Palestinian agriculture and its capacity for sustaining population. Robert Nathan and his associates take the agricultural population as a coefficient of the total potential population. In advanced economies, if 15 per cent of the total employed are engaged in agriculture, the needs of the general population can be adequately supplied. Taking 15 per cent as a coefficient, a huge population can be maintained in Palestine if all land capable of irrigation is reclaimed.

But such a calculation has no relation to

reality. In a vast and diversified area like the United States, 15 per cent of the working population, with abundant land and mechanical equipment, can supply the population with all the food and fiber it needs. In Java 85 per cent of the workers, engaged in agriculture, barely succeed in supplying the other 15 per cent. Palestinian agriculture is weak in the production of staple foods. It can produce marvelous citrus fruits. It could produce superb winter vegetables. But these are speculations on the West European markets.

A Jordan Valley Authority could indeed open up 750,000 acres of productive land. The engineers calculate that the cost could be covered by a water rate of \$29 an acre annually. No staple crop can pay such a water rate, and luxury products lean precariously on the world markets.

It is wiser to base all calculations of potential population capacity on industrial possibilities. Palestinian industry expanded rapidly in the war years, supplying the British armies in the Near East. It has made its readjustment to peacetime conditions, and there is no problem of unemployment among either the Jews or the Arabs. There is no assignable limit to the further expansion of industry. As compared with Western industrial countries Palestine is at a disadvantage in respect to cost of raw materials, fuel, power, and transportation. These disadvantages can be compensated by the development of a higher order of skill, superior salesmanship, and lower wages. And with the

expansion of the industrial population, markets can be found for an increasing population in fruit and truck gardening, which alone can afford the high cost of land and irrigation.

Only the incorrigibly rational will try seriously to puzzle out the actual economic status of the Zionist program. In every Palestinian economic equation there are undefinable factors of religion and politics. We are told that the average price of farm land is twenty-nine Palestine pounds per dunam. As the pound now stands at an inflated value, we may reduce the twenty-nine pounds to \$75.

This means \$300 an acre. No ordinary agriculture will carry such a land value, but Palestinian agriculture does not need to carry it. Jews abroad supply the purchase money with no expectation of any return on it. So, also, the Jewish farmers in Palestine make only the barest living. But they take as the major part of their reward the privilege of delving in the sacred soil of Palestine.

So long as the struggle with the British and the Arabs continues, the Jews of Palestine can count on the support of non-economic forces. But once a *modus vivendi* has been attained, will money from abroad continue to pour in? Will industrial workers and farmers be content with a low standard of living? For any other contingent of the world population the answer would be in the negative. But no one will wisely forecast the behavior of such a group as the Zionists, whose religious and national faith has burned deeply into their being.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

DIANA TRILLING reviews fiction for the *Nation*, *COMMENTARY*, and other periodicals.

HAROLD ROSENBERG, poet and critic, wrote "Pledged to the Marvelous," in the February *COMMENTARY*.

WILLIAM PETERSEN has long been active in the defense of civil and labor rights. He spent

four years in the army, and is now a student at the New School.

HAROLD KAPLAN is an instructor of English at Rutgers University. His story "My Father and Mr. Preston" appeared in the December 1946 *COMMENTARY*.

ALVIN JOHNSON is president emeritus of the New School.

CURRENT BOOKS ON JEWISH SUBJECTS

- ANTI-SEMITISM: A SOCIAL DISEASE.** Edited by ERNST SIMMEL. New York, International Universities Press, 1946. 140 pp. \$2.50.
A collection of papers by psychoanalysts and social scientists.
- A WORLD IN RUINS.** By HERMANN SCHWAB. London, Goldston, 1946. 308 pp. 12s. 6d.
The history, life and work of German Jewry.
- BANNER OF JERUSALEM.** By JACOB B. AGUS. New York, Bloch, 1946. 240 pp. \$3.00.
A biography of Abraham Isaac Kuk, who was Chief Rabbi of Palestine after World War I.
- BRUCKNER, MAHLER, SCHOENBERG.** By DIKA NEWLIN. King's Crown Press, New York, 1947. 293 pp. \$3.50.
An analysis of the music of the three composers.
- THE CHALLENGE OF HATE.** By A. R. LERNER and HERBERT POSTER. New York, F.F.F. Publishers, 1947. 96 pp. \$1.00.
Photographs and text on the fight against bigotry. With an introduction by Norman Corwin.
- ECCLESIASTES.** With an essay by IRWIN EDMAN. New York, Odyssey Press, 1946. 58 pp. \$2.50.
- EINSTEIN: HIS LIFE AND TIMES.** By PHILIPP FRANK. Translated by George Rosen; edited and revised by Shuichi Kusaka. New York, Knopf, 1947. 310 pp. \$4.50.
A biography of the scientist by the well-known philosopher of science who succeeded Einstein at the University of Prague.
- FABRIC OF MY LIFE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HANNAH G. SOLOMON.** New York, Bloch, 1946. 263 pp. \$2.50.
Recollections by the organizer of the Jewish Women's Congress and founder of the National Council of Jewish Women.
- HAPPINESS FOR SALE: STORIES OF JEWISH LIFE.** By MRS. DOROTHY ALOFISIN. New York, Bloch, 1946. 175 pp. \$2.00.
Short stories for children 11-14.
- HEINE: A BIOGRAPHY.** By FRANÇOIS FEJTO. London, Wingate, 1947. 301 pp. 18s.
- HERE'S A GOOD ONE; STORIES OF JEWISH WIT AND WISDOM.** By FELIX S. MENDELSON. With a preface by Dr. A. A. Brill. New York, Bloch, 1947. 270 pp. \$3.00.
- ISRAEL: ITS LIFE AND CULTURE.** By J. P. E. PEDERSEN. Oxford, 1946. Volumes 3 and 4. 21s 6d.
- JACOB'S DREAM; A PROLOGUE.** By RICHARD BEER-HOFMANN. Translated from the German by Ida Bension Wynn. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 5707-1946. 188 pp.
Intended as a prelude to the trilogy, The Story of King David, of which only the first play was published.
- THE JEW OF TARSUS.** By HUGH J. SCHONFELD. London, MacDonald, 1946. 255 pp. 10s 6d.
- THE JEWISH WAY OF LIFE.** By DAVID ARONSON. New York, National Academy of Adult Jewish Studies, 1946. 191 pp. \$2.50.
- THE LIFE OF JUDAH TOURO (1775-1854).** By LEON HUHNER. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946. 192 pp.
The biography of a New Orleans Jew of the last century.
- OUTLINES OF JUDAISM.** By SAMUEL PRICE. New York, Bloch, 1946. 235 pp. \$2.75.
"A manual of the beliefs, ceremonies, ethics and practices of the Jewish people."
- PATH OF LIFE.** By SAMUEL A. RUBIN. New York, Bloch, 1946. 260 pp. \$3.25.
Case histories presented by the presiding judge of the Jewish-American Board of Peace and Justice.
- PALESTINE'S ECONOMIC FUTURE: A PREVIEW OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS.** Edited by JOSEPH BURTON HOBMAN. With a message from Field Marshal Smuts. New York, W. S. Heinman, 1946. 310 pp. \$5.00.
A symposium, by Palestinian experts and other economists, on agricultural and industrial progress in Palestine. Published on behalf of the Children and Youth Aliyah Committee for Great Britain.
- PALESTINE: A STUDY OF JEWISH, ARAB AND BRITISH POLICIES.** Published by the Esco Foundation for Palestine. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947. Two volumes. \$12.00.
- PALESTINE THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA.** By M. F. ABCARIUS. London, Hutchinson, 1946. 240 pp. 12s 6d.
An Arab view.
- SPINOZA: PORTRAIT OF A SPIRITUAL HERO.** By RUDOLF KAYSER. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946. 326 pp. \$3.75.
- STOLEN WATERS ARE SWEET.** By THERESA ABELES ROSENBERG. New York, William Frederick Press, 1946. 119 pp. \$2.50.
Dorothy, who was brought up in a strictly orthodox Jewish home, by her religious faith saves her husband from a fatal infatuation.
- STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW.** By DAVID DAUBE. Cambridge University Press, 1946. 328 pp. 21s.